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ABSTRACT 
 
          I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how 
the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection 
of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in 
the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental 
story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on 
individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate 
underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a 
clearer understanding of his philosophy. 
          I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s 
middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical 
terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the 
concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of 
his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes 
substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” 
atoms.  
          I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct 
confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter 
and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 
iv 
 
2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de 
Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ 
individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate 
a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology 
(1714). 
          My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, 
claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental 
positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general 
continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what 
makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence 
with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle 
period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, 
space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz 
really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. 
While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient 
proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader 
framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and 
the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies. 
          Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the 
correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas 
Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly 
constant point of his philosophy. 
 
1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
          The scope of this study goes from Leibnizian philosophy in itself to its intellectual context 
in the Seventeenth-century, to the living philosophical debate between Leibniz and his 
contemporaries, from Jakob Thomasius and Antoine Arnauld to Christiaan Huygens and 
Nicholas Hartsoeker. Throughout this study, I contrast Leibniz’s views in the published works 
with the views he exposed to his correspondents, as well as the opinions he chose not to make 
public and keep in manuscript form.  
          My approach distinguishes itself from similar work on the early and mature Leibniz by 
indicating the discontinuities in Leibniz’s thought. This goes against a continuist view of 
Leibniz’s philosophy that has increasingly shaped Leibnizian studies for more than a century 
now and, quite remarkably, has continued to do so over the past few decades. There are several 
examples of this in secondary literature. Thus, in his 1990’s trilogy on early Leibniz’s 
philosophy, Konrad Moll adopts a systematic and continuist view of the German philosopher’s 
intellectual evolution: “In the course of the year 1671, the major lines of [Leibniz’s] system were 
already securely in place.”1 The result, according to Moll, is that, from very early on, Leibniz 
develops a conception of spiritual points that will come to be known as the “monads” of his late 
                                                 
1
 According to Moll (1996), the decisive turn towards Leibniz’s mature metaphysics was represented by 
“the adoption of, and […] heterodox interpretation of Thomas Hobbes’ concept of conatus […] in the 
early summer of 1670.” In Der junge Leibniz III: Eine Wissenschaft für ein aufgeklärtes Europa: Der 
Weltmechanismus dynamischer Monadenpunkte als Gegenentwurf zu den Lehren von Descartes und 
Hobbes, 257. 
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years.
2
 The last claim is symptomatic of a way of doing history of philosophy that blatantly 
ignores the historical evolution of a philosopher’s thought, the shifts and turns his opinions might 
have taken throughout his career. It also exhibits a specific type of retrospective hermeneutical 
interpretation that thrives upon reading late texts into earlier ones. To put this in the words of a 
more recent commentator: young Leibniz “[…] was already inching his way toward the theory of 
monads of his mature metaphysics.”3 The continuist thesis implies that the foundations of 
Leibniz’s mature theories (substance, complete concepts, monads, etc.) were laid surprisingly 
early and that the basic features of his philosophy only underwent inconsequential changes 
before they naturally emerged from them. Another Leibniz scholar seems to hold the idea that 
most of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics was established prior to his stay in Paris in 1672: “Upon 
leaving Paris [in 1676], the only one of his prominent mature doctrines that has not yet evolved 
is his account of truth.”4 
          My work here aims to contribute to the considerable progress made in recent decades in 
returning Leibnizian texts to their intellectual and historical context, by dispelling a handful of 
misconceptions, redressing remaining imbalances between Leibniz’s early and mature work, and 
working out the ways in which a couple of aspects of his thought, individuation and the rejection 
of atomism, evolved together. 
       
 
 
                                                 
2
 For a review of the German secondary literature sharing this continuist view, see Goldenbaum, 
“Transubstantiation, Physics and Philosophy,” in Brown 1999, 78-81.  
 
3
 Antognazza 2009, 113. 
 
4
 Mercer 2001, 386. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN LEIBNIZ’S FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1663-1686)
5
 
 
          In his Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (2011), Daniel Garber works through, in great 
detail, the twists and turns in Leibniz’s thought, from his early idiosyncratic Hobbesian views, to 
those he developed in his middle years, and ultimately to the later Monadology. Garber 
reconstructs Leibniz’s concerns, almost day-by-day, and the modifications he makes to his 
views, as he delves into issues about body, motion, and force within diverse philosophical, 
physical, metaphysical, mathematical, and theological contexts. This, of course, constitutes a 
concrete repudiation of the kind of history of philosophy, such as Benson Mates’ study of 
Leibniz that strives to produce a “syncretic” picture of the thinker’s thoughts. In The Philosophy 
of Leibniz (1986), Mates asserts that “Leibniz did change his mind on many topics, as would be 
expected. Indeed, he himself tells us about some of these changes, mostly having to do with his 
views on matters of physical science.” However, Mates continues: “But on the fundamental 
points of his philosophy, his constancy over the years is little short of astonishing. From the first 
of his publications, at age seventeen, to the end of his life he never wavered in holding to the 
rather unusual and implausible doctrine that things are individuated by their ‘whole being’; that 
is, every property of a thing is essential to its identity.” Mates concludes: “Consequently, in this 
account of the elements of Leibnizian philosophy I have felt free, on the whole to cite him 
                                                 
5
 A slightly different version of this chapter was published as “The Individual in Leibniz’s Philosophy 
1663-1686,” (co-authored with Roger Ariew), in Nita 2015, 11-25. 
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without paying much attention to the date of the passage cited.”6 I wish to emulate Garber’s 
method in tracing Leibniz’s views about individuation, his twists and turns, his 180 degree shifts, 
over a host of disparate theses; but I also wish to limit my story to the period of Leibniz’s early 
to middle years, from his 1663 (deeply Scholastic) bachelor’s thesis, Disputatio Metaphysica de 
Principio Individui, to his more mature work, Discours de Métaphysique (1686); in the process 
we will also discuss his views of individuation in a number of his other essays, including the  De 
Transsubstantiatione (1668), Confessio philosophi (1672-1673), and  Meditatio de Principio 
Individui (1676).  
           By tracing this puzzling and intricate path, I argue that, in the Discourse on Metaphysics 
(1686), Leibniz accounts for individuation by bringing together three traditionally distinct and 
conflicting strategies. His first strategy is to reinterpret the Thomist principle of individuation for 
immaterial substances as holding for all substances. Individual substances are each their own 
kind or specifically different, exactly like Thomas Aquinas’ angels. For the second strategy, that 
of the Scotists, Leibniz transforms haecceities in qualitative internal properties, even though 
before he had made them into external space-time circumstances (Confessio philosophi 1672-
1673). The last strategy is individuating substances through complete concepts or the multitude 
of their internal properties. The relational, spatio-temporal aspect of individuation is now 
internalized in Leibniz’s theory of complete concepts. 
           Thus, I prove that by the end of his middle period, Leibniz weaves together three disparate 
notions about individuation over which, earlier on, his opinion had twisted, turned or even 
shifted entirely: Thomas’ last species, a Scotist haecceity, and the complete concept view of 
substance. I show that Mates’ continuist view of Leibniz’s philosophical evolution is false. One 
cannot see how, even if we ad absurdum presuppose a continuity thesis for Leibniz’s entire 
                                                 
6
 Mates 1986, 7-8.  
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thought, this claim would be anything other than completely ungrounded. There is no proof 
Mates offers on whether the first thesis (individuals are individuated by their whole entity) 
necessarily implies the second thesis he mentions (every property of an individual is essential to 
his identity) – just as there is no passage in the Disputatio de principio individui (1663) which 
would back up this claim. The mending together of these two theses is specific for a completely 
unhistorical understanding of Leibniz’s thought. Moreover, there is another reason such a 
comprehensive and detailed defense of one of his versions of the principle of individuation is 
nowhere else to be found in Leibniz’s work. After the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), in texts 
like the Principles of Nature and Grace and the Monadology, there is a change of terminology: 
Leibniz abandons the language of individuation (individual substances) in favor of a language of 
unity and simplicity (simple and truly one substances).
7
 This textual and genetic fact does not 
only forbid the retrospective projection of the monadological thesis in the Discourse, but also the 
overlapping of the determinations of individual substance in the doctrine of monads. 
           It would be unusual, of course, if Leibniz could change his views on matters of physical 
science and remain constant on the fundamental points of his philosophy. If, Leibniz’s views 
change with respect to body and substance, one would also expect changes with respect to 
individuation. And, in fact, not only does he offer a complex response to the problem of what 
makes up individuals, but his solution changes a number of times throughout his career, 
involving a unique combination or reinterpretation of components from the history of 
philosophical thinking about individuation. 
 Let me start with the endpoint, that is, the notion of individuation Leibniz marshals in the 
Discourse. As Leibniz says there, God chooses the perfect world, one made up of individuals 
                                                 
7
 I will return to this significant change in Leibniz’s ontology in the last chapter, thus completing the 
circle. 
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with actions and passions, given that actions and passions properly belong to individual 
substances—actiones sunt suppositorum (DM § 8). What God creates are subjects, that is, 
individuals, like Alexander, whose individual notion or haecceity, God sees. And what God sees 
in this individual notion or haecceity is “the basis and reason for all the predicates that can be 
said truly of him, for example, that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (and 
not by experience) whether he died a natural death or whether he was poisoned, something we 
can know only through history” (DM § 8). Among the “notable paradoxes that follow,” as 
Leibniz calls the propositions to which he is committed, are the claims that “every substance is 
like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe” (DM § 9) and that no 
two substances can resemble each other completely and differ only in number—solo numero. 
Given that two substances cannot differ only in number, Leibniz formulates his positive view as: 
“what Saint Thomas asserts on this point about angels or intelligences (that here every individual 
is a lowest species [quod ibi omne individuum sit species infima])
8
 is true of all substances” (DM 
§ 9). Thus, in the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz weaves together three disparate notions – at 
least in provenance – about individuation: Thomas’ species infima, a Scotist haecceity, and the 
complete concept view of substance. These entail the thesis of the identity of indiscernibles.
9
 The 
seemingly disparate notions can be found together elsewhere in Leibniz’s writings in the 1680s.10  
 I should emphasize two points about the three elements concerning individuation, which, 
for Leibniz in the 1680s, entail the identity of indiscernibles. The first is that Seventeenth-
century Scholastics usually distinguished the three from one another. For example, in his 
Metaphysics, Scipion Dupleix (1610) discusses three main opinions about the principle of 
                                                 
8
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, art. 4.  
 
9
 Mature Leibniz will not be as positive about these Scholastic remnants. See Chapter IV.  
 
10
 Notationes Generales (Summer 1683-1685?), A VI.4, 553. I analyze this passage in the last chapter. 
7 
 
individuation, that of the Thomists, with their signate or quantified matter, of the Scotists with 
their haecceity, and of another group which he does not identify with anyone in particular. He 
grants that the Thomists have the authority of Aristotle behind them, but argues that quantity 
cannot reveal “the proximate and true formal cause of the individuality and unity of the essence 
of singular things,” since quantity is always an accident and accidents do not operate at the level 
of essences.
11
 Dupleix’s preferred position is the general Scotist position that “in order to 
establish the individual essence of Socrates, Alexander, Scipion, and other singular persons, we 
must necessarily add for each one of them an individual and singular essential difference which 
is so proper and so peculiar to each of them for themselves, that it makes each of them differ 
essentially from all the others.”12 His third, anonymous group consists of those who base the 
principle of individuation on the “multitude of accidents,” given that this multitude “is never 
found together in any other subject.”13 Dupleix (1610) has no problem rejecting this opinion 
using the same argument he used against the Thomists: accidents cannot be the principles of the 
essential constitution of substances.
14
 So Dupleix (1610) distinguishes the Scotist position he 
favors from both the Thomist and the third (this latter position can be considered as a forerunner 
                                                 
 
11
 Scipion Dupleix, La Metaphysique, 233. 
 
12
 Dupleix, La Metaphysique, 235. 
 
13
 Dupleix, La Metaphysique, 232. 
 
14
 René de Ceriziers similarly refers to two groups: 1) those who accept “a real difference that determines 
the thing’s particular nature, in the way Rational restricts animal to the species of man,” presumably the 
Scotists, and 2) those who “think that the principle of individuation is nothing more than the concourse 
and multitude of the accidents that befall the substantial being of the individual” (De Cerisiers, Le 
Philosophe Français 3, 31). De Ceriziers rejects both of these principles of individuation. Théophraste 
Bouju also gives a similar argument, but from a Thomist perspective, against those who hold that 
something is singular by its essence and by its accidents all together, which, he claims, would be not 
different from the Scotist view that the thing is individuated by its essence alone. Bouju asserts: “The 
singularity of the thing would be distinguished only rationally from the whole thing, which would amount 
to things being neither universal nor singular by themselves, but through the consideration of the 
understanding” (Bouju, Corps de toute la philosophie, 237). 
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of Leibniz’s complete concept, in which the principle of individuation is nothing more than the 
multitude of the accidents that befalls the individual). Dupleix (1610) rejects these two 
alternatives because he thinks that quantity and quality cannot provide the basis for the 
individuality and unity of singular things, since they are accidents and accidents do not operate at 
the level of essences. 
 The second point is that the views represented by Leibniz’s three notions were rejected by 
him in his 1663 thesis, two of them explicitly and one implicitly; implicitly also, he did not 
subscribe to the identity of indiscernibles at the time. Leibniz’s 1663 Metaphysical Disputation 
was a youthful Scholastic exercise.
15
 It begins with a preface written by Jakob Thomasius, 
Leibniz’s professor at Leipzig, which shapes the thesis. The preface provides a guide to the 
underlying conceptual framework and strategic aim of his student’s dispute.  
With an expeditious gesture, Thomasius dismisses the controversial problem of 
individuation as being “more subtle than necessary,” while the thesis which his student will 
defend (the individual being individuated by its whole entity) is characterized as “the most 
simple and true,” set to avoid many thorny difficulties.16 Moreover the preface advances the 
Nominalist tota entitate principle as the most exemplary treatment of the problem, a thesis 
notably maintained by Francisco Suárez in his Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597). For 
Thomasius, ancient Greek philosophy can be divided into four sects, sharing an essentially pagan 
component. In attempting to explain finitude and the origin of evil, Platonists, Aristotelians, 
                                                 
 
15
 The full title is Disputatio Metaphysica/ De/ Principio Individvi,/ Quam/ Deo O. M. Annuente/ Et/ 
Indultu Inclytæ Philosoph. Facultatis/ In Illustri Academiâ Lipsiensi/ Præside/ Viro Excellentissimo et 
Clarissimo/ Dn. M. Jacobo Thomasio/ Eloqvent. P. P. Min. Princ. Colleg./ Collegiato/ Præceptore et 
Fautore suo Maximo/ Publicè ventilandam proponit/ Gottfredus Guilielmus/ Leibnuzius,/ Lips. Philos. et 
B. A. Baccal./ Aut. et Resp./ 30. Maji Anni MDCLXIII. As one can see, Thomasius is given “top billing” 
(in the largest font); Leibniz’s name comes in second (and in smaller font). For more on the relations 
between Thomasius and Leibniz, see Mercer (2002).     
16
 A VI.1, 8. 
9 
 
Zenonists, and Epicurians, all resort to the same dualistic, “manichaeist” program according to 
which ex nihilo nihil fit and thus posit matter as a second metaphysical principle, alongside God, 
uncreated and coeternal with him.
17
 According to this historical reconstruction, the Aristotelian-
Thomistic idea of individuation through signate matter originates within this ontological setting 
and is thus unsatisfactory from the point of view of a Christian philosophy. Thomasius argues 
that since the Thomistic individuation thesis limits itself to corporeal substances, Scotus’ 
haecceity should be favored as the more general solution to the problem of individuation.
18
 As 
Thomasius sees it, Aquinas and his followers cannot contribute to a general solution because 
they hold a principle of individuation for simple creatures, such as angels, different from the one 
they hold for corporeal creatures. For Thomas, spiritual creatures are altogether simple in their 
essence, but have a dual composition of essence with existence and of substance with accidents. 
Corporeal creatures are composed in addition of potency and act, that is, of matter and form. 
Thus, the principle of individuation for corporeal creatures, namely signate (or quantified) 
matter, relies on something that angels do not possess. (Each angel, as a result, constitutes its 
own species.) Given the division of labor between teacher and student, Leibniz is charged with 
the critique of the Scotistic principle of individuation through haecceity, which receives the 
longest treatment in his bachelor thesis.
19
       
As a result, in the Metaphysical Disputation (1663), Leibniz follows the path traced out 
by his teacher. He dutifully sets aside Thomas’ solution as not furnishing a single principle of 
                                                 
 
17
 A VI.1, 6. This judgment on Greek thought is taken up again in Jakob Thomasius (1665). 
 
18
 A VI.1, 6 and note.  
19
 Thomasius is representative of a powerful revival of Aristotelianism on the side of Reformation. His 
polemic against the Scholastics and the Scotists, in particular, is constant; he regards contemporary 
metaphysical systems such as Clemens Timpler’s or Suárez’ to be ontologically deviant in their lack of 
theological premises. For more on his judgment of Scotism, see Thomasius (1665). 
10 
 
individuation for both material and immaterial substances.
20
 He discusses four other possible 
solutions to the problem, rejecting three of them, including the Scotist answer, and defends as 
best the “whole entity” principle of the nominalists.21 Perhaps the one novel element in Leibniz’s 
contribution to the issue of individuation is the taxonomy he provides. Either a single general 
principle of individuation for all individuals can be given or, because different principles for 
material and immaterial individuals must be provided, it cannot. With respect to the general 
principles, the whole entity can be proposed as a principle or something less than the whole 
entity can be proposed. Within the category of “something less,” the principle can be expressed 
by negation or by something positive added to the essence. Two views have been proffered for 
the positive principle, that is, existence and haecceity, depending upon whether a physical part or 
a metaphysical part is added. Since Leibniz disposes negatively of non-general principles (one of 
which he identifies as Thomas’), he discusses four primary options: (1) whole entity; (2) 
negation; (3) existence; and (4) haecceity. The young Leibniz attributes the first principle he 
discusses, “whole entity”, to some older and to some recent Scholastics, including Suárez. 
Further, he classifies the principle as that of the terminists or nominalists and defends it against 
the attacks of the Scotists (identified as such). There is no mystery about this principle of 
individuation. Leibniz claims that the whole entity of a composite being is simply its matter and 
form; he states that he uses the term “whole entity” rather than “matter and form” merely 
                                                 
20
 A VI.1, 11, §3. 
 
21
 It is generally recognized today that Leibniz constantly endorsed or adhered to a nominalist ontology or 
epistemology. See Fichant (1998, 147), but also Mugnai (1990). As Leibniz says to Arnauld, “I hold this 
identical proposition, differentiated only by the emphasis, to be an axiom, namely, that what is 
not truly a being is not truly one being either.” (A&G, 86) The passage is a statement of one of the 
main tenets which make up Leibniz’ “provisional nominalism”: the specific claim to a particularist 
ontology that only individual substances exist. In a text from 1688 entitled De realitate accidentium, 
Leibniz defines himself as a nominalist, at least “per provisionem”, see Grua II, 547. 
11 
 
because he wants the principle to be general and to cover immaterial substances.
22
 Moreover, by 
“matter and form” he does not include accidents, which he specifically omits from the 
discussion.
23
 If Leibniz’s principle works at the level of matter and form without any 
consideration of accidents,
24
 then Leibniz in 1663 does not hold the complete concept view of 
substance and thus he is not committed to the identity of indiscernibles; clearly he also rejects 
versions of both Thomist and Scotist principles of individuation. 
A few years later, in 1668, in the theological context of finding a philosophical 
explanation for the Eucharist, Leibniz changes his mind and accredits individuation to the 
substantial form viewed as an active principle directly enacting a divine idea: more specifically, 
he asserts that bodies are not substances apart from a concurring mind because a substance is a 
being that “has a principle of action within itself” and “actiones sunt suppositorum.” Substance 
is union with a mind and bodies that lack reason are substances through a union with the 
universal mind or God. Transubstantiation thus involves the mind of Christ taking on the 
accidents (bread and wine) in the sacraments, substituting its special concourse for the general 
concourse of the divine mind. Thus the transubstantiated accidents would have numerically the 
same substantial form as Christ’s body and since they would not be changed in any respect 
besides the substantial form of the concurrent mind, they would retain and realize their accidents. 
Leibniz states in a scholium: “These theorems of ours differ very little from the accepted 
philosophy. In Aristotle, nature is the principle of motion and rest. But substantial form is 
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 A VI.1, 12, §4. 
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 A VI.1, 14, §10. 
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 This omission of the problem of individual accidents is another aspect of Leibniz’s jejune treatment of 
the issue of individuation that points to his limited, second-hand knowledge of Scholastic sources. 
Francisco Suárez, in his classical treatment of individuation discusses the nature of individual accidents, 
see DM XXXVII–XXXVIII.  
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properly nature in the same philosopher. Hence Averroes, Angelus Mercenarius, and Jacob 
Zabarella also assert that substantial form is the principle of individuation.”25 In the 1663 thesis, 
Mercenarius and Zabarella were cited as supporters of the Scotist view; they are now among 
those who agree with Leibniz, which places Leibniz in the Scotist camp.
26
 In case the point is not 
fully understood, Leibniz also refers to “Those who locate the nature of subsistence in the union 
of matter and form, like Murcia,”27 thereby distancing himself from that position. Of course, in 
1663, Murcia was among those who agreed with Leibniz in holding the “whole entity” principle 
of individuation. Leibniz emphasizes that he is using the terms substance, transubstantiation, 
accident, species, and identity in the same sense which the Council of Trent favored, that none of 
his conceptions are innovations, that he demonstrates “the numerical identity of substance from 
the numerical identity of the substantial form, in conformity with the principle of the noblest 
Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophers, for whom substantial form is the principle of 
individuation.” 
Despite his 1668 explanation of transubstantiation claiming that substantial form is the 
principle of individuation, Leibniz almost immediately began rejecting substantial forms as the 
Scholastics understood them.
28
 In 1668 and 1670, Leibniz advocated a nominalistic, particularist 
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  A VI.1, 510; Loemker, 117. 
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 Leroy Loemker realized this; in a footnote to the passage he writes: “Leibniz’s departures from 
Thomism are significant; his view of individuality and of the soul here is Scotistic, though he had earlier 
rejected Scotus’ principle of individuality. The unity of matter as an aggregate is never itself material but 
logical and mental. The soul itself, in turn, has its own matter, distinct from its body” (Loemker, 120). 
Loemker is right in thinking of the view as a kind of Scotism, even though, of course, it says nothing 
about individuals as common nature plus haecceity, two things asserted to be formally distinct. 
Substantial form as principle of individuation would have been considered by Leibniz in the category of 
“something less” than whole entity, with a metaphysical part being added to the essence. 
 
27
 A VI.1, 510; Loemker, 117. 
 
28
 In 1668, Leibniz adds a Neo-Platonic spin to his conception of substantial forms: substantial forms are 
ideas in the mind of God. 
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ontology and rejected any universals, substantial forms, and real qualities.
29
 The 1668 account of 
transubstantiation presents several stumbling difficulties which lead to the rejection of Scholastic 
substantial forms in Leibniz’s 26 September/6 October 1668 letter to Thomasius and his preface 
to Nizolius (1670). The Academic edition of Leibniz’ works transcribes four fragments or 
samples under the common title of Demonstratio possibilitatis Mysteriorum Eucharistiae: the 
first three fragments from 1668 (among which is De transsubstantiatione) start with a critique of 
English philosopher Thomas White. While these three fragments preserve the use of substantial 
forms, the fourth one (1671) does not mention substantial forms any more, only referring to them 
negatively as the “fictional and monstrous entities” of the Scholastics.30 Moreover, in the letter to 
Thomasius from 26 September/6 October 1668, Leibniz shows his support toward the new 
mechanistic philosophy and accordingly sets up the program of reconciling Aristotle and the 
novatores. Leibniz adopts as a common rule of mechanism the simple formula that all corporeal 
properties of bodies have to be explained through their primary attributes, i.e. magnitude, figure, 
and motion. Even though in 1668-1670 Leibniz’ adoption of this rule is not yet paralleled by a 
carefully formulated natural theory, he uses it as the grounds for a renovation of the proof of the 
existence of God as Prime Mover. This renewed demonstration was supposed to be a part of 
chapter 4 of the first part of the plan of his Catholic Demonstrations.
31
 A preliminary version of 
it can be found in the introduction to De Arte combinatoria.
32
 Each body or corporeal nature 
                                                 
29
 This does not seem very different from Leibniz’s earlier adherence to nominalism in the earlier 
Disputatio. Yet, explaining the reasons for Leibniz’ rejection of substantial forms in 1668-1670 enables 
an understanding of the larger context which ultimately led him to positing an external principle of 
individuation in the Confessio philosophi of 1672-1673. 
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 Same fragment: A VI.1, 516. 
 
31
 “Demonstratio ex eo principio, quod in corporibus nulla sit origo motus,” A VI.1, 494. 
 
32
 GP IV, 32-33. 
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receives its mechanistic features and primary attributes from a unique and incorporeal principle 
or being: God as governor of the material world. A mechanistic explanation of nature requires a 
Prime Mover, since the cause of motion in the universe cannot be a principle physically 
immanent to the corporeal nature of bodies. Bodies do not move because each of them would 
possess an immaterial entity or internal principle of activity responsible for their autonomous 
motion, but as a consequence of reciprocally transmitting or transforming motion through their 
primary attributes.
33
 Despite its apparent Aristotelianism, Leibniz’s attempt at renewing the 
proof of the existence of God as Prime Mover is quite un-Aristotelian: for Aristotle, the unmoved 
mover causes the motion of other bodies through final causation and not as an efficient cause.
34
 
In this case, the unmoved mover, God, is a “full” efficient cause, responsible for all efficient 
causation in the universe. Early Leibniz’s God is a full efficient cause, because all finality is, in 
the end, absorbed in him. God is both responsible for the origin of forms and the cause of 
movement – he alone ensures the ontological consistency of substances. Thus, the notion of God 
Leibniz marshals in this early period is that of mechanist philosophy, conceiving the primary 
relation between God and the world of corporeal substances in terms of an overarching, external 
principle imprinting motion onto bodies. In conclusion, Leibniz rejects the traditional Scholastic 
interpretation of substantial forms both on the count of their unnecessary multiplication and 
because mind-like substantial forms which would enable bodies to move through themselves, 
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 Confessio Naturae Contra Atheistas, GP IV, 108-109: “[…] cum corpora motum habeant, non singula 
ente incorporali, sed a se invicem.”  
 
34
 The prime mover causes the movement of other things as a final cause and not as an efficient cause: it 
is the purpose, the end of the moving. For Aristotle, an efficient cause imprinting motion onto the world 
would itself be affected by that movement or push, which it cannot since it is an unmoving cause, 
Aristotle (1910-1952), Metaphysics, book Λ, 1072 a26–b4. 
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without an incorporeal mover outside of them, would shut off the proof of the existence of God 
as Prime Mover.
35
  
 On the other hand, in his 1669 program-letter on natural philosophy
36
, discussing the 
origin and generation of forms, Leibniz reiterates the Scholastic dictum that forms have to be 
“educed from the passive power of matter” and not directly from the active power of God.37 
Here, the substantial forms of bodies are described as the Scotist forma corporeitatis, educed 
from matter through a process of mechanist heterogenesis.
38
 This assumption about the origin of 
forms goes against those novatores who assumed their celestial origin, and Leibniz condemns 
Scaliger, Sennert, Sperling and their ilk, for believing that forms are created not from the passive 
power of matter, but from the active power of the efficient cause.
39
 This, he argues, would imply 
that God is the prime matter of all things and that, furthermore, extended, physical matter would 
act through itself qua matter. Both these consequences are unacceptable for Leibniz, since he 
claims that the pre-existing matter, from which substantial forms are derived, is a non-being – 
purely passive (and objective) potentiality.
40
 The unnecessary multiplication of substantial forms 
is an ontological blunder of which Scholastics and contemporary novatores are equally 
chargeable: countless incorporeal entities glued onto the extended body of each substance would 
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 A II.1, 11. 
 
36
 It is worth noting that Leibniz chose to publish the text of this 1669 more extended letter as an 
Appendix to his own Dissertatio preliminaries to Marius Nizolius’ De veris principiis et vera 
philosophandi (republished in 1670).    
 
37
 The “eduction” of forms from the passive power of matter was a theory held by the majority of 
medieval philosophers, Aquinas in particular, but also Sixteenth-century textbook authors, such as 
Franciscus Toletus and Benito Pereira. 
 
38
 See Chapter II, “Concluding remarks,” pp. 63-70. 
 
39
 A II.1, 14. 
 
40
 A II.1, 16. 
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risk introducing thought into matter and leading to a divinization of nature.
41
 As I will show 
through an extended analysis of this letter in the second chapter, at this stage, Leibniz really 
believes that, behind the medieval vulgata of commentaries on Aristotle, there is an authentic 
Aristotelian thinking that needs to be recovered. Both his attempt at construing a valid, reformed 
mechanistic philosophy (against and with the novatores) and his adherence to the tenets of a 
nominalistic ontology that back it up, explain why Leibniz gave up traditional or contemporary 
interpretations of substantial forms, early on after his essay on transubstantiation.  
In 1668 Leibniz was keenly interested in keeping substantial forms, but to this purpose he 
had to use an opposite strategy to that of the neo-Scolastici, the liberal Jesuit (and mostly 
Spanish) Scholastics of the Counter-Reformation. Despite the reference to the common 
Scholastic adage actiones sunt suppositorum, Leibniz subverts the medieval concept of 
substantial form by conceiving it in a much more Neo-Platonic than Aristotelian way. Forms 
assume ontological reality only as instruments of God’s own action, since bodies have to rely on 
their direct enactment of divine ideas for both their potentiality towards motion and the principle 
of activity of said motion.
42
 There is even a slight imprecision in Leibniz’ recourse to actiones 
sunt suppositorum: his argument that the substance or being subsisting by itself, taken 
individually, is the support for the accidents and actions belong to these supports.
43
 Generally 
speaking, the majority of substances are considered to be supposita. In On Transubstantiation 
the difficult issue that Leibniz’ explanation of the Eucharist has to face concerns Christ’s body, 
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 A II.1, 22: “Ita reditur ad tot deunculos, quot formas substantiales […].” This would amount to placing 
as many little gods into things, as there are substantial forms. 
 
42
 A VI.1, 513. Divine ideas are the substance of things: “Ideae Dei et Substantiae rerum sunt idem re 
[…].”  
 
43
 That is, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic dictum. “Nam Ens per se subsistens seu substantia hæc 
vel illa in individuo sumta est Suppositum. (Scholastici enim in usu habent Suppositum definire 
individuum Substantiale). Iam actiones sunt Suppositorum” (A VI.1, 497). 
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its corporeal substance. The substance of the body of Christ is not a suppositum. His divine 
nature is, because this corporeal substance subsists in the person of the divine logos. If in order 
to show that substances have a principle of action within themselves Leibniz makes all 
substances supposita, the immediate unwanted consequence would be that he is submitting to 
Nestorianism while attempting to explain transubstantiation, allowing two persons in Christ.
44
 
Yet, there are other reasons which, given Leibniz’ choice for a principle of individuation in 1668, 
make his explanation of transubstantiation turn out to be even more problematic. First, he has to 
explain the temporality and succession of forms and second, to find a way of reconciling his 
account of transubstantiation via substantial form with one of the basic principles undergirding 
the “provisional” nominalism adopted in the Preface to Nizolius (1670), text in which he rejected 
the existence of universals, forms, and real qualities. 
In De transsubstantiatione (1668), Leibniz had stressed his continuity with the Tridentine 
Council with regards to defining substance, accidents, species and transubstantiation.
45
 The 
Council of Trent stated that, given the unique and miraculous nature of transubstantiation, the 
operation it involves cannot be explained in terms of similar natural transformations or 
transmutations. Since, in the Eucharist a part of common matter is “consecrated”, 
transubstantiation involves a complete conversion: as striking as it may seem on a sensible level, 
the substances of both bread and wine disappear entirely.
46
 As a consequence, examples of 
                                                 
44
 The conspectus of Catholic Demonstrations included, in its 3rd part, a chapter on the Augustinian 
congruentia incarnationis and a reference to Saint Anselm’s Cur Deus homo. The next chapter, on 
incarnation, was planned: “[…] contra Arianos et Nestorianos” (A VI.1, 497).  
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  Scholia, A VI.1, 510. 
 
46
 Marbeau-Charpentier 1923, Catéchisme du Concile de Trente, II, XIX, 1. 
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physical transformation such as natural accretion (in food digestion)
47
 or fermentation (the 
transformation of wine into vinegar), are not considered adequate in conceiving 
transubstantiation. Complete conversion is a conversion not only of the substantial form of a 
substance into the substantial form of another substance, but also a change of matter: from the 
matter of the bread and wine to the corporeal substance of Christ’s body. Thus, this conversion 
cannot be defined as a mere variation or succession of substantial form, but as a change 
occurring in the corporeal substance or matter of things. The matter and form of the species 
make a complete passage into the corporeal substance of Christ. It is unclear how the succession 
between God’s general concourse and Christ’ concurrent mind could represent a viable solution 
in explaining transubstantiation, since in this case, Leibniz’ particular choice of an individuating 
principle for inanimate bodies involves the risk of drifting dangerously close to pantheism and 
conceiving God as a world soul. The significant issue here is theological more than 
metaphysical; it involves ascribing to non-human corporeal substances like the Eucharistic bread 
and wine not yet informed by the mind of Christ, ideas-forms that share the same separate status 
with God’s concurrent mind: accidents and species sub specie aeternitatis.  
     Secondly, what is the ontological status of accidents in a non-realist, nominalist ontology 
whose main assumption, among others, is resolutely anti-Platonic: do only individual substances 
exist?  In the Isagoge 
48
, Porphyry gave a dual definition of accident, leaving open the possibility 
that accidents could possess an existence or reality separately from substance. Some accidents 
(like “sleeping”, in the case of man) are separable, while others (the “being black” of a raven) are 
inseparable. Following this definition, the nominalist tradition had tried to redefine accidents 
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 In the first fragment on the Eucharist from 1668, Leibniz had specifically criticized Thomas White’s 
analogy between transubstantiation and augmentatio: see A VI.1, 501.  
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 Libéra & Segonds 1998, Porphyre, Isagoge, V, 1, 15.  
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according to the metaphysical presuppositions of its own singularist ontology. Ockham’s Summa 
Logicae put forward four different meanings of accident: first of all, the accident is something 
really inhering in a substance the way “heat really inheres in the fire and whiteness in wall.”49 In 
this sense, an accident is something which cannot be subtracted from its underlying subject 
without corrupting or annihilating it. In its second influential sense, accident would be a 
predicable and thus it would not amount to something absolutely inseparable from the subject, 
but would attach itself to different substances. In this latter meaning, an accident could be 
separable (at least through the power of God) or inseparable from its subject. The nominalists 
including Ockham share a common task in proving that this second meaning of accident only 
possesses a mental reality and that accidents only exist in nature as inherent to substances. The 
issue of the separability of accidents on a natural level is an authentic cul-de-sac for Nominalist 
ontologies as it is for Leibniz, who adopts the first understanding of the concept of accident, one 
that is intimately related to his conception of individual substance. If accidents are just 
modifications of their respective substances, inherent to and inextricably bound to their subjects 
so that they have no existence outside these substances; they are only abstract things with no 
reference to the things themselves. It is difficult to see not only how Leibniz would reconcile this 
view with the separability of accidents – the sine qua non condition for any eligible explanation 
of the Eucharist in an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework – but also with the manifestation of 
these accidents under the form of the species at the sensible, phenomenal level. 
     In both the notes annexed to On transubstantiation
50
  and in a closely dated text on 
hypostatic union (De incarnatione Dei seu de unione hypostatica, 1669-1670), Leibniz seems to 
argue that the Scholastics have uselessly complicated their explanations of transubstantiation and 
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hypostatic union, notions he had re-grounded on the presupposition of God’s mediated action 
through minds or substantial forms. Right after his rejection of substantial forms in the letter to 
Thomasius (26 September/6 October 1668) and the preface to Nizolius (1670), Leibniz once 
again dismisses substantial forms, this time in the context of finding an appropriate philosophical 
solution to the problem of resurrection. Surprisingly enough, in the first part of his paper “On the 
resurrection of body” (1671), Leibniz claims that some version of atomism or corpuscular theory 
of matter could cope with bodily identity problems related to resurrection better than 
hylomorphism. He takes into account the Scholastic view of matter and form, but does not 
consider that it provides an adequate framework to explain the resurrection of the same body: 
“For since the followers of Aristotle believe that the essence of each thing consists in matter and 
a certain substantial form which is extinguished by the corruption of the thing and since they 
hold as an axiom that there is no return from privation to possession, they have been unable to 
grasp how the same flesh can return.”51 There is no return from privation to possession – a 
privatione ad habitum non dari regressum – yet again the problem of the temporality, duration of 
substantial forms, is particularly problematic in the case of bodily resurrection. Leibniz invokes 
here another Scholastic dictum, based partly on Aristotle’s Metaphysics H 1044b34-1045a6 and 
found in the works of thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon.
52
 The reditus or 
return principle states that privation and habit subsist differently and are as opposed as 
affirmation and negation are. As a consequence habit can change into privation, but not the other 
way around: a blind man, Aristotle says, cannot recover sight.
53
 What is deprived of substantial 
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form cannot regain it: no natural thing can be restored with numerical identity in the event that it 
undergoes corruption or annihilation. In order for numerical identity to be restored something 
other than substantial form is needed. 
          As evidenced by the previous passage as well as the fourth fragment on transubstantiation 
(1671) and its general rejection of the “fictional and monstrous entities” of the Scholastics”,54 
whatever its meaning for Leibniz, substantial forms tend to disappear from his vocabulary after 
1671.
55
  
          Furthermore, all the difficulties implied in postulating substantial form as a principle of 
individuation lead to Leibniz’ radical departure from the common Scholastic, internal principle 
of individuation in the Confessio philosophi (1672-1673): identifying haecceity as the principle 
of individuation consisting in the external spatio-temporal circumstances. Leibniz further 
emphasizes the distinctiveness of his interpretation and his break with Scholasticism by having 
his interlocutor assert: “You speak of astounding things, which, I believe, have not come into the 
mind of any Scholastic even in a dream, but which, nevertheless, no one can disavow, for they 
are taken from practical experience.”56 He also starts his discussion by distancing himself from 
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 Even though his reflection on the Elementa de Mente and de Corpore continues to develop (as 
announced in the 1668-1669 plan of the Catholic Demonstrations, see A II.1, 175-176. This also raises 
doubts whether anything like a primitive theory of complete concepts is developed at an early stage in 
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 Sleigh 2005, 104-105. The paragraph continues: “For no man reasons otherwise when he must 
distinguish things that are entirely similar.” Leibniz’s distancing himself from the Scholastics in the 
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the traditional way of posing the problem: “This question seems difficult, but more because of 
the tortured manner of asking the question, than from the nature of the problem. It touches upon 
the very thorny consideration of the principle of individuation, that is, of the discrimination of 
things differing solely in number.” The example Leibniz uses is that of two eggs similar in every 
way such that not even an angel can observe a difference; he asks “yet who can deny that they 
differ?” and replies: 
At least they differ in this: that one is this one, the other, that one, that is, they differ in 
haecceity, or because they are one thing and another thing, i.e., because they differ 
numerically. But what do we mean when we count, that is, when we say this (for to count 
is to repeat this). What is this? What is it to determine something? What is it except the 
perception of time and place, i.e., of motion either, on the one hand, of a given thing in 
relation to us or to a thing already determined, or, on the other hand, of our own 
movement (e.g., the motion of our hand or the finger by which we point), or the motion 
of some already determined thing, like a stick, in order to point to a given thing? There 
you have it, what may amaze you, the principle of individuation, outside the thing itself. 
For between these eggs no difference can be assigned either by an angel or, I have the 
audacity to say, by God (given the hypothesis of the greatest similarity possible) other 
than that at the present time this one is at place A, and that one is at place B.
57
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
even “more immoderately and eagerly” than his teachers approved, so that they “feared that he would 
cling too tightly to these rocks.” He also claimed that when he began to study philosophy at the 
universities he made “some original and profound comments” on Scholastic topics, such as “the principle 
of individuation,” and he “never since regretted having sampled these studies” (GP I, 197-198; Loemker 
190). 
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          In the 1663 Disputatio, confronted with both Scotism and nominalism, Leibniz had 
interpreted Scotus’ haecceitas as a formalistic element (privileging form over matter).58 Later 
reinterpretations of the concept seem to insist on its realistic elements: identification with 
quantity or synonymy with numerical difference consisting in the perceptions of time and place 
(sensus temporis et loci).
59
 The originality and directness of the Confessio consist in Leibniz’ 
commitment to the idea that the principle of individuation of a thing is not internal to itself.
60
 
Thus he accepts a radically reconsidered notion of haecceity and does not fully embrace a 
complete concept view of substance or the identity of indiscernibles.
61
 
In the Parisian period, once Leibniz advances his criticism of Descartes’ theory of 
extension and expounds upon the concepts of space and time as mere relations or orders of 
coexistence and non-simultaneity, the external spatio-temporal individuating circumstances will 
be ready to be internalized, as contained in their complete concepts. We can see the beginnings 
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of Leibniz’s more mature view encompassing the thesis that two substances cannot resemble 
each other completely and differ only in number in an essay from 1676 entitled Meditatio de 
Principio Individui. There Leibniz considers two rectangles or two triangles coming to constitute 
two indistinguishable squares, as an example of different causes producing an effect that is 
perfectly the same. Of his two squares Leibniz asserts “neither of these can be distinguished from 
one another in any other way, not even by the wisest being.” Based on the principle that the 
effect involves its cause “in such a way that whoever understands some effect perfectly will also 
arrive at the knowledge of its cause,” Leibniz argues that:  
[…] if we admit that two different things always differ in themselves in some respect as 
well, it follows that there is present in any matter something which retains the effect of 
what precedes it, namely a mind  
Thus, for matter to be individuated, it has to be connected to a mind that will retain the memory 
or traces of its construction. Leibniz concludes:  
This argument is very fine and proves that [...] we cannot think of anything by which 
matter differs, except by mind. […] This principle is of great importance.62  
Of course, the mind Leibniz is referring to could be either inside or outside the thing, a universal 
soul or a mind, individual soul, substantial form, or individuating form, that is, a haecceity. 
Leibniz chooses to locate the principle of individuation inside the thing and thus derives 
something like the identity of indiscernibles:  
[…]unless we admit that it is impossible that there should be two things which are 
perfectly similar, it will follow that the principle of individuation is outside the thing, in 
its cause.”63 
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          In the two-year period between 1670 and 1671 the concept of substantial form is 
overshadowed. The concept of mind and its interpretation through indivisibles or points takes its 
place. Although between 1672 and 1676 Leibniz had not yet developed an elaborate physical 
theory, an idea guides his Parisian writings: matter is always connected to mind, held together by 
a mind or a mind-like substance; it only exists in virtue of a relation to mind.
64
 It is after this 
fruitful period of confrontation with Cartesianism that the views Leibniz had developed on 
mechanics in his physical theories of Theoria motus abstracti and Hypothesis physica nova 
(1671) became subject to a drastic revisionism. This revision of his first physical theories was 
initiated after the Parisian period and his return to Hanover through a reconsideration of the laws 
of motion between colliding bodies. In 1676 (in De Arcanis motus and Meditatio de Principio 
individui), Leibniz believes he has arrived at a possible solution in reconciling the empirical laws 
of motion and an a priori principle of conservation: this “Ariadnic thread” was the regulative 
principle of the equipolence between full cause and entire effect. The Meditation on the 
Principle of the Individual (1676) is particularly important not only because it gives an overview 
of Leibniz’ views on individuation at a crucial time, but also through the fact that the text itself is 
an early formulation of the principle of equivalence between full cause and entire effect, 
equivalence which is maintained through phenomenal changes.  
          But Leibniz’s mature view about individuation also develops through the revival of the 
Aristotelian concept of primary substance and a reinterpretation of the Thomistic angelic 
principle of individuation as species infima. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, the individual for 
Leibniz corresponds to the Scholastic last species he had declined to discuss in the Disputatio. Its 
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particularity is that each individual is, in itself, its own last species – not an exemplar of a 
specific essence, but a unique one with all its accidents. Leibniz’ main originality is that to this 
individual essence or last species there corresponds a complete concept. I have traced Leibniz’s 
views on individuation from 1663 to 1686. We can say without equivocation that the only 
constancy about individuation during these years is Leibniz’s willingness to change his mind 
completely about a host of issues, as he works through various problems of disparate provenance 
and adjusts his thinking accordingly, using one result in one domain against another in another 
domain and then reversing himself, repeating the process. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
FROM INDIVIDUALS TO ATOMS: VARIETIES OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ATOMISM 
 
          When discussing atomism in the Sixteenth or Seventeenth-century, the common view is 
that early modern corpuscular theories of matter have their origin in the revival of different 
strands of ancient atomist thought, whether Democritean, Lucretian, or Epicurean. Since it 
witnessed the publication of Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, one cannot underrate the impact 
the rediscovery of ancient atomism
65
 had in the Fifteenth-century. Yet reducing the origin of 
Sixteenth
 
or Seventeenth century atomism to this influence alone represents a risky gamble since 
it fails to understand the varieties of “atomism” available to early modern thinkers. Therefore, 
understanding the complexity of early modern atomism as a diverse philosophical movement 
will help better grasp those theories about the ontological fabric of the world that leading 
philosophical figures such as Leibniz or Descartes were coming up against.  
          We first have to start by making several important distinctions. Sometimes corpuscular 
doctrines were motivated by physical or mathematical considerations about the continuum 
(Galileo; the famous problem of Poysson
66; Gassendi’s distinction between “mathematical” and 
“physical” atomism), other times they set aside “physical” or classical atomism and relied upon 
alchemical or “chymist” sources in developing “qualitative”, non-mechanist versions of atomism 
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(as was the case for Libavius, Scaliger, or Sennert).
67
 Another important difference was that, 
while classical atomism admitted the void, this was sometimes not the case for early modern 
atomism. Influential atomists such as Basso or Sennert replaced the Democritean interstitial 
vacuum with a subtle, fifth element, the ether, permeating all bodies and filling the gaps between 
the atoms of the four elementary kinds.   
          Secondly, for the Seventeenth-century, the word “atom” itself ended up designating a wide 
range of different things besides “indivisible extended corpuscles.” Sometimes it was used to 
refer to mathematical units or indivisible substances and other times, early moderns simply 
replaced the traditional indivisible atoms with divisible corpuscles, in their explanations.
68
 The 
point is varieties of atomism available at the beginning of the Seventeenth-century cannot be 
fitted under a single umbrella or univocal description. Any history of early modern atomism has 
to take into account the complex relationship between mechanical philosophy, Aristotelianism 
and “chymistry” or alchemy. Even on the level of historiographical categories, there was just as 
much “innovation” or empirical backing and experimental proofs for atomism69 (Daniel 
Sennert), as there was “renovation”, the mere modernizing or Christianizing of the ancient 
Democritean or Epicurean theories (Nicholas Hill, Sebastian Basso, Pierre Gassendi). If this 
suffices to point out how in the case of early modern atomism, we are dealing with a complexity 
of sources matching a similar variety of views, one can also envision something of a lowest 
common denominator between them: anti-Aristotelianism. At the start of the Seventeenth-
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century, internal problems within the Scholastic framework had weakened the Aristotelian 
position to the point hylomorphism became problematic even for Scholastic philosophers. Thus, 
in their challenge to Scholastic Aristotelianism, early modern atomists were presented with the 
alternative of 1) either completely rejecting the basic building-block of its ontology and natural 
philosophy (substantial forms) and instead proposing a range of specific alternatives (elemental 
mixture doctrines, physical atomism, semina rerum theories) 2) or engaging in revisionist 
interpretations of Aristotle ascribing new meanings to substantial forms (minima naturalia 
doctrines, Sennert’s inclusion of substantial forms in atoms).  
          Yet, since substantial forms were a necessary prerequisite in a hylomorphic description of 
a world of bodies and qualities, their rejection attracted several conceptual problems. For 
example, if substantial forms are denied, how does one explain obvious changes in the sensorial 
qualities of bodies (color, taste, solubility) during chemical reactions without appealing to a 
change in substantial forms or without appealing to real accidents? One of the paths of 
accounting for real qualities in early modern atomism and avoiding the rigidity of classical or 
mechanical atomism was to suggest theories of matter supposing that atoms incorporate every 
possible quality, each atom being the corporeal hypostasis of a single quality. The development 
of this type of qualitative, non-classical atomism and its revisionism towards Aristotelian 
doctrines was connected to the enormous success of two distinct doctrines which did not entirely 
fit within the mechanist or Epicurean traditions: the minima naturalia theory and the semina 
rerum. These two doctrines directly contributed to the emergence of early modern corpuscular 
theories of matter. In the first part of this chapter I explore the two alternative traditions which 
influenced Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century atomism: the semina rerum and minima naturalia 
corpuscular theories of matter. In the second part, I focus on Wittenberg Professor of Medicine 
30 
 
Daniel Sennert (1572-1637), probably the most interesting and complex figure in early modern 
atomism, an author whose commitment to hylomorphism did not prove to be an obstacle to the 
successful development of an atomist program. 
     
Minima Naturalia and Semina Rerum: Two Sources for Early Modern Atomism 
          As noted earlier, Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century atomism offered several alternatives 
to Aristotelian substantial forms and to Aristotle’s traditional “four elements” theory. This 
alternative tradition was the result of the resurgence of alchemy or “chymistry,” exemplified in 
the works of Paracelsus, Theophrastus von Hohenheim (1493-1541), Petrus Severinus (1542-
1602), or Johannes van Helmont (1579-1644).  
           Paracelsian alchemical doctrines explained the structure of bodies and the interactions of 
their parts through combinations or transmutations of three “chymical” principles or basic 
elements: the tria prima of salt, sulphur, and, mercury. However, for all their denial of 
substantial forms and the replacement of Aristotle’s elements with the tria prima, Paracelsian 
alchemists were not as critical towards other ancient or Aristotelian notions. Central to the works 
of von Hohenheim and his followers, the complex Greek notion of semina rerum resurfaced in 
Renaissance philosophy and medicine, until through its various reinterpretations it became part 
of corpuscular and atomist theories of matter in the first decades of the Seventeenth-century. A 
wide range of views on semina can be found in various philosophical contexts prior to the early 
modern period: from Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ use of seminal principles or atoms, to the Stoics’ 
logoi spermatikoi, or Augustine’s idea of seminal reasons acting as immaterial principles 
informing matter at the creation of the world. The Sixteenth-century re-conceived the ancients’ 
semina rerum as an alternative to Aristotle’s notion of substantial form: invisible living entities 
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of an immaterial and semi-divine nature or active particles of matter “endowed with some sort of 
formative power or potential for growth.”70 In medicine, for example, Girolamo Fracastoro’s 
(1476-1553) work on contagion conceived of “seeds” as invisible particles of matter, agents 
responsible for the communication of diseases. Thus, by the early decades of the Seventeenth-
century, the notion of semina led to the idea that matter is non-homogenous, since some atoms or 
corpuscles are endowed with different powers and formative forces. The works of Etienne de 
Clave, Daniel Sennert, Anselmus de Boot (1550-1632), Nicholas Hill (1570-1610) and others, 
reinterpreted semina rerum as corpuscles and explained processes of natural change (generation, 
corruption, qualitative alteration, quantitative augmentation or diminution) at the level of the 
ultimate constituents of matter.   
          A different strand of early modern thought about the continuum involved a number of 
chymists and Aristotelian natural philosophers trying to bridge between alchemical and 
Aristotelian theories of matter. They held the view that the primary elements of each substance 
can be divided into minimal parts that would lose their status as elements if divided beyond a 
certain limit. The notion of a natural minimum of any given element or compound body is based 
on the Aristotelian doctrine that substantial forms are not preserved beyond a given limit “in the 
direction either of the greater or of the less.”71 As Antonio Clericuzio notes,72 although it had 
originally dealt with the particular problem of placing limits to the division of a substance (the 
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division-to-dust problem) and was seen as distinct from atomism, by the Seventeenth-century, 
the minima naturalia doctrine developed into at least three distinct versions: 1. substances cannot 
exist below a certain minimal size; 2. substances are unstable below a certain limit of magnitude; 
3. minima are physical, indivisible parts of bodies, preserving their substantial form.  
          The last of these alternatives, the transformation of minima into ultimate units of matter 
paved the way towards the establishment of corpuscular philosophy. In the second half of the 
Sixteenth-century, in his Exotericarum Exercitationum Libri XV, Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-
1558) introduced an innovative reinterpretation of the minima of both elements and compound 
bodies as actual physical particles endowed with indivisibility, size, and, motion.
73
 Scaliger 
posited minima of different substances, as well as of earth, water, air, and fire different in size 
and used them to explain a variety of physical and chemical phenomena. Different states of 
bodily aggregation are explained through the arrangement of minima, while density and rarity are 
produced by their motion. Yet what made this doctrine highly significant in the context of 
Sixteenth or Seventeenth-century century atomism was that, in comparison to semina rerum 
doctrines, the minima naturalia theorists never rejected the Aristotelian concept of “substantial 
form,” the distinction between the minimal parts of bodies relying on their different forms or 
essences.
74
  
          A good example of an early Seventeenth-century corpuscularian alchemist working within 
both the tradition of minima and the semina rerum doctrine is Daniel Sennert. Sennert’s work 
reunites these strands of corpuscularianism by straightforwardly transforming Scaliger’s minima 
into atoms. By endowing his atoms with substantial forms and chemical properties, he supported 
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a version of atomism that was, in several respects, very different from classical atomism. In the 
first place, Sennert uses “atom” to mean a corpuscle resisting division by means of chemical 
laboratory techniques and therefore de-emphasizes the absolute physical or mathematical 
indivisibility of traditional Democritean atoms. Sennert’s second point of originality is 
abandoning the Democritean uniformity of all atoms differentiated only by shape, size, and 
spatial orientation: different sorts of atoms have their own essences. He therefore combines the 
atomist idea of basic substantial units with the hylomorphic notion of causally active forms: his 
atoms are form-bearing minima. We are far away from anything like a purely mechanical 
atomism based on size, shape and motion. Sennert’s atomism is qualitative, his corpuscles being 
differentiated either by their structural characteristics or through the essences residing in their 
substantial forms. Moreover, in contrast to ascribing the origin of forms to their eduction from 
matter, Seenert embraces a version of traducianism claiming substantial forms are self-
multipliable and they propagate through semina rerum. These seeds are composed of a spiritual 
and material part, and, as agents endowed with formative power, they constitute the vehicle for 
souls (themselves self-multipliable) as well as substantial forms. The spiritual part of these 
seminal principles organizing matter is a spirit, or semi-material substance acting subordinately 
and instrumentally to these immaterial formative principles (form or soul) in plants and animals.   
 
Sennert’s “Religion of Form”75: The Divine Origin of Forms    
          Sennert’s name comes up in a rather lenghty list of novatores Leibniz sends to his former 
teacher at the University of Leipzig, Jakob Thomasius.
76
 Writing to his former Leipzig professor 
in 1669, Leibniz adds:  
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[…] it seems to me that, Scaliger, Sennert, and Sperling (who publicly claims to be the 
later’s disciple) align themselves with this opinion that God is the prime matter of 
things, since they claim that forms are educed, not from the passive power of matter, but 
from the active power of the efficient cause. Consequently, they believe God produces 
creatures from his own active power, instead of the objective power or, so to speak, 
passive power of nothingness. Thus, according to their position, God produces things 
from himself (ex se) and is their first matter.
77
   
What is the view of substantial forms and their origin that Leibniz describes here? I leave aside 
Leibniz’s own critique of the atomist and minima naturalia conception on the origin of 
substantial forms for now, since I will tackle this issue in the following section of this chapter. 
Instead, I want to focus on a general overview of Sennert’s conception of substantial forms and 
its sources.
78
 In doing so, I disregard Newman’s claim that issues such as the creation of forms 
ex nihilo are extraneous to early modern problems.
79
 Throughout this study, I show, on the 
contrary, that disentangling the various early modern doctrines on the origin of substantial forms 
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can give a better grasp of the intellectual debates between early atomists and Late Scholastics on 
connected issues such as, for example, the status of prime matter.   
          In the introduction I pointed out how the first half of the Seventeenth-century witnessed a 
weakening of Aristotelian hylomorphism. One of the problems relating to the erosion of 
hylomorphism was that of the origin of substantial forms, namely, the assumption that they are 
created ex nihilo. In his De generatione et corruptione (I 4 319b6-21) Aristotle argued that the 
generation of new substances occurs when not just the qualities of a thing are changed, but the 
whole sensible substrate in which these qualities inhere is changed and, more so, beyond 
recognition. Thus, the Aristotelian theory of mixture explained the transmutation of elements or 
the formation of new compounds by assuming the substantial form of the final result appeared 
out of nothing, while the forms of the initial elements disappeared into nothing.
80
 Could 
processes such as alteration or corruption result in the annihilation of the elements themselves 
and their forms? This Aristotelian conundrum was highly debated in both Medieval and Late 
Scholastic times. Sixteenth-century Averroism, for example, taught that during the process of 
mixture, forms of the elements only undergo a remission and thereby become “broken” 
(refractae). Another influential opinion had its source in Avicenna and concluded to the 
persistence of substantial forms in a compound, yet dominated by a supervening forma mixti. It 
seems that this last position inclined some atomists such as Sennert to argue for the immutability 
of forms. For Sennert there are two types of change at the atomic level: either the substantial 
form remains constant and only the material structure in which it inheres undergoes alteration; or 
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the dominating form is removed and replaced by a subordinate one.
81
 In both cases, the 
conclusion is the same: whether replaced or not the form itself does not witness any change, it is 
entirely immutable. For Sennert argues, forms are not educed from matter on a continuous basis, 
but at the time of the first Creation, God made every species of things and endowed all beings 
with endurable self-multiplying forms.
82
 In beings that come to be by spontaneous generation, 
the forms are present in “seeds”, semina rerum. How does Sennert’s view conflict with those of 
his contemporaries, in particular, with those of the Late Scholastics? Several early modern 
atomists, including Sennert, compile lists of Scholastic versions of substantial forms doctrines. 
There seems to have been little consensus among early modern natural philosophers on the issue 
of the origin of substantial forms. Thus, a Seventeenth-century atomist like Etienne de Clave, 
notes how:  
Scarcely three philosophers together can reach accord on this subject, even though they 
all agree that the form is what gives being to a thing […]. Some hold that the form is 
educed from the potency of matter; others from the diverse mixture of the elements; 
others, from the temperament […]; others that it is enclosed in a seminal spirit […]; some 
hold that form is purely celestial and comes from the stars […].83 
In what follows, I look at early Leibniz’s rejection of contemporary atomism from two 
perspectives: his Aristotelian stance against atomism in the Confessio Naturae Contra Atheistas 
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(1668) and his rejection of contemporary atomism on the issue of the origin of substantial forms 
in the correspondence with Jakob Thomasius (1668-1669).   
 
Breaking up the Atom: Early Leibniz against Minima Naturalia Theories and Atomism 
          In a letter written to Nicolas Rémond, counselor to the Duc d’Orléans in Paris, in July 
1714, Leibniz retrospects on his early philosophical development: 
As for Gassendi, of whom you ask my opinion, I find that he has great and wide 
knowledge and is well versed in his reading of the ancients and in both secular and 
ecclesiastical history and all classes of learning. But his thoughts satisfy me less now than 
they did when I first began to drop Scholastic views in my own schoolboy days. Since 
the atomic theory satisfies the perceptual imagination, I gave myself to it, and it 
seemed to me that the void of Democritus or Epicurus, together with their incorruptible 
atoms, would remove all difficulties.
84
 
The late date of this letter, at the end of Leibniz’s long life, has led to a generally cautious 
approach amongst scholars concerning both the accuracy of the autobiographical account and its 
possible rhetorical purposes. This might well be the case since Leibniz gives several similar 
accounts of his intellectual formation. In a 1689 dialogue entitled Phoranomus or on Power and 
the Laws of Nature, Leibniz summarizes his youthful views about the continuum and recalls of 
this as a period in which he had subscribed, not without enthusiasm, to the ideas of the “new 
philosophy.” He again claims to have supported “atomism and the void” at an early stage in his 
thought. Recently, Leibniz commentators have commonly made these Leibnizian biographical 
accounts the grounds for researching and proving some more or less stronger measure of 
commitment to atomism, intermittent throughout the period from 1666 to 1676.   
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          For now, leaving aside the issue of trustworthiness, such examination of Leibniz’s thought 
based on a purely mnemonic clue has completely disregarded the literal indication of the account: 
atomism and the void are mentioned, and, moreover, as related doctrines sustained for a long 
extent of time. I think here we have to stress the importance of the coordinating conjunction, 
“and.” While there is certainly room to argue for some sort of penchant towards an atomism of a 
kind or another in Leibniz’s youthful work, it is nonetheless difficult, if not impossible – given 
that Leibniz was a committed plenist in the tradition of Aristotle – to find probatory texts 
supporting his repeated claim that at one point he had held both atoms and the void. It is my 
contention that early texts such as the Hypothesis de Systemate Mundi (1671) which, as far as I 
know, is the only text to include a discussion relating atomism and the void, are not indicative of 
a strong commitment towards the one or the other. It is true that in a letter written to Henry 
Oldenburg on the 15
th
 of October 1671, Leibniz seems to exhibit similar views by stating that 
“[…] as I believe the world to be made of globules, bubbles, vortices, and spheres I hold for 
certain that vacuous spaces are included [in it],” but he immediately adds that he does not think 
“an observable vacuum can be obtained experimentally […].”85 While the late 1671 Hypothesis 
does describe the world as “a space full of globes, touching each other only at points,”86 and with 
voids in the gaps between them,
87
 atomism in this brouillon is explicitly based on hypotheses 
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(such as the existence of a vacuum) which contradict, for example, those of the more extensive 
physical treatise Hypothesis physica nova (1670).  
          As I show throughout my study, it looks as if early Leibniz toys with different types of 
theories of matter or principles of individuation. In this particular case, the testing of hypotheses 
(hypothetibus fingendis), non-dogmatic in character, seems to lead to the idea that for young 
Leibniz, a particular doctrine such as Gassendian atomism (or even Hobbes’ reductionist 
epistemology) is less of an actual instrument giving access to reality or the nature of physical 
phenomena and more of a hermeneutical tool allowing to understand contemporary historical 
thinking. The requirement of a nominalist type of hypothetical simplicity corresponds to the 
simplicity of nature: atomism is far-removed from it as well as from experiments, disconnected as 
it is from an authentic understanding of natural phenomena.
88
 
          In order to understand Leibniz’s early philosophical thought, we must understand its place 
in the Seventeenth-century debate over Aristotelian natural philosophy. All throughout his early 
years (Leipzig/Mainz 1668-1672), Leibniz is concerned with finding adequate metaphysical and 
physical explanations which would allow him to develop the “true notions” of substance, motion, 
and body. It also has to be stressed that during this period, the driving force behind Leibniz’s 
work on metaphysics was theologically informed by the necessity of proving the existence of 
God and defending the doctrines and the mysteries of the Christian religion (Eucharist, 
incarnation, trinity). Thus, his aim was to build a metaphysics consistent with two sets of 
doctrines to which he was deeply committed: the mechanistic explanation of nature put forward 
by the “moderns” or novatores and the central tenets of the Christian religion.     
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          Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze three different aspects of early 
Leibniz’s natural philosophy, including his own judgments, views, and relationship with 
Seventeenth-century Aristotelian natural philosophy and corpuscular or atomistic theories of 
matter. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter, I analyze how early on, in his first 
contributions to modern natural philosophy, the Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas (1668) and 
the correspondence with Jakob Thomasius (1668-1669), Leibniz took a definite and formative 
stance against the atomist theories of contemporaries Julius-Caesar Scaliger, Daniel Sennert, and 
Johannes Sperling.
89
 By itself, my claim that the Confessio Naturae is an essentially anti-atomist 
text is not entirely new.
90
 My approach is original in showing that Leibniz’s rejection of atomism 
was essentially Aristotelian (De Generatione et Corruptione) and how it further shaped and 
rendered problematic his program of reconciling Aristotle’s natural philosophy with early 
modern corpuscular theories of matter. But while his argument for rejecting atomism was indeed 
Aristotelian, his account of substantial forms in the 1668-1669 correspondence with Jakob 
Thomasius was less so. I thus re-configure the different accounts of substantial forms from 
Leibniz’s early years and attempt to place them in a more adequate framework. Accordingly, in 
the second part, I contend that this initial stage in Leibniz’s thought about natural philosophy led 
to, one the one hand, his abandonment of the project of conciliation between Aristotle and the 
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novatores and, on the other hand, his abandonment of substantial forms in natural philosophy up 
to his middle years (1678).  
 
Leibniz’s Aristotelian stance against atomism in the Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas 
(1668)  
          As Leibniz writes to Thomasius in 1669, in the first months of 1668 he had written a short 
composition in which he attempted to prove the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. 
This writing published under the title Confession of Nature against Atheists represents a key 
document for understanding Leibniz’s views about nature, body, form, matter, space, and motion 
during his formative years. Physics and metaphysics, the science of bodies and the science of 
minds respectively (elementa de corpore, elementa de mente
91
), are grounded upon the principle 
of sufficient reason. The principle occurs for the first time in the Confessio, albeit indirectly, 
through the constant use of the formula “rationem reddere.”92 At this early stage in Leibniz’s 
thought, the principle of sufficient reason simply holds that “nihil est sine ratione.” The 
principle’s meaning is made explicit through a demand aimed at contemporary novatores. Under 
the holistic presupposition that nature has a unique author, God, who orders and harmonizes its 
parts, adequate, rational causes (and not just material causes
93
) have to be given for natural 
phenomena. These truly capable contemporaries have examined how to save or to explain 
natural, bodily phenomena without assuming God and incorporeal, substantial forms or 
introducing them into their arguments. On the other hand, Leibniz attempts to establish, 
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considering the anatomy of bodies, whether sensory appearances can be explained (rationem 
reddere) without assuming a non-corporeal cause. A refutation is intended, of those “[…] 
contemporary philosophers who have revived Democritus and Epicurus and whom Robert Boyle 
aptly called corpuscular philosophers such as Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and 
Digby.”94  
          Leibniz starts by accepting as his premise that every single property of substance has to be 
deduced from that which structures corporeity, namely, its primary qualities: magnitude, figure, 
and motion. Yet, if it turns out that these primary qualities cannot be deduced from the 
“definition of body”, it would become evident that the “reason” for this has to be derived not 
from the body itself, but from something “extrinsic to it.”95 The ensuing demonstration on the 
nature of bodies works with a definition of body originating in Cartesianism: the essence of body 
is to “exist in space” since body is everything we find in space and, conversely, we call what we 
find in some space a body. The definition raises a problem as to: “[…] why a body fills this 
much space and this particular space rather than another, why it should be three feet long rather 
than two, or why square rather than round.”96  Differently formulated, even if it is true that 
spatial extension derives from a consideration of the essence of bodies, it is nonetheless 
impossible for definite corporeal figures to be generated or produced from a matter that is in 
itself indeterminate. If matter is indeterminate, one would have to admit to indirectly subjecting 
matter to some form of causality external to it. But Leibniz rejects both the hypothesis that 
bodies possess a determinate form (ex., square) from all eternity (since eternity cannot be the 
cause of anything) and the hypothesis of an efficient action exercised by an external impact or 
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motion (which would involve an infinite regress in the causal chain of motions). Consequently, 
no reason can be found for either magnitude or figure in the nature of bodies themselves.  
          Analogously, he sets out to prove how neither motion, nor other properties of bodies such 
as resistance, firmness or cohesion can be deduced from the definition of corporeity conceived as 
the filling up of space. Mobility arises from the nature of body, while motion itself does not.
97
 
Therefore, given the impossibility of deriving adequate reasons for the motion, magnitude, 
figure, and cohesion of bodies from the nature of body itself, some ancient as well as modern 
philosophers (Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, and Lucretius; Gassendi and Jean Chrysostôme 
Magnen) were led to postulate the existence of indivisible atoms. Through various combinations, 
these infinitely hard particles produce both the different figures of bodies and their sensible 
qualities. In the Confessio, Leibniz’s response to corpuscularianism and atomism is fundamental 
for understanding his scientific formation as well as the way he conceptualizes natural and 
organic phenomena. The principle of sufficient reason expressed throughout the text by terms 
such as ratio reddendae rationis or ratio reddenda plena, cuts through the core of atomism.  
          Offering an adequate explanation of the cohesion of bodies was, from the beginning, one 
of the great stumbling-blocks for atomism and an issue Leibniz persistently dealt with in his 
early years (from 1668-1676 onwards). Atomist explanations have theorized all sorts of 
imaginary contraptions in order to account for what holds bodies together and makes them one. 
But Leibniz argues that, while the cohesiveness of macroscopic, observable bodies can be 
explained in terms of hooks, crooks, and eyes, like Gassendi does, this account leaves the 
cohesion of the atoms themselves unexplained. Must we, he then asks, suppose hooks on hooks 
onto infinity?
98
 The atomists assume that the division of matter comes to an end with the division 
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into atoms, “but no reason for cohesion and individuality appears within these ultimate 
corpuscules.” Therefore, the explanation of the ancients was, he claims: 
[…] so inept that their recent followers were ashamed of it, namely, that the parts of atoms 
cohere because no vacuum comes between them. From this it would follow that all bodies, 
once they touch each other, ought to cohere inseparably in the manner of atoms, since there 
can be no intervening vacuum when any two bodies touch.
99
    
But for Leibniz, nothing is more absurd or far removed from experience than the atomist 
hypothesis. Through itself, it neither explains why indivisible atoms exist, nor the reason why 
there is an initial motion, in other words, an indirect cause of all remaining motions in the 
universe. What is the source of this Leibnizian argument or objection against atomism?  
          The classical argument for the indivisibility of atoms goes back to Democritus and 
Leucippus. It relies on the perfect solidity or firmness of atoms and their lack of inner void. Thus, 
a body is susceptible to division only if it contains an internal vacuum.
100
 In the Confessio,
101
 
Leibniz makes the counterargument he would further develop during his mature years,
102
 that if 
the atomists assume mere contact without an intervening vacuum as a sufficient reason for 
cohesion, then atoms should cohere with one another upon contact. Consequently, all bodies once 
they touch each other should cohere inseparably in the same way as atoms, since there would be 
no intervening void between two touching bodies.  
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          This, I claim, is a fundamental objection to atomism, one that Leibniz would take up, 
rework, and develop over the years, to the point that it would become the most articulate 
objection against atoms of his philosophical maturity.
103
 More importantly for this section’s 
purposes, it has its direct source in a pertinent objection Aristotle made in the 1
st
 book of De 
Generatione et Corruptione against the Democritean argument for the indivisibility of atoms. If, 
as the Stagyrite claims, the mere absence of intermediate void is sufficient for cohesion, atoms 
should coalesce on collision. Since all atoms are made of the same fundamental matter, “why, 
when they come into contact, do they not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when 
drop touches drop (for the two cases are perfectly parallel)?”104 Leibniz immediately recognizes 
that the arguments Aristotle raised to oppose the reductionist theories of his atomist precursors 
have not lost their strength against Seventeenth-century atomism. On the assumption that mere 
contact would be sufficient for cohesion, he echoes, atoms should progressively coalesce like 
snowballs rolled through the snow. The outcome would be nothing more than the adamantine 
firmness of an absolutely solid and immutable mass of matter: a quasi-Parmenidean bulk of 
being.
105
 
          Facing these intrinsic difficulties physical considerations such as those exposed by the 
atomistic theory of matter have to be overcome through a higher metaphysical consideration. As 
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demonstrated, bodies do not possess definite quantity, figure or motion through themselves 
without necessarily presupposing an incorporeal being. This being is all the more unique, given 
the harmony of all things among themselves (harmoniam omnium inter se
106
). Leibniz marvels 
that neither an atomist such as Gassendi, nor any other insightful Seventeenth-century 
philosopher had noticed this excellent opportunity for proving the existence of God.  
          There are two points I wish to underscore here. First, the analysis of bodies is structured by 
a dual, methodological and ontological, use of the principle of sufficient reason: nature is 
organized according to intrinsic rational criteria and governed by rules of harmony as well as 
symmetry. On the one hand, Leibniz readily concedes natural laws can be discovered and 
explained autonomously through geometrical and mechanistic concepts. On the other hand, he 
emphasizes the need to distinguish between the physical and metaphysical levels that ground both 
natural phenomena and the physical laws that govern them. Hence, it is necessary to appeal to 
incorporeal principles, such as God, in explaining both natural phenomena in general and bodily 
phenomena in particular.  
          Secondly, the Confession of nature against atheists marks what I believe to be Leibniz’s 
radical departure from anything close to corpuscularianism or atomism. As I have shown, at this 
earlier stage, Leibniz takes a definite stance against atomism, a position even more significant 
since its nature is clearly Aristotelian. The primitive counterargument against atomism is based 
on a fitting objection regarding atomic cohesion and individuality. Despite its apologetic 
character, the critical apparatus of the Confessio is not merely limited to underlining the 
indispensability of the concept of God in understanding natural phenomena. This initial objection 
will be constantly reworked in Leibniz’s mature thought and its various instances will mark his 
definitive rejection of atoms. Thus, there is little doubt that the thesis claiming some form of 
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proximity or commitment to atomism on Leibniz’s part after ’68-’69 becomes tout court highly 
problematic.
107
 
 
Magis Amicus Aristoteles? From Reconcilement to a Neo-Platonic Account of Substantial 
Forms 
          Earlier in the chapter it was pointed out that Leibniz’s first philosophical enterprise was 
oriented by ample theological concerns involving both natural theology (proving the existence of 
God) and revealed theology (defending the doctrines and mysteries of Christian religion). Among 
Leibniz’s early concerns was finding a valid philosophical explanation for the Christian mystery 
of the Eucharist and the process it involved, transubstantiation. Therefore, in 1668, as a part of his 
larger plan of the Catholic Demonstrations, Leibniz explains transubstantiation by accrediting 
individuation to substantial form. Form is viewed as an active principle directly enacting a divine 
idea. Christ’s mind substitutes its special concourse for the general concourse of the divine mind. 
Thus the form of this concurrent mind transubstantiates accidents by replacing their substantial 
form and being numerically the same form as Christ’s body. My analysis in the 1st chapter has 
shown how this account presented several intrinsic difficulties regarding the origin, generation, 
and temporality of substantial forms. The same year, within a few months (September/October 
1668 – April 1669), Leibniz writes two letters to German Aristotelian Jakob Thomasius, the 
master under the aegis of whom he had pursued his first philosophical studies at Leipzig. Several 
interpreters have previously highlighted the importance of Leibniz’s correspondence with 
Thomasius, whether as the first sketch of a “systematic program” to be found in his youthful 
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writings (Konrad Moll) or as a privileged hermeneutical key for understanding the “originary 
metaphysics” and methodological eclecticism transplanted in his mature works.108  
          These letters are significant for several reasons. First, by setting out the plan of reconciling 
Aristotle and the moderns, they are immediately connected with the Confession of Nature against 
Atheists, thus allowing, in tandem, a thorough reconstruction of Leibniz’s initial philosophical 
thought. Secondly, it is worth noting that the German philosopher had chosen to publish the 
revised text of the 2
nd
, more extended letter (1669), as an Appendix to his own Dissertatio 
preliminaris to Marius Nizolius’ De veris principiis et vera philosophandi (republished in 1670). 
As a consequence of his Nominalist-minded philosophical program, in both his 1668 letter to 
Thomasius and the Preface to Nizolius, Leibniz rejects the substantial forms he had previously 
and unsuccessfully used to explain transubstantiation. 
          In continuity with my previous analysis of the Confessio, I follow a dual purpose: first, I 
outlay and examine Leibniz’s problematic program for reconciliation between Aristotle and the 
novatores. Consequently, in light of the dismissal of atomism in his first account of natural 
philosophy, the Confessio, I analyze a second rejection of corpuscularianism in his April 1669 
letter to Thomasius: Leibniz’s critical confrontation with minima naturalia theorists (Scaliger, 
Sennert, Sperling) concerning the status of prime matter and the origin and generation of forms. 
Granted that, as it will appear, Leibniz’s attempt at proving the compatibility of Aristotle and the 
innovators is intrinsically problematic and his critique of minima naturalia theorists is not 
without inaccuracy, I at least hope to have proven that, in light of his philosophical theology and 
natural philosophy, interpretations claiming a youthful Leibnizian commitment to atomism are, if 
not unsustainable, at least highly problematic.             
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          In his1668 letter to Thomasius, Leibniz expresses the hope that, given the new discoveries 
of mechanistic natural philosophy, the Seventeenth-century would soon be in possession of “a 
reformed philosophy (philosophia reformata) for the use of humankind.”109 After showing his 
support towards the new mechanistic philosophy, he then sets up the program of reconciling 
Aristotle and the novatores. In itself, this is not just a reference to the ideas of a “reformed 
philosophy” defended by his master Thomasius, himself a representative of a revival and 
reinterpretation of Aristotelianism on the side of Reformation. Leibniz goes even further by 
immediately emphasizing the connections between the reformed philosophy of the moderns and 
Aristotelian philosophy. Hence, in this epistolary exchange, he intends to prove the bold thesis 
that the reconciliation between Aristotle and the novatores is not only possible, but also provable. 
Yet, bold as it may be, this idea was neither innovative, nor particularly original at the time. Later 
on, in the Preface to Nizolius’ treatise, Leibniz recollects how his attempt at reconciling Aristotle 
with early modern natural philosophy had already been undertaken by both Sixteenth-century 
Paduan Aristotelians
110
 and contemporary Aristotelians such as Thomas White, Kenelm Digby, 
Johann de Raey, or Jakob Thomasius himself. Following these predecessors, any attempt at 
showing the “wonderful” consistency of Aristotle with the novatores has to start by 
distinguishing between the former’s authentic philosophy and the layers of corrupted 
interpretations through which the Scholastics have adulterated its meaning.    
          Without further ado, in this letter, Leibniz once again adopts the rule of mechanism 
expressed in the formula that corporeal properties are to be explained through magnitude, figure, 
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and motion: the primary attributes of bodies.
111
 Now, Leibniz claims, Aristotelian prime matter 
can easily be equated with an inert mass which lacks movement, and thus – in a universe 
excluding void – lacks shape or figure. In accordance with the demonstration of the Confessio, he 
goes on to argue that movement is imprinted onto bodies from the outside, and that figures 
produced by a group of motions and the disposition of parts are the intimate, first forms of 
bodies. These forms are derived from the (passive) power of matter upon which an external 
incorporeal principle had imprinted motion. What Leibniz expounds here is a straightforward 
mechanistic interpretation of form, where substantial forms of bodies are seen as objects of a 
geometrical discourse, expressing only potentialities of the motion of the body itself. Saying that 
forms are deduced from the passive power of matter is synonymous with saying that it is from 
this movement of matter and position of its parts, that the figure of the whole is derived. Through 
the union of two triangles, a ▲ and b▼, and their moving, material power in mutual contact, we 
can derive the form of square c █. Despite lacking an elaborate physical theory, Leibniz uses the 
rule of mechanism to constitute the grounds for a renovation of the proof of the existence of God 
as Prime Mover. Each body has its magnitude, figure, and movement from an incorporeal being, 
God. In this context, mechanism for Leibniz amounts to a denial of all physical causality 
immanent to the corporeal nature of bodies: corporeal nature receives all its mechanistic features 
from God as the governor of the material world. Substantial form is thus ruled out from the 
constituents of bodies inasmuch as it would amount to including something like an internal, 
autonomous, and spontaneous causality regarding their movement. This is what Leibniz considers 
to be the meaning of substantial forms as the Scholastics had understood them. The direct 
consequence is that incorporeal, mind-like substantial forms that would enable bodies to move 
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through themselves without an incorporeal mover outside of them, would shut off the proof of the 
existence of God as Prime Mover. Thus, they have to be rejected.  
          The idea that the Scholastics have been misinterpreting Aristotle’s Physics all along was 
generally accepted by Seventeenth-century German Aristotelianism and largely diffused in 
Leibniz’s contemporary academic environment.112 As a result of this cultural background, in his 
long letter to Thomasius from 1669, Leibniz delineates a plan to show the compatibility of 
Aristotelian theses with those of the novatores. Redefining the terms of his position in relation to 
the innovators’ theses, he daringly asserts that in the chapters of Aristotle’s Physics he has found 
more approvable opinions than in Descartes’ meditations. To this he adds that all eight of 
Aristotle’s books of the Physics can be accepted, while at the same time preserving reformed 
philosophy.
113
 The arguments in Aristotle’s Physics regarding matter, form, privation, nature, 
place, infinity, time, and motion are proven certain, while the ones concerning the void and 
motion in the void have to be rejected or at least considered doubtful.
114
 Here, Leibniz considers 
the debate on the problem of the void as unnecessary to natural philosophy. 
          After setting up this theoretical platform, Leibniz believes that, once it is demonstrated that 
the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian natural philosophy (form, matter, change) can easily be 
translated in the modern terms of figure, size, and motion, the possibility of reconciliation 
between Aristotle and the novatores is immediately proven. As a consequence, he sets up an 
attempt to redefine the Aristotelian principles of the physical world in modern concepts. The first 
such concept is prime matter, defined as mass itself, the sum of extension and impenetrability 
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(antitypia).
115
 Matter is continuous and undivided into parts – thus no actual boundaries can be 
identified between its “internal parts”.116  In order to contrast a possible objection against the 
Thomistic conception of prime matter as pure potency being a non ens, Leibniz makes matter an 
entity prior to all form, possessing its own existence, and identical with Averroes’ indeterminate 
or indefinite quantity. As a result, the (passive) power of this indeterminate matter is its 
divisibility. What breaks up the uninformed, pure homogeneity of prime matter is form: nothing 
but “figure” or terminus corporis, i.e., that which delimits and characterizes the specific structure 
of an individual body with respect to others.
117
 That figure could be identified with Aristotelian 
form was certainly a possibility left open by Aristotle himself, when in the Physics he had talked 
about the coinciding limits of the container and the contained (περιεχόμενον) and of those whom 
identify place with form.
118
 While entirely passive and not an essential property of natural things, 
figure sometimes “recurs in physical arguments as a kind of stand-in or likeness of form, 
especially substantial form.”119 In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, a late Scholastic like 
Franciscus Toletus (1532-1596) underlines the analogy and marks it as an error: 
[…] the figures of things are strongly analogous to substantial forms. For as proper 
substantial forms are consequent upon singular things and species, so too are their exterior 
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figures; so that indeed many have mistakenly judged that substantial form is nothing other 
than this exterior form.
120
    
We can see that in 1669, Leibniz considers it unnecessary to unjustifiably multiply entities as the 
Scholastics have done and thereby adopts this “error”: a non-Scholastic and non-Aristotelian 
account of substantial forms. Forms are not “incorporeal entities” glued onto the extended body 
of each substance, but rather figures: actual dispositions of matter.
121
 In my view, his definition of 
substantial form as figure or terminus corporis is a clear attempt to geometrize Aristotelian forms 
by appealing to the Euclidean definition of figure, i.e., that which is contained (περιεχόμενον) by 
some boundary or boundaries.
122
 Again, similar to 1668, no internal, autonomous, and 
spontaneous causality is attributed to bodies via forms regarding their movement. Forms are a 
principle of mobility residing in the nature of bodies, not a principle of motion through 
themselves.
123
 A principle of movement is not to be sought after in the substantial forms per se, 
like Scholasticism had erroneously claimed. Instead, motion necessitates the intervention of an 
external efficient causality through which it generates a kind of mutual flow of the parts of a body 
in different directions, thus creating determinate figures. This movement is necessary for the 
generation of forms, since division originates from motion and the boundaries of different parts 
derive from division. The figures or forms are deduced from these boundaries. As a result, forms 
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derive from the power of matter not by generating something new, but by chiseling away the 
default, the old (like a column modeled from a block of marble). Dividing existing matter they 
form new boundaries of bodily parts.
124
 The primary origin of movement is a first form realiter 
abstracted from matter and causally efficient, a Mens. To return Aristotle’s Prime Mover,125 the 
primary and efficient cause of motion is the free and spontaneous activity of mind as the ens 
cogitans radically heterogeneous with respect to corporeity.
126
  
          In conclusion, by being the reason for both the diversification of matter and the origin of 
substantial forms, movement becomes the common denominator that allows for an understanding 
of natural multiplicity. While inspired by Aristotle,
127
 the analogy between sculpting and the 
natural process generating forms is, in last analysis, not only radically mechanistic, but also Neo-
Platonic. Writing to Thomasius in 1668, Leibniz controversially claims that after metaphysics, 
geometry was among the perfectissima scientiarum for Aristotle
128
: a flagrant misinterpretation in 
his master’s opinion.129 Rather than answering this hammering objection, in another letter from 
1669, Leibniz once more reiterates that geometry deals with substantial forms, rejects their 
traditional interpretation, and surreptitiously construes them on a dualistic, Cartesian basis. 
Furthermore, this construal is, withal, resolutely Neo-Platonic. Since both are abstracted from 
matter, Mens, the primary and causally efficient form responsible for movement, has the same 
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separate status with the pure (and qualified as substantial) form studied by geometry. It generates 
forms by introducing organized motions into a matter that in itself is inert and indeterminate. The 
arithmetical and geometrical nature of forms (as figurae) is a Neo-Platonic cosmological 
interpretation of all forms that organize matter.
130
 Yet, while it was rejected by Late Scholastics 
such as Toletus, Aristotle’s open possibility was exploited by more than just ancient Neo-
Platonists. Along with a similar role attributed to God as Prime Mover, we find the same 
interpretation of Aristotelian substantial forms qua geometrical, Euclidean figures in Erhard 
Weigel, Leibniz’s other influential teacher at Jena.131 In his Philosophia mathematica, Weigel 
emphasizes one of his main teachings and states that: “[…] only God will be nature acting as 
nature […] moving all without being moved himself.”132 This is very similar to Leibniz’s 
fundamental argument from the Confessio Naturae and the 26 September/6 October 1668 letter to 
Thomasius that the cause of motion for bodies is not an internal incorporeal being, but a mind 
that governs the whole world, i.e., God.
133
    
           
Leibniz against the Minima Naturalia Theory: on the Origin of Forms 
          The highly idiosyncratic non-Aristotelian
134
 and non-Scholastic account of forms fleshed 
out in the previous section is Leibniz’s response to the vexata controversia of the origin and 
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generation of substantial forms.  He believes a contemporary such as Hermann Conring could 
not solve this controversy, other than through postulating the generation of forms ex nihilo.
135
 
Armed with this account of substantial form, Leibniz sets out to defend the Scholastic and 
supposedly Aristotelian doctrine of the eduction of forms against a triad of novatores and minima 
naturalia theorists. The most significant of these novatores is Wittenberg professor of medicine 
and atomist Daniel Sennert (1572-1637).   
          As noted earlier, Seventeenth-century revisionist interpretations of Aristotle’s natural 
philosophy flourished in German universities. Directed towards Aristotelianism, this revisionist 
hermeneutical wave was connected to the enormous success of two distinct doctrines that 
directly contributed to the emergence of early modern corpuscular theories of matter: the minima 
naturalia theory and the semina rerum doctrine. One important aspect of the first of these 
doctrines was that, although usually seen as distinct from atomism, the minima naturalia theories 
of matter never rejected the Aristotelian concept of substantial form. A 2
nd
 half of the Sixteenth-
century supporter of the natural minima doctrine, Julius Caesar Scaliger reinterpreted minima as 
particles, thus paving the way to corpuscular philosophy and the legacy of Daniel Sennert’s 
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qualitative atomism (minima as atoms).
136
 While supporting atomism against Aristotle, Sennert’s 
disciple, Johannes Sperling (1603-1658), also pointed out the Scholastic misinterpretations of 
Aristotle’s Physics. His Institutiones physicae were reprinted six times between 1642 and 1672 
and were adopted as one of the basic textbooks in the majority of German universities. These are 
three natural philosophers, atomists, or novatores, whom Leibniz sets out to attack on account of 
their view of substantial forms.   
          In the letter to Thomasius from April 1669, Leibniz follows his teacher’s footsteps in 
giving a rather lengthy list of the novatores.
137
 From this extended general list, Leibniz selects, 
retracing Thomasius’ historical-comparative approach, minima naturalia theorist Daniel 
Sennert
138
 and his disciple Johannes Sperling, to whom he adds Julius Caesar Scaliger. Through 
this name association, Leibniz is able to accurately identify the lineage of a very particular 
doctrine: Scaliger as a source for Sennert and Sperling’s minima naturalia theories. Thus, in his 
response to Thomasius, he discusses this group’s view on the particular issue of the origin of 
substantial forms. Together with his letter from the 2
nd
 of October 1668 Thomasius sent Leibniz 
a short disputation he had publicly defended on the 20
th
 of June 1668. In the booklet, he was 
taking a stand against the assimilation of God with prime matter.
139
 In his long 1669 letter, 
Leibniz adds his own personal comments to the disputation:  
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Moreover, it seems to me that, Scaliger, Sennert, and Sperling (who publicly claims to be 
the later’s disciple) align themselves with this opinion that God is the prime matter of 
things, since they claim that forms are educed, not from the passive power of matter, but 
from the active power of the efficient cause. Consequently, they believe God produces 
creatures from his own active power, instead of the objective power or, so to speak, 
passive power of nothingness. Thus, according to their position, God produces things 
from him self (ex se) and is their first matter.
140
 
In this comment Leibniz reiterates a reference to the Scholastic dictum that forms derive from 
the passive power of matter (forma educitur a materia), a position he had previously adopted in 
1668.
141
 Thomasius responds by defending the traditional meaning of this dictum. He attributes 
its origin to Aristotle, who, contrary to Plato situating substantial forms in God, believed that 
forms are immersed in matter: therefore the expression that forms are derived from the passive 
power of matter. Despite its supposed origin, the expression is not found in Aristotle’s work, 
the controversial proposition being attributed to Aristotle by the Scholastics. The Majority of 
medieval philosophers held this theory, Thomas Aquinas in particular, but also Sixteenth-
century textbook authors, such as Franciscus Toletus (1535-1610), Benito Pereira (1535-1610) 
or young Leibniz’s acquaintance, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617).142 Aquinas, for instance, 
classifies two different types of substantial forms. On the one hand, the rational souls: the only 
subsisting incorporeal forms. On the other, the inhering, perishable material forms that are 
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educed from matter. He thus holds the view that all forms other than the human rational souls, 
the material substantial forms, are not created but educed from pre-existing matter and 
destroyed when the body disintegrates. Thus, a natural substantial change consists in a new 
material form emerging from the non-being or pure potentia of prime matter: what Leibniz here 
calls the passive power of matter.
143
  
          In the preface to the reader of his 13
th
 Books on Natural Philosophy, Sennert lays down 
some of the doctrines concerning the origin of substantial forms:  
There are the greatest disagreements among the philosophers concerning the true origin 
of the form […]. Aristotle and his commentators say that neither matter nor form is 
generated but a composite […]. If you ask a Peripatetic […] where the form comes from, 
he will say it’s educed from the potency of matter […] Others hold, with Plato, that the 
Ideas are the effective cause of forms, and from him later writers introduced the world 
soul. Avicenna thought the cause was the tenth Intelligence, in his language Cholcodea 
[…]. Fernel, and others with him, stated the heavens to be the effective cause of forms 
[…]. Some Peripatetics say that matter does not actually contain forms in itself, but that 
there is in matter a certain disposition towards form which. When completed, becomes in 
actuality what it already was potentially.
144
  
Throughout his treatise Sennert opposes the first among these doctrines: the eduction of forms 
from the power of matter. Against the eduction theory of substantial forms, he affirms that the 
generation of natural things depends on the multiplication and propagation of souls. The eduction 
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of forms from the passive power of matter, Sennert adds, is an opinion originating in ignorance 
regarding the creation of the world. He finds the ascribed source of this doctrine, whether 
Aristotelian or Averroist, questionable. However, its remote source might be found in the treatise 
on Meteors (Book I, ch. 4), in whcih Aristotle makes a distinction between actuality and 
potentiality in this world and actuality is ascribed a celestial origin. This distinction led 
Scholastics to postulate an external agent responsible for bringing some disposition towards form 
into matter. But in Sennert’s opinion, the doctrine of eduction is based on the commentators of 
Aristotle misunderstanding the analogy between the artificial and natural generation of things. 
He argues that in the classical example of a statue or column sculpted from marble or wood there 
is nothing like a form induced into matter, but only an accident, quality or shape. Consequently, 
there is no power of matter involved, if not an obediential one. Sennert claims that when it comes 
to the natural process of the generation of forms, the example used by Aristotle in Metaphysics 
1048 a 32-33, muddled the issue of artificial and natural generation.
145
 There is a first difference 
at stake here between Sennert and Leibniz regarding the natural process generating forms. For 
Leibniz sees the Aristotelian analogy with sculpture as paradigmatic and perfectly parallel with 
the mechanist, natural process of the genesis of forms.  
          Sennert’s account of forms and their generation admits a plurality of hierarchical forms, 
both supervening substantial forms and subordinate ones. In living things, souls are the specific 
supervening form; in inanimate things, Sennert adopts Scaliger’s view “[…] that every form of 
every perfectly mixed body, although it is not a soul, it is a fifth essence or substance, far 
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different from the four elements.”146 Further on in Hypomnemata physica (1636) he fleshes out 
several properties of forms. First of all, forms have no quantity and therefore cannot be divided; 
secondly, they are extended according to the extension of matter, since form fills its entire 
matter. Lastly, although forms are indivisible in themselves, because they are coextensive with 
the whole body possessing quantity and therefore being dividable, they are capable of number 
and multiplication into many individuals. While grounding his rejection of the doctrine of the 
eduction of forms, this power of self-multiplication is not one and the same for plants, animals, 
and humans. The view that substantial forms are self-multipliable (as opposed to eduction) 
presupposes that forms propagate through semina rerum, seeds composed of a spiritual and 
material part, as agents endowed with formative power. Seeds are the vehicle for souls 
(themselves self-multipliable) and substantial forms. The spiritual part of these seminal 
principles organizing matter is a spirit or semi-material substance, acting subordinately and 
instrumentally to these immaterial formative principles (form or soul) in plants and animals. 
These seeds are composed of a spiritual and material part, and, as agents endowed with 
formative power, they constitute the vehicle for souls (themselves self-multipliable) as well as 
substantial forms. The spiritual part of these seminal principles organizing matter is a spirit, or 
semi-material substance acting subordinately and instrumentally to these immaterial formative 
principles (form or soul) in plants and animals. What about the prime matter these forms or seeds 
organize? Sennert maintains that, although prime matter has a proper essence and being of its 
own, since it is characterized by indeterminate extension, matter has no specific length, breadth 
or depth unless determined by a substantial form. Therefore, matter does not have an actual 
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existence apart from substantial form.
147
 In 1669, Leibniz also admits prime matter is 
characterized by indeterminate extension, but, contrary to Sennert, he regards matter as more 
substantial than corporeity itself. Prime matter is an entity anterior to any form, possessing its 
own actual existence. Defined by occupying some space even without movement or 
discontinuity, its essence or forma corporeitatis consists in impenetrability (antitypia).
148
 His 
main objection against minima naturalia theorists is that by rejecting the doctrine of the eduction 
of forms from the passive power of matter, they conceive of matter as an active power from 
which forms are derived. The consequence of this last assumption would be that by identifying 
prime matter to God, minima naturalia theories relate the origin of forms to divine efficient 
action. It becomes clear from this objection that, for Leibniz in 1669, the adoption of anything 
like a semina rerum or minima naturalia doctrine in order to account for the generation of forms, 
would imply that somehow material, physical mass would act qua mass. This is an implication 
Leibniz is unwilling to admit because it would violate the principle according to which matter is 
purely passive. Thus, the contrasting position he lets us understand indirectly is based on a 
distinction between creation ex nihilo (from the objective power of nothingness) and the 
generation of forms (from the passive power of matter). But we also have to note that the second 
point of his critique against Sennert is very problematic. The claim that Sennert ends up relating 
the origin of forms to God’s efficient action seems to disregard a distinction present in the 
Wittenberg atomist’s work, between the action of God in the beginning of creation and the origin 
of specific forms
149
, in the sense that Leibniz seems to misunderstand God’s role in the 
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generation of individual forms.
150
 Grounding his objection on the difference between the passive 
power of matter of the Scholastics and the supposed active power of God invoked by the minima 
naturalia doctrine, Leibniz claims that Sennert, Sperling, and Scaliger were led to posit God as 
the prime matter of things: an extremely controversial claim.  
          It is therefore, unclear whether as early as 1669 Leibniz had an actual profound knowledge 
of Sennert’s writings, and consequently, whether at this stage he could have supported an atomist 
position of Sennertian influence. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
          In what follows I will summarize Leibniz’s positions with respect to the problem of 
individuation and atomism between 1668 and 1671.  
          Leibniz’s pre-Parisian writings were informed by several philosophical and theological 
concerns. Ursula Goldenbaum believes that Leibniz’s 1668 attempt to give an adequate 
philosophical explanation of the Christian mystery of the Eucharist was central to these 
preoccupations and therefore “[…] we have to see all his writings in light of this concern.”151 A 
closely dated text such as the Confessio naturae contra atheistas, is no less significant. First, as I 
have demonstrated throughout this chapter, there Leibniz takes a definite stance against atomism. 
Secondly, it is an important attempt on Leibniz’s behalf to reconcile the new mechanistic 
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philosophy with Christian orthodoxy. The conception of God and his role in the Confessio 
naturae permeates all throughout Leibniz’s other writings from this period. Leibniz demonstrates 
that mechanical philosophy cannot satisfactorily explain its central concepts (shape, size, 
motion) and therefore it has to appeal to an external, incorporeal moving and individuating 
principle, “a mind ruling the whole world, that is, God.”152 Indeed, when we first get a glimpse 
of Leibniz’s view of substantial forms, in a text attempting to demonstrate the possibility of 
transubstantiation (De transubstantiatione, 1668), he gives a Neo-Platonic account of forms and  
defines them as active principles, enactments of divine ideas. Consequently, this external 
principal of individuation was held only for human beings and God, because any other corporeal 
substances can only be individuated through the general concourse of God and his mind. But the 
Eucharistic species, bread and wine, are not each and every substance: this interpretation of 
substantial forms led to difficulties concerning the individuation of corporeal substances besides 
Christ’s body and the Christic corporeal substance in the Eucharist. When formulating the first 
rudiments of a natural philosophy, Leibniz had to extend substantial forms from theology to 
physics. Therefore, to address these issues, in the letter to Thomasius from 26
th
 September/6
th
 
October 1668, Leibniz now defines substantial forms of corporeal substances as the disposition 
of parts, educed through motion from the passive power of matter, and states that: “It is not 
absurd to call substantial form the intimate figure of the parts of a body.”153 Less than a year 
later, writing to the same correspondent, Leibniz develops an account of substantial forms 
conceived as geometrical figures. No longer merely ideas in God’s mind, substantial forms are 
now important for the body itself and central to an understanding of the physical world. “Form-
figures” were obviously meant to give a better account of the individuation of corporeal 
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substances in the realm of natural philosophy, away from revealed theology. Yet, in his attempt 
to reconcile Aristotle and the novatores, Leibniz is both non-Aristotelian and an anti-atomist. 
First, he is a non-Aristotelian, because he rejects the traditional Scholastic interpretation of forms 
conceived as omnipresent, immaterial entities, principles of activity internal to corporeal 
substances and thus responsible for their autonomous motion. Secondly, he is an anti-atomist, as 
a result of attacking the account of forms of the minima naturalia and semina rerum corpuscular 
theories of matter. In his opinion, Sennert’s view of substantial form encasing atoms or minima 
would lead to a divinization of nature.
154
 Thus, both the Scholastic and the contemporary atomist 
view of forms are rejected for unnecessary multiplying incorporeal entities.
155
 However, while 
criticizing the Scholastic interpretation of substantial forms as self-moving principles inherent to 
bodies, Leibniz is much more charitable towards Scholastic accounts of the origin and generation 
of forms. Leibniz explains the eductive origin of substantial forms by introducing motion into 
matter through a primary form, that’s abstracted from it (leading back to the revival of the proof 
of the existence of God as Prime Mover). Thus, roughly speaking, there are two types of 
substantial forms, according to a dualist, almost Cartesian reclassification:  
Who could imagine an entity which does not participate neither to extension, nor to 
mind? What use to posit incorporeal souls of beast and plants, and substantial forms of 
elements and metals which would not possess extension?
156
  
We can now make more sense of Leibniz’s account of substantial forms in 1668-1669. On the 
one hand, the ontological fabric of the world includes the indivisible, spiritual principles of 
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activity, the substantial forms of human beings, and the primary immaterial form, which is 
endowed with efficient causality and is responsible for motion. This first form is identified with 
mens seu ens cogitans and, in last analysis, with God as the governor of the natural world, the 
efficient cause of movement in the universe. A second ontological layer is made up by the 
extended and thus divisible, material form-figures of non-rational beings (animals and plants) 
and inanimate bodies (elements, metals). These entities have to rely on God qua concurrent mens 
or ens cogitans as their principle of activity and motion, since freedom and spontaneity belong 
only to minds.
157
      
          Given this classification of substantial forms, Leibniz explains their production through 
what I call, “mechanist heterogenesis.”158 Against accounts of the generation of forms based on 
the propagation of seeds or astral influences, common to both atomism and corpuscular theories 
of matter,
159
 young Leibniz explains the generation of new forms through a sort of heterogenesis. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a generation of new forms, since the eduction of forms happens 
through the chiseling away of the old material. In this way, forms of living beings or inanimate 
bodies do not arise from the imposition or propagation of form on suitably disposed matter, but 
rather through the corruption of older forms and the emergence of newer ones out of them. In his 
famous 1669 letter to Jakob Thomasius, referencing Hooke’s Micrographia’s examples of 
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spontaneous generation, Leibniz indicates that the new discoveries of microscopy have revealed 
a sort of universal heterogenesis, not just of biological, animated creatures but of elements and 
metals as well. As a consequence, he adopts the novatores’ simplified account of change in terms 
of local motion and makes sense of Aristotle’s four-part analysis of cause (generation and 
corruption, increase and decrease, alteration, and change of place) by reducing substantial 
change to accidental change or alteration, viewed mechanistically as the subtle movement of 
parts:  
 I observe in advance that numerically one and the same change may be the generation of 
one being and the alteration of another; for example, since we know that putrefaction 
consists in little worms invisible to the naked eye, any putrid infection is an alteration of 
man, a generation of worm. Hooke shows similarly in his Micrographia that iron rust is a 
minute forest which has sprung up; to rust is therefore an alteration of iron but a generation 
of little bushes.
160
 
Thus, rejecting spontaneous generation, Leibniz claims that forms are generated from the 
environment, not ex nihilo, but rather from the preexisting material of other forms. The alteration 
of these forms brings about what we call “generation,” which can be explained along 
mechanistic lines, in terms of change of place alone. This is the meaning of forms being educed 
through motion, from the passive power of matter. Once again, I wish to underline that, 
throughout this period, Leibniz defines body as space or extension and figure as the limit of the 
body. Bodies can move by reciprocally transmitting motion, but the source of this capacity, for 
non-human bodies, must be outside the body. Since the principle of action or motion in a body 
cannot be the body itself, bodies lack an internal principle of individuation or motion. This 
principle has to be either the divine mind, or the human mind. 
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          Did this highly idiosyncratic account of substantial forms enjoy any continuity in Leibniz’s 
work? Interestingly enough, the same view of substantial forms is repeated almost verbatim, a 
couple of years later, in a physical treatise, Theoria motus concreti (Winter 1670/1671), in which 
Leibniz claims that:  
The mind aside, certain substantial forms, are not, even in Aristotle’s sense, absolute 
beings, but a certain relation, proportion, number or intimate structure of the parts of the 
bodies.
161
  
Therefore, by the time he elaborates a consistent (and less jejune) physical theory, Leibniz still 
seems to hold the same view of substantial forms from his letters to Thomasius. Yet, between the 
first Latin letter to Arnauld written in November 1671, and the few letters exchanged with 
Hermann Conring in February-March 1678, there is only one other textual occurrence of 
“substantial form” in his early works. In a text dating from the Parisian years, 1673-1675, 
Leibniz reinterprets substantial forms in the framework of his doctrine of conatus: 
What then shall we add to extension to complete the concept of body? Certainly nothing 
which sense does not verify. Sense, namely, establishes three things at once: that we 
sense; that bodies are sensed; and that what is sensed is varied and composite, or 
extended. To the concept of extension or variety, therefore, is to be added that of action. 
A body is therefore an extended agent. It can be said that it is an extended substance, only 
if it be held that all substance acts, and all agents are substances. It can be shown 
adequately from the essential principles of metaphysics that what does not act does not 
exist, for there is no power of acting without a beginning of action. You say there is no 
little power in a bent bow, yet it does not act. But I say, on the contrary, that it does act; 
even before it is suddenly released, it strives. But all striving [conatus] is action. For the 
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rest, much that is excellent and certain can be said about the nature of conatus and the 
principles of action, or as the Scholastics called it, of substantial forms.
162
  
Two points stand out in this passage. First, Leibniz criticizes the Cartesian conception of matter: 
body is conceived as an “extended agent” and no longer merely as an extended thing filling up 
space. Secondly, in an equally unorthodox interpretation, Leibniz claims that what is substantial 
about the body as agens extensum is a principle of action, conatus or substantial form, “as the 
Scholastics called it.”  
          In light of these idiosyncratic and sometimes contradictory developments, it becomes clear 
that between 1668 and 1670, Leibniz toys with different and, at times, unsatisfactory 
understandings of substantial form. Consequently, he does not maintain the same view when it 
comes to individuation for very long. He also rejects contemporary atomism on several counts:  
1. Gassendian atomism’s inability to provide an adequate explanation for the cohesion of bodies 
(Confessio naturae);  
2) Sennertian atomism’s view of substantial forms and their origin (Correspondence with 
Thomasius)  
3) It seems that given early Leibniz’s great concern for giving an adequate explanation of 
transubstantiation, atomism contradicts the dogma of real presence: how could the body of Christ 
really be present in the Eucharist, if only impenetrable, material particles and their motion in the 
bread and wine exist?   
          There are also broader consequences of these early Leibnizian attempts at explaining the 
origin and duration of substantial forms. The account Leibniz gives of substantial forms in 1669 
will be abandoned because it was dangerously close to pantheism and the doctrine of God as 
World-Soul. As a consequence, no other elaborate attempt at developing the use of substantial 
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forms in natural philosophy will be advanced by Leibniz until the re-establishment of substantial 
forms in 1678-1679 (Conspectus libelli elementorum physicae; Thoughts for the Instauration of 
a New Physics). Furthemore, even his grandiose project of reconciling Aristotelian natural 
philosophy with the physics of the novatores will not enjoy any posterity once Leibniz develops 
his first elaborate physical theories: the 1671 Hypothesis physica nova and the two theories of 
motion (Theoria motus abstracti; Theoria motus concreti).                  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FRAMING HYPOTHESES: THE PSEUDO-ENIGMATIC ATOMISM OF YOUNG 
LEIBNIZ 
 
“You have hit the nail on the head. 
 And I am amazed there has been no one hitherto who has sensed that this is my game.  
For it is not the job of philosophers to always take things seriously.  
In framing hypotheses, as you rightly point out, they try out the force of their ingenium.”163 
Leibniz to Christopher Matthäus Pfaff, 2 May 1716 
 
          The second-hand origin of one of Leibniz’s last letters makes it difficult to establish this 
account’s credibility. Nevertheless, one can distinguish an underlying tone that is genuinely 
Leibnizian: a significant hint towards understanding Leibniz’s philosophical attitude that 
discloses a profound feature of his thought. Philosophers invent or “frame” hypotheses, thus 
testing the capacities of their intellectual abilities. The general impression we get is that, for 
Leibniz, philosophy involves a disengaged attitude tending to assimilate, in the last instance, the 
activity of philosophizing to a kind of intellectual play. Of course, what I have in mind here is 
something rather contingent: neither a matter of the exoteric/esoteric distinction like Bertrand 
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 Acta Eruditorum, 1728, 127. In full this passage concerns the Essais de Théodicée: “Ita prorsus est, Vir 
summe reverende, uti scribis, de Theodicaea mea. Rem acu tetigisti. Et miror neminem hactenus fuisse, 
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Russell had argued,
164
 nor some Straussian persecution drift. Leibniz’s thought twists and turns, 
sometimes in the space of only a few months, sometimes from one interlocutor to another. This 
feature emerges even more clearly when it comes to some of his life-long projects, such as the 
attempt to reunify the Catholic and Protestant churches. In discussions with representatives of 
different confessions, his opinion seems to shift from one correspondent to the other, whether he 
is speaking with the Catholic Bossuet or the Protestant Paul Pellisson-Fontanier. No doubt the 
ecumenical concern is authentic. Yet it seems Leibniz is more interested in achieving pragmatic 
results than in doctrinal orthodoxy. In other circumstances, those of his published scientific 
articles, he tailors his language to his audience so that it will appear more familiar to them: 
In those [journals] of Leipzig I accommodate what I say to some extent to the language 
of the School [Scholasticism]; in the others [Paris, Holland] I accommodate myself 
rather to the style of the Cartesians.
165
  
Thus, as the opening passage suggests, the philosopher or scientist limits himself to constructing 
coherent hypotheses endowed with explanatory power, but he does not directly commit to the 
truth-value of his conjectures or claim that they give an accurate description of reality 
independent of our knowledge. In matters that normally imply strong feelings, the philosophical 
attitude dictates that he assume a position far from any emotional and personal involvement. If 
we thoroughly scavenge the gigantic amount of material Leibniz left behind, we can certainly 
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argue for such different make-ups of his philosophy. According to different texts, these might be 
a Platonic theory of ideas, the revival of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance, at the same time 
realism and idealism, sometimes maybe even occasionalist or Spinozistic leanings. With a 
conspicuous exception, his passionate hostility towards what he sees as different forms of 
materialism, Leibniz brings together disparate and sometimes even radically opposed 
philosophical doctrines. This seems to be his stance towards all philosophical doctrines: 
I have found that most of the sects are right in a good part of what they propose, but not 
so much in what they deny. The formalists, Platonists and Aristotelians, for example, are 
right in seeking the source of things in final and formal causes. But they are wrong in 
neglecting efficient and material causes and in inferring from this, as did Henry More in 
England and certain other Platonists, that there are phenomena which cannot be explained 
mechanically. The materialists, on the other hand, or those who accept only a mechanical 
philosophy, are wrong in rejecting metaphysical considerations and trying to explain 
everything in terms of that which depends on imagination (ce qui depend de 
l’ima ination).166 
Yet, and this is easy to concede, there are few philosophical doctrines or positions Leibniz is 
more passionate about throughout his career than the rejection of atomism. As early as the 
Confession of Nature Against Atheists (1669) in which Leibniz offers his first detailed critique of 
atomism, it is clear that his negative target was materialism, which he perceived as a reductionist 
“naturalism” that would eventually lead to atheism. His idea of materialism is that of a 
description of the natural world aiming at offering an exhaustive explanation of all physical 
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 February 1714, GP III, top of 607. Leroy Loemker translates the underlined 
part as “in terms of sense experience.” I chose to translate the passage literally, because, as I show in this 
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phenomena on the sole basis of the concepts of matter and movement. In Leibniz’s time, the 
prevailing materialist account of the physical world was offered by the atomistic point of view. 
Atomism rested on the assumption of the existence of congeries of very small parcels of matter 
endowed with infinite hardness, which aggregate and disaggregate, therefore giving rise to 
ordinary bodies.  
          In his mature years, Leibniz reacted vehemently against the view that the nature of matter 
is particulate. I, therefore, return to my question from the previous chapter, in which I delineated 
the reasons for Leibniz’s strong Aristotelian opposition to atomism and the minima naturalia 
doctrines of Scaliger and Sennert on the specific issue of the origin of substantial forms. Did 
early Leibniz truly embrace atomism between 1666 and 1676?
167
 Was atomism an actual 
ontological commitment or merely a “framed” hypothesis meant to play a negative role in his 
natural philosophy and then subsequently abandoned? Attempting to answer this set of questions 
will not only help clarify the relationship between the two main issues that form my concern 
here, individuation and atomism in Leibniz’s philosophy, but will also eventually lead to the 
main point of my thesis: what was the motivation behind the “atoms of substance” of late 
Leibniz’s more “fundamental” ontology?    
          Let me illustrate the point in more detail. Leibniz does refer to some sort of atoms, 
minima, vortices, etc. during his Paris period and before that. Texts from early on in De Summa 
Rerum seem to show him ready to admit the existence of a void,
168
 while others, sometimes 
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 This presumed short atomist phase in Leibniz’s thought is seen by some interpreters (Mormino 1999, 
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written only a few months later, seem to argue for the existence of both atoms and a plenum.
169
 
Before Paris, he also refers to bullae, “flowers of substance”, semina rerum or similar notions. 
These views are indeed similar to some of the ancient or even contemporary Seventeenth-century 
atomist theories and might have been influenced by them. Yet the question persists: does the 
sometimes confusing and contradictory, nevertheless complex variety of views Leibniz expounds 
during this decade, indicate that he truly and fully upheld atomism? My answer in this chapter 
would have to be a negative one, followed by several clarifications.  
          First of all, it appears that early on, Leibniz’s theory of matter and his attempted solutions 
to both the continuum problem and mind-body problem needed some sort of elementary or 
particulate constituents (bullae) or even physical indivisibles (“obscure” flowers of substance). 
In this sense, I believe that Leibniz does flirt with some kind of atomism during the Paris years. 
Yet, as I argue in this section, the Paris episode has to be understood in the larger framework of a 
bundle of interrelated problems: cans of worms both his tentative, youthful writings on 
individuation and the more elaborate attempts at physical theories (Hypothesis Physica Nova, 
Theoria Motus Abstracti) left open. These problems can be summarized as follows: how do 
bodies cohere, how do they manifest their qualities on a phenomenal level, and – more 
importantly – what makes them individual bodies? In the first and second chapters, I showed 
how between 1663 and 1672, Leibniz toyed with different solutions to the problem of 
individuation until inherent difficulties resulting from postulating substantial forms as 
individuating principles led him to abandon substantial forms altogether and search for specific 
alternatives. The concept of substantial form is replaced, with various degrees of commitment, 
by either an entirely external principle of individuation (Confessio Philosophi, 1672-1673) or by 
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the concept of mind and its interpretation through indivisibles or points.
170
 But cohesion and 
individuation, the problems Leibniz had to deal with all throughout his early years, could not be 
solved without addressing an even more fundamental problem: how to integrate minds into the 
system? And, as I claim in the opening chapter, there is always a guiding thread to Leibniz’s 
Parisian notes: matter is always connected to mind, held together by a mind or a mind-like 
substance; it only exists in virtue of a relation to mind. 
 
Disentangling Presumed Enigmas     
          The claim that in his early years and Paris period (1666-1676) Leibniz had subscribed to 
both atomism and the void rests upon several types of arguments or textual support:  
1. Leibniz’s different accounts and claims about his own intellectual formation (specifically the 
claim that he at some point supported both atomism and the void). 
2. Surface readings overstating the “influence” early Seventeenth-century atomists such as 
Gassendi and Sennert might have had on young Leibniz.
171
 
3. Texts lending support for an atomist phase in Leibniz’s thought dating from either the Paris 
period, or pre-dating it.
172
  
                                                 
170
 As I show in the following section of this chapter, one such specific alternative to Scholastic 
hylomorphism is represented by Leibniz’s early doctrine of the “flower of substance”. 
 
171
 Especially Moll’s trilogy Der Junge Leibniz, volume 2 on Leibniz and Gassendi; and Arthur: “Animal 
Generation and Substance in Sennert and Leibniz”, 304-359 in The Problem of Animal Generation in 
Modern Philosophy edited by Justin Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; “The Enigma 
of Leibniz’s Atomism”, Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume 1, 183-227, 2003. 
 
172
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          I will try to treat each of these points one at a time, supporting my argument with close-
readings of the early Leibnizian corpus and, more specifically, with a useful comparison between 
Leibniz’s published and unpublished works throughout his early period.  
          I argue that although some of the early writings show Leibniz flirting with atomist notions, 
these texts can only be taken for granted to a certain extent. Thus, whichever conception about 
atoms Leibniz appears to be presenting there, the sum of the instances does not amount to 
definitive proof towards claiming a serious commitment to atomism on his behalf. I address 
claims to the contrary
173
 by re-examining the context in which Leibniz’s views were formulated 
from several angles: 1) the early published and manuscript textual sources and the differences 
between them, 2) the several accounts Leibniz gives of his intellectual formation, 3) early 
Leibniz’s view on the source of atomism, 4) the fundamental differences between early Leibniz’s 
views and the supposed “influences” of Sennert and Gassendi, 5) the continuity between some of 
Leibniz’s early anti-atomist views and the mature position. Finally, against both the strong 
commitment thesis (Arthur) and the continuity thesis (Mercer
174
), I reveal that in spite of his 
Parisian flirtations with atomism, Leibniz does arrive at something far more significant than 
either an atomist theory of matter or proto-atoms of substance or proto-monads. Leibniz 
discovers the regulative principle of the equivalence between full cause and entire effect, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
texts. If that’s not enough, most of the connections he makes with early Seventeenth-century atomist 
literature are highly conjectural (Mormino 1999, 260-261). 
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“Ariadnic thread” that would lead him outside the labyrinth of the continuum and into his 
mature, anti-atomist natural philosophy and metaphysics. This principles helps him formulate 
what will become two landmark doctrines of his maturity. He can now, 1) reformulate an internal 
principle of individuation stating that for matter to be individuated, it has to be connected to a 
mind that will retain the memory or traces of its production 
175
 and, 2) arrive at a primitive 
version of his mature theory of complete concepts.
176
      
          Let me start ad fontes, the textual basis itself. More recently or not, several Leibniz 
commentators, most notably Richard Arthur,
177
 have argued for an atomist phase in early 
Leibnizian thought, with slightly different degrees of commitment to atomism on Leibniz’s part. 
For the most part, the textual support offered towards these claims is a large collection of notes, 
marginalia, or workshop drafts penned down by Leibniz right before and during his Paris stay. 
Published by the Akademie Ausgabe as volume VI.3, this extended body of work, making up 
almost seven-hundred pages, lends proof to Leibniz’s wide variety of philosophical, physical, 
metaphysical, and theological concerns.  
           A first section (A. Specimina Physica) includes Leibnizian texts about physics and natural 
philosophy, in which he delves into issues such as the consistency of bodies, minimum and 
maximum, incorporeal substances, or mechanical principles. Two other sections (C and D) 
include Leibniz’s excerpts and annotations upon reading the works of his contemporaries: 
Galileo, Descartes, Cordemoy, or Spinoza. It is also important to note that, while in Paris, 
Leibniz writes his Confessio Philosophi (Fall of 1672 or the Winter of 1672-1673),
178
 in which 
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he briefly argues for an external principle of individuation. Finally, the most substantive 
collection of texts, De Summa Rerum (section F), the same body of work recent commentators 
have used to argue for a Leibnizian commitment to atomism during the Paris years, is also the 
one in which we find Leibniz presenting almost every possible view on both atoms and the void, 
in addition to related topics like body and motion, soul and God.  
           Naturally, when confronted with this voluminous and diverse amount of work in a short 
amount of time (1672-1676), a question springs to mind: what did Leibniz publish during his 
Paris period? The answer is striking: almost nothing and definitely none of the philosophical 
essays from De Summa Rerum. First, a quick glance at Ravier’s bibliography of Leibnizian 
works shows that during the Paris years, the only two texts published by Leibniz were a short 
political writing on German peace (1672) and a 2
nd
 edition (1674) of a work he had himself 
edited and published in 1670, Marius Nizolius’ Anti-Barbarus Philosophicus.179 In fact, we have 
to wait for Leibniz’s return to Hannover three years later in 1677 in order to see anything, albeit 
again non-philosophical, published.
180
 Secondly, when it comes to articles published in journals, 
in 1675 Leibniz publishes “Extrait d’une Lettre de M. Leibniz a l’Auteur du Journal touchant le 
principe de justesse des Horloges portatives de son Invention (avec une planche)”,181 but once 
again we have to wait until 1677-1678 to see an increase in his publishing activity.
182
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          Furthermore, if we compare the end product of Leibniz philosophical work in Paris with 
his previous and in a sense less productive or resourceful years in Mainz and Leipzig, the result 
is, once more, surprising. Between 1663, the date of his Bachelor’s thesis, and 1672, we witness 
the publication of Leibniz’s Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (Leipzig, 1666); the Hypothesis 
Physica Nova and Theoria Motus Abstracti were published in both Mainz and London the same 
year (1671). In 1669, Theophilus Spitzel publishes his Confessio naturae contra atheistas 
anonymously, attached to a letter sent to Antonius Reiser and without Leibniz’s consent.183    
          The analysis of Leibniz’s publishing activity shows that even though recent scholars184 
unanimously agree in regarding the Paris episode as one of his most intensive and productive 
periods of intellectual activity, Leibniz himself deemed none of the work produced during these 
years worth publishable. Of course, against this argument, one could object that publications 
were not the only means through which early modern philosophers presented their work to an 
audience. The importance of learned correspondences for the propagation of philosophical ideas 
during the Seventeenth-century is itself widely acknowledged. Furthermore, Leibniz’s own 
correspondence is central to understanding his philosophical work. But his intellectual and 
scientific correspondence also seems to wane around this time. If we take a closer look at the 
early and middle-years, without taking into account the extensive late correspondences with De 
Volder (1698-1706) or Des Bosses (1706-1716), we get the following picture: between 1663 and 
1672, the Leipzig and Mainz period, a total of 106 letters, from Leibniz to different 
correspondents and vice versa. The Hannover years, 1676-1685, include a total of 126 exchanged 
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letters. Comparatively, although spread throughout a shorter time frame (1672-1676), the Paris 
episode attests to a mere 24 letters: a significant reduction in Leibniz’s epistolary exchanges. 
          This part of my argument strengthens a line already taken by André Robinet and Philip 
Beeley, who dismiss the unpublished papers in which Leibniz refers to atoms as mere “work-
shop drafts” that do not indicate a committed atomist position. According to Beeley, the claim 
that during his Paris period Leibniz embraced atomism is “a mistake” resulting from the “over-
interpretation of work-shop drafts”.185 The various unpublished manuscripts wherein Leibniz 
talks about atoms should simply be considered as further experiments in his “workshop of 
ideas,” hypotheses framed in order to test a theory. Robinet claims the concept of atom 
undergoes violent twists in the fragments from 1672-1676 because Leibniz’s elimination of 
indivisibles also destroyed the concept of “physical atom.” This process was a result of what he 
calls “a series of ephemeral hypotheses, all these documents being written in the style of 
«videndum est». (“It must be seen whether […]).”186 
          At the beginning of the 2
nd
 chapter, I pointed out how one of the main arguments for early 
Leibniz’s commitment to atomism relies on a mnemonic clue. Thus, the specific claim that in his 
early years and the Paris period (1666-1676) Leibniz had subscribed to atomism and the void 
rests upon textual support found in several accounts he gives of his intellectual formation. 
          The first of these accounts dates from 1689. Reminiscing about his early views on the 
continuum Leibniz describes his youth as a period of enthusiastic subscription to the “new 
philosophy” and recalls that he: 
[…] indulged other dogmas of this kind, to which people are prone when they are willing 
to entertain every imagination, and do not notice the infinity lurking everywhere in 
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things. But although when I became a geometer I relinquished these opinions, atoms and 
the vacuum held out for a long time [my italics], like certain relics in my mind rebelling 
against the idea of infinity; for although I conceded that every continuum could be 
divided to infinity in thought, I still did not grasp that in reality there were parts in things 
exceeding every number, as a consequence of motion in a plenum.
187
 
Leibniz locates the source of atomism in a weakness of the imagination: its failure to observe the 
infinity “lurking everywhere in things.” This is an argument against atomism he will repeat from 
his early to his late years.
188
 One has to highlight that here he claims to have supported both 
atomism and the void for an extended period of time. A similar account of his intellectual 
formation is given in 1695, in A New System of Nature: 
In the beginning, when I had freed myself from the yoke of Aristotle, I accepted the void 
and atoms, for they best satisfy the imagination. But on recovering from that, after much 
reflection, I perceived that it is impossible to find the principles of a true unity in matter 
alone, or in what is only passive, since everything in it is only a collection or aggregation 
of parts to infinity.
189
 
This resounds with the same judgment of atomism as a “weakness” of the imagination, blandiens 
intelligendi facilitas, from the Phoranomus (1689). Three years later, in De Ipsa Natura (Acta 
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Eruditorum, September1698), Leibniz simply rejects his earlier flirtation with atomism during 
the Paris period as a youthful prejudice:  
But having overthrown the prejudices of youth, I have realized for a long time now that 
atoms should be rejected, along with the void.
190
  
Despite their differences, all these texts serve to illustrate Leibniz’s conception of his own 
intellectual development. Since they bear the status of a personal testimony, should we take these 
accounts literally, at face-value? As French philosopher Paul Ricoeur brilliantly argues in his 
study of memory, history and forgetting, “[…] we have nothing better than testimony and the 
critique of testimony to give credibility to the historian’s representation of the past.”191 In this 
case, historiographical interpretation has its point of departure in personal testimony: Leibniz’s 
act of producing a verbal representation of some part of his past as a text. But as Ricoeur notes, 
this act of producing a representation of the past is in itself always rhetorical and therefore 
interpretative. Moreover, it is bound up with personal memory. Since we are not Jorge Luis 
Borges’ character Ireneo Funes, who had no deficiency of memory, only of forgetfulness,192 
something about the past is undoubtedly no longer accessible to us, as it was no longer accessible 
to Leibniz. Memory is infamously imperfect, it embellishes and adds to those traces of the past 
that remain and through which we try to represent our past to our present selves. Therefore, 
historical accounts, lacking a positivist image of the past “as it happened,” are only partial and 
susceptive to misrepresentation. 
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Handy Influence-Mongering: the “Gassendian” Leibniz 
          Some interpreters argue the case for early Leibniz’s commitment to atomism by 
underlining or pointing out the influence two early modern atomists such as Gassendi and 
Sennert’s might have had on the former’s views of matter and substance.193 Early on, in 1669, 
Leibniz criticized Sennert’s account of the origin of substantial forms and this critique was in 
itself contentious, since it seemed to stem from either a limited knowledge or a misreading of 
Sennert’s works. In the case of Gassendi and Sennert’s influence on early Leibniz’s “atomism,” 
it seems to me that Leibnizian texts encourage intuitive surface readings that can make his views 
seem closer to contemporary opinions than they actually are. In contrast to many of his 
contemporaries (Descartes being the best example), Leibniz brings together a wealth of 
philosophical doctrines handed down by tradition: “I have found that most of the sects are right 
in a good part of what they propose, but not so much in what they deny.”194 He often declares to 
have read copiously from ancient, medieval and modern texts, but the extent to which he actually 
might have embraced contemporary ideas is highly debatable. Indeed, Leibniz rarely writes 
anything without using a large number of eclectic references: a clear sign that he appeals to the 
claims of well-regarded historical and contemporary figures to illustrate and support his own 
views. Yet, in most of the cases in which Leibniz references an author, it is unclear how much of 
that author’s work he had actually read and how deep of a knowledge of his doctrines he actually 
possessed. I therefore have difficulties with the type of approach adopted by Arthur or Moll in 
investigating the “atomist” sources and influences on Leibniz’s first philosophy. Claims of 
influences have to be grounded, that is, accurately identified in Leibnizian texts themselves. As a 
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result, in this section, I do not attempt to discover handy influences, but instead I focus on what 
Leibniz actually wrote on Gassendi: the explicit reception of the latter’s work through textual 
occurrences. 
          Specifically, what did Leibniz write on Gassendi during the Paris period? André Robinet 
has published 2-and-a-half pages of a Leibnizian reading of Gassendi’s Opera (1658) dating 
from 1673-1675. These notes refer to Gassendi’s mathematics, celestial observations, and his 
physical experiments. As Robinet writes, Leibniz annotates Gassendi’s works in a context, the 
Parisian years, during which time Gassendi’s discoveries or observations were already made 
obsolete by Christiaan Huygens inventions. Once he had arrived at the principle of the 
equivalence between cause and effect, Leibniz would abandon Cavalieri’s indivisibles, the 
hypothesis of a point-like soul and Gassendi’s atoms.195 We find no trace of atoms or atomism in 
the few annotated pages. This type of marginalia or reading notes generally illustrate the 
working process of “[…] someone like Leibniz, who would often just read the first few pages of 
books in order to get inspiration, or better, set his thought in motion (in many ways the typical 
method of the autodidact).”196 Robinet’s publication of these marginalia on Gassendi’s Opera 
casts doubt over the former claim Leibniz makes towards the end of his stay in Paris, that he read 
Bacon and Gassendi more thoroughly than the Cartesian corpus: 
I admit that I have not yet been able to read all his writings [Descartes’] with all the care I 
had intended to bring to them, and my friends know that, as it happened, I read almost all 
the new philosophers before reading him. Bacon and Gassendi were the first to fall into 
                                                 
195
 Robinet 1997, “Notes de lecture des Opera de Gassendi par Leibniz,” 297; in Gassendi et l’E rope 
(1592-1792), edited by Sylvia Murr, Paris, J. Vrin, 295-300.   
 
196
 Beeley, “Response to Arthur, Mercer, Smith, and Wilson,” Symposium on Kontinuität und 
Mechanismus, Leibniz Society Review, Vol. 7, 1997, 97. 
86 
 
my hands; their familiar and easy style was better adapted to a person who wants to read 
everything.
197
 
But Gassendi’s influence on early Leibniz cannot be overstressed for reasons that go beyond the 
German philosopher’s reading or name-dropping practices.198 Philip Beeley has already argued 
for a fundamental difference between early Leibniz’s theory of matter and Gassendi’s atomism, 
especially in terms of the broader picture, the problem of the continuum.
199
 Gassendi rejects both 
the orthodox Aristotelian position
200
 and the position Leibniz adopted from early on that the 
continuum is actually divided into infinite parts. The French atomist replaces infinity with his 
own concept of inexhaustibility. But I believe there is another fundamental separation between 
the two: early Leibniz’s view on substantial forms and their origin and Gassendi’s position on 
the same issue.  
           In my previous chapter, I showed that facing several problems in explaining the nature of 
body, Leibniz developed a highly idiosyncratic theory of substantial forms, as such generated 
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through eduction or, what I called, “mechanist heterogenesis”. Discussing the origin of forms in 
the natural world, Gassendi presents a terribly unsatisfying argument. He objects to the 
traditional answer that form is educed through the potentiality of matter by claiming that 
eduction:  
[…] is mere words. For if they mean that form is educed in such a way that it is only a 
mode of matter like the shape of a statue into which bronze or wood is formed, then they 
are indeed saying something, but form will be merely passive, like the matter whose 
mode it is, and not at all an active principle. However, if they mean that it is some super-
added entity, then they cannot say at all whence this entity exists, since the potential of 
matter has been put aside, nor from what source its power of acting comes, since the 
potential of matter is merely passive and in no way active.
201
 
Gassendi agrees with the basic assumption of hylemorphism that matter is entirely passive. 
Nonetheless, he objects that a genuine active principle, a form, cannot be educed from the 
potential of a purely passive thing. This, he believes, always amounts to “all active potential 
being derived from merely passive potential.” Therefore, he concludes, since “it is impossible to 
hold that matter supplies power to the form,” we must either abandon the claim that matter is 
entirely passive, or abandon the position that form is educed from its power. Both these options 
seem to be dead-ends in Gassendi’s argument. Surprisingly, Gassendi’s objections are not much 
different from the ones held by the other presumed influence on early Leibniz’s atomist leanings. 
On similar lines with Gassendi, Sennert argues that in the classical Aristotelian example of a 
statue or column sculpted from wood (Metaphysics 1048 a 32-33) there is nothing like an active 
principle educed from matter, but only an accident, quality or shape. As a consequence, there is 
no power of matter involved and the example used by Aristotle merely muddled the issue of 
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artificial and natural generation. In contrast to both Sennert and Gassendi, young Leibniz not 
only sees the Aristotelian analogy as entirely unproblematic, but he also embraces the traditional, 
Scholastic theory of the eduction of forms from the passive power of matter. Since whether or 
not Leibniz actually read Gassendi’s Syntagma is subject to debate, let me now turn to the 
explicit reception of the latter’s work in Leibnizian texts.  
           Leibniz writes to Fabri upon leaving Paris and clearly states his points of disagreement 
with Gassendi’s Democritean philosophy by declaring that the latter’s “corpuscles, unsplittable 
in their nature” do not exist.202 Even several years earlier, in a letter to Oldenburg from the 18th 
of September 1670, Leibniz notes how in order to avoid the inherent difficulties in explaining the 
cohesion and resistance of bodies, Gassendi had joined his atoms together through hooks and 
barbs. This leads into an infinite argument trap, which leaves the solidity/rigidity, the cohesion of 
these contraptions themselves – unexplained. Caught in this Gordian knot, Leibniz says, 
Gassendi had to appeal to divine will. Thus, in order to explain atomic cohesion, “one must 
resort to a perpetual miracle.”203 This point of view on atomism had already been adopted by 
Leibniz the year before, in his De rationibus motus (1669). Rejecting atomism, this short writing 
tries to explain the cohesion or resistance of bodies as an effect of motion, against both:  
[…] sectatores Democriti et Epicuri, et inter eos egregium Gassendum a quibus 
supponitur esse quaedam corpuscula (ipsi atomos vocant) ita solida, ut etiam cum 
quiescunt, impactu cujuscunque alterius corporis, non dissolvantur.
204
  
Here, Leibniz even considers Descartes’ explanation of cohesion (the three element doctrine) to 
be atomistic. But in the natural state of things, he notes “[…] there is no such ramified structure, 
                                                 
202
 A II.1, 289.  
 
203
 Hall&Hall 1970, 167. 
 
204
 A VI.2, 161. 
89 
 
no such cohesion, no such continuity.”205 Since at this stage he directly assimilates the Cartesian 
corpuscularian position with the Gassendian atomist position, Leibniz clearly did not have an in-
depth knowledge, if any at all, of Cartesian physics. Another instance of this conflation as well 
as the distinction early Leibniz operates between atomism and mechanical philosophy is found in 
a text from 1671 entitled De actionibus ope aeris exercitis. In this work, Leibniz defends 
mechanical philosophy “[…] that explains everything through size, shape and motion”206 against 
the corpuscular philosophy “[…] Gassendi and Descartes have partially revived and partially 
modified.” Once again the principles of atomism or corpuscular philosophy are considered 
altogether inadequate, too remote from experience to explain the qualities of bodies, “[…] if not 
through a frightful leap.”207  
          In both these preliminary writings to Theoria motus abstracti and Hypothesis Physica 
Nova (1670-1671), Leibniz attempts to explain cohesion without appealing to divine will. Thus, I 
believe, at this point, anti-atomism became a firm point in his thought. He already takes a strong 
anti-atomist stance even before leaving for Paris in 1672. De rationibus motus, written under the 
influence of the discovery of Huygens and Wren’s laws of motion and collision between bodies, 
develops an objection to atomism that Leibniz will repeat obsessively in his mature arguments 
against atomism. Writing to Huygens in 1/11 April 1692, Leibniz claims that: 
This last time, reading your explanation of gravity again, I noticed that you support atoms 
and the void. I admit I am having difficulties in understanding the reason for such 
firmness [of atoms] and I believe that in order to prove it, one would have to appeal to a 
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sort of perpetual miracle. I do not find it necessary to resort to such extraordinary 
things.
208
 
Against Huygens’ atomist claims in the Appendix to the Discours de la cause de la pesanteur,209 
Leibniz thinks it is impossible to give a reason for absolute firmness without having recourse to a 
sort of perpetual miracle. But this constant divine intervention is ultimately unexplainable and 
unjustifiable because it cannot be reduced to mechanical causes. On the contrary, if firmness is 
an intelligible quality of bodies, it has to come from movement, since “[…] motion is the only 
thing diversifying bodies.”210 Otherwise, the perfect firmness of Huygens’ corpuscles is an occult 
quality similar to doctrines such as Aristotle’s theory of gravity, Newton’s attraction, and the 
sympathies, antipathies and other similar occult qualities of the Paracelsians. In early texts, 
Leibniz applies the same objection to Gasssendi. In his excerpts from Honoré Fabri’s Physica, 
there is a passage where explanations of bodily cohesion grounded on the existence of hooked, 
striped or spiral atoms such as Gassendi’s are judged to be simplistic. In this sense, he compares 
with Paracelsian explanations through occult sympathies and qualities.
211
 
          In late texts, Leibniz again attacks atomism’s explanation of the firmness of its corpuscules 
for making recourse to perpetual miracle. In a couple of letters to another Dutch atomist, 
Nicolaas Hartsoeker, he claims:  
There is no need to find a reason for the divisibility of matter, since naturally, if nothing 
impedes it, a part, different from another, can be separated. One would therefore have to 
find a reason for this impediment [firmness that avoids separability – my note]. But to 
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establish this as originary or primitive in certain parts of matter is to appeal either to a 
miracle, or to an imaginary, occult quality.
212
  
Appealing to God’s will in physical arguments is an insufficient reason for explaining natural 
things. And after looking at all these texts – according to Leibniz, this has been common practice 
among Seventeenth-century atomists from Gassendi to Huygens and Hartsoeker.  
           
Atoms and the void in Paris and before     
          In a text from De Summa Rerum (1676), Leibniz rhetorically asks whether the existence of 
atoms is consistent with reason.
213
 If we follow mature Leibniz’s own indications about his 
intellectual development, we are inclined to believe that in his youth he had supported the idea 
that reality is constituted by atoms and the void, i.e., that he was an atomist. Since there is only 
one early text where Leibniz seems to clearly advocate both atoms and the void (the Hypothesis 
de Systemate Mundi), unless one can build a strong case for Leibniz’s adoption of atomism based 
on a single piece of textual evidence, the claim that he had in fact, in his youth, embraced an 
atomist theory of matter is difficult to probe. Building upon the previous chapter, I argue that 
Leibniz was already aware and clearly articulated his anti-atomist stance somewhere between 
1669 and 1671. The multitude of self-contradictory and almost irreconcilable notes about atoms 
from the Paris years are merely, like Philip Beeley calls them, workshop drafts – Leibniz’s own 
testing of hypotheses. The description Leibniz gives of his own early views, atoms and the void 
holding out for a long time, does not correspond with any of his early texts. Even when it does, 
his claims in those texts are difficult to make sense of.  
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          One of the most representative texts for the period between 1666 and 1671 is the 
Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (1666). The atoms Leibniz presumably adopted during this time 
are characterized by infinite divisibility; thus, they are not indivisible atoms in any classical or 
physical sense. In the Dissertatio (1666), Leibniz claims both that matter is infinitely divisible 
and that the nature of matter is constituted by ultimate particles or atoms, two claims that cannot 
be easily reconciled.
214
 However, he does not give any explanation as to why these atoms are 
infinitely divisible or how they cohere together to form macroscopic bodies. In the previous 
chapter I argued that the most important reason Leibniz does not embrace a particulate theory of 
matter is that he identifies cohesion as the main stumbling block for atomism. This idea that 
Seventeenth-century atomism is unable to account for why bodies cohere together will 
accompany his progressive rejection of atomism all throughout the early period. Thus, when 
discussing the cause of cohesion in the Theoria motus concreti (1671) Leibniz declares to have 
always believed that anything that has been said about the various configurations of atoms by: 
Cartesii Gassendique maximorum sane virorum sectatores, et quicunque in summa illud 
docent, ex magnitudine, figura et motu explicandam omnem in corporibus varietatem, 
habent me prorsus assentientem. Credidi tarnen semper, quicquid de atomis varie 
figuratis, de vorticibus, ramentis, ramis, hamis, de uncis, globulis tantoque alio apparatu 
dicatur, lusui ingenii propius, a naturae simplicitate, et omnino ab experimentis remotius, 
aut jejunius esse, quam ut manifeste connecti cum Phaenomenis possit.
215
  
The barbs, hooks, globules, vortices and any other contraptions atomists used to explain the 
cohesion of bodies are merely a “game of the learned” (lusui ingenii propius): far removed from 
the simplicity of nature, remote from experiments, and, furthermore, too naive to be related 
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clearly to phenomena themselves. Therefore, in explaining the nature of bodies, Leibniz’s 
Theoria motus concreti (1671), appeals to motion rather than matter and proposes bullae 
(bubbles), not atoms, as the ultimate constituents of matter. Macroscopic bodies cohere through 
these bubbles, which he defines as the: 
[…] seeds of things, receptacles of the aether, the basis of bodies, the cause of their 
consistency and the principle of both the great variety we admire between bodies and of 
the great impetus in their motions.
216
  
Conceived as bubbles, the ultimate unities of matter are not indivisible or infinitely hard, but 
elastic. Continuously breaking and recombining with each other, these elastic unities of matter 
are agitated by the internal motion of the ether, they are constantly in motion and not inert.
217
 
Again, these are not atoms in any classical or physical sense, for analogously to the Dissertatio 
(1666), Leibniz rejects a traditional feature atoms entailed for physical atomism: indivisibility. 
          The same year, in a letter to Thomasius, Leibniz puts forth ten hypotheses in an attempt to 
make sense of an obscure Pre-Socratic fragment. Jakob Thomasius had invited Leibniz to 
conjecture on Anaxagoras’ paradox of the “black snow.” In his explanation, Leibniz uses 
differently shaped atoms (fire-pyramidal; water-spherical; earth-cubical) and their interstitial 
vacua to hypothesize a theory of vision and colors.
218
 In explaining the process of vision, 
Leibniz’s appeal to atoms does not prove he adopts atomism at this time, as it becomes clear 
from the following letters. Rather, he is looking for a plausible, coherent explanation of an 
ancient paradox.  
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          Therefore, one can conclude that Leibniz does not defend an atomist theory, at least not in 
the classical sense of physical atomism, in any of his pre-Parisian writings. Explaining the 
cohesion of individual bodies, why one body stays the same without being dissipated under the 
effect of motion or through the shock imparted in collisions with other bodies, requires a 
different grounding. To ground the explanation of material reality or corporeal substance on the 
primary qualities of mechanism or the atomist explanation through hooks, barbs, etc., only gives 
an exclusively physical reason for their cohesiveness, not a ratio plena, a ratio rationis. The 
principle of bodily cohesion has to be of a different nature than the bodies themselves, i.e., there 
has to be a metaphysical reason for the individuation of body in actu, otherwise one would fall 
prey to either a recourse to occult qualities and miracles, or to a material redundancy that is itself 
unexplainable. As Leibniz states in yet another account of his intellectual formation: “In my 
youth I did not think I could explain anything (including cohesion) by appealing to divine 
will.”219 
          He does not seem as positive about the vacuum either. In the letter to Thomasius from 
20/30 April 1669, Leibniz acknowledges that the compatibility between Aristotle’s physics and 
the new natural philosophy can be proven, with the exception of the impossibility of the void and 
of motion in the void. When it comes to being a plenist or a vacuist, Leibniz declares his 
neutrality: “It seems to me that neither the void, nor the plenum are necessary and that the nature 
of things can be explained both ways.”220 He then lists the three parties in this debate: the 
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partisans of the void (Gilbert, Gassendi, von Guericke); the plenists (Descartes, Digby, Thomas 
White, Gilbert Clerke, De Plenitudine mundi, 1660); and a third category, those who admit both 
possibilities (Hobbes and Boyle). Later in the letter, Leibniz claims that despite inherent 
difficulties, explaining the phenomena of rarefaction is possible even without postulating the 
void. By maintaining the alternative in this way, it seems likely that Leibniz is leaning towards 
the third, conciliatory position he lists, that of Boyle and Hobbes. Nonetheless, this neutral 
attitude towards either position could be of Hobbesian origin. Following Hobbes, early Leibniz 
might have distinguished between admitting the possibility of the void (a hypothetical vacuum, 
through God’s absolute power) and considering its existence unnecessary for explaining natural 
phenomena (a real void that does not exist in nature).
221
 In the same letter, he distinguishes 
between two ways in which discontinuity is introduced into an otherwise purely homogenous, 
continuous prime matter: 1) either contiguity disappears at the same time (for example: when 
between the parts there’s a gap left empty – void) or 2) contiguity is preserved (when two things 
are kept in mutual contact, but are moving in different directions; for example: two spheres, one 
included in the other, can move in different directions and nonetheless remain contiguous, 
although they lose continuity).
222
 Hence it follows, Leibniz continues, that if, from the beginning, 
creation gives rise to a discontinuous mass or a mass interrupted by voids, it equally results in 
forms of matter (formas aliquas statim materiae concreatas esse). But if mass (or primary 
matter) had from the start been continuous, forms must necessarily arise through motion, because 
the annihilation of certain parts, required to create interstitial vacua into matter, is “a 
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supernatural thing I do not speak of.”223 Clearly, in the first part of this argument Leibniz objects 
to atomism and the void. Yet, in his notes leading up to the Theory of Abstract Motion, he writes:  
Note well that we seem to be able to demonstrate from our principles that there is some 
sort of vacuum, and that the phenomena in the world cannot be saved if everything were 
full.
224
  
What was Leibniz’s view on atoms and the void during the Paris years (1672-1676)? In the 
account of his earlier position given in the New System, he claims to have supported both 
atomism and the void for a long period of time. As a result, reconciling this personal testimony 
with the fact that neither before, nor during the Paris years did Leibniz hold a unique, definite 
stance about atoms and the void, becomes problematic and difficult.  
          In De Summa Rerum, Leibniz seems to claim the existence of a void, arguing that space 
itself is a vacuum, since there is no perfect fluid filling up all space: 
If I imagine in space, instead of extension, a perfectly quiescent fluid which, when some 
body swims in it, is moved to fill its place, then I am simply saying that space is a 
vacuum. It would be matter, if the motion of a body were retarded by its motion.
225
   
Only to jump immediately, in the next paragraph, to a denial of the existence of perfect fluids: 
One must examine along what line each point is moved, in order to prove that each point 
is moved now along one line, now along another – granted which something absurd will 
follow: namely, that a continuum is composed out of minima. From this it will also 
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follow that it is impossible that there should be a perfect fluid which fills all things, i.e., it 
will follow that space has to be understood as a vacuum.  
This passage is a clear criticism of Descartes idea of subtle matter in Principles part III, articles 
49 and 50. In several fields, Leibniz locates Descartes’ error in the belief that the real distinction 
between parts implies their separability. What defines an absolute fluid is its absence of 
cohesion, the separability of its parts, which is only suited to an abstract, passive matter. In this 
sense, Leibniz considers that postulating the separability of minima was an error common to both 
the atomist hypothesis of absolute firmness and the Cartesian hypothesis of absolute fluidity. 
Therefore, in the longest, most structured text written during his Paris stay, Leibniz denies atoms, 
as well as perfect fluidity:  
I myself admit neither Gassendi’s atoms, i.e. a body that is perfectly solid, nor Descartes’ 
subtle matter, i.e. a body that is perfectly fluid. […] If a perfectly fluid body is assumed, a 
finest division, i.e. a division into minima, cannot be denied; but even a body that is 
everywhere flexible, but not without a certain and everywhere unequal resistance, still 
has cohering parts, although these are opened up an folded together in various ways. 
Accordingly the division of the continuum must not be considered to be like the division 
o sand into grains, but like that of a sheet of paper or tunic into folds. And so although 
there occur some folds smalled than others in infinite in number, a body is never thereby 
dissolved into points or minima.
226
  
Although this seems to be Leibniz’s definitive position and is corroborated by earlier writings,227 
there are texts written a few months earlier in which it looks as if he advocates some sort of 
atoms: 
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If some atom once existed, it will always exist. For liquid matter which surrounds it and 
is a plenum will immediately endeavor to break it up since it disturbs its motion, as can 
easily be shown. 
To this, he adds straightway, “[…] there necessarily exists an interspersed vacuum, which is not 
inconsistent with a physical plenum.”228 It appears we are again dealing with a metaphysical 
vacuum as opposed to an actually existent one. Still, months later, in “A Chain of Wonderful 
Demonstrations about the Universe” (12 December 1676), Leibniz shifts views once more and 
claims that the argument for the infinity of space: “[…] also proves that there is no vacuum, 
whether interspersed or great, since it is possible for all things to be filled.”229 Now he claims, if 
plenitude is granted, atoms are also proved. But atoms are also demonstrated in the absence of a 
plenum (sic!), “[…] from the mere consideration of the fact that everything which is flexible is 
divided into points.” 
  
Conclusion 
          The purpose of this section was to examine the hypothesis that during his early years, 
Leibniz was committed to an atomist theory of matter. In a short amount of time, his thought 
twists and turns regarding positions on atoms and/or the void, reflecting his shifting views of 
substantial forms or individuation. By highlighting the discontinuities regarding this aspect of his 
philosophy, I do not wish to relativize its importance. His arguments and objections to atomism 
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(its recourse to “perpetual miracles”) are taken up again in his mature writings, thus lending 
credit to the idea that this early Leibnizian anti-atomist stance had, in fact, for the first time, 
directed his attention towards the role of God in relation to the laws of nature. Still, whether or 
not he had adopted the conceptual model of physical atomism in the second half of the 1670’s, it 
is not until the publication of the New System (1695), that will Leibniz publicly discuss atoms 
and atomism again. 
          Before the discovery of “substantial atoms,” in a text written in his supposed atomist 
period, Leibniz presents a position on substance outstandingly similar to his complete concept 
theory: 
In my view a substance, or, a complete being, is that which by itself involves all things, 
or for the perfect understanding of which the understanding of nothing else is required. A 
shape is not of this kind; for in order to understand from what a shape of such and such a 
kind has arisen, we need to have recourse to motion. Each complete being can be 
produced in only one way; the fact that figures can be produced in various ways is a 
sufficient indication that they are not complete beings.
230
  
Either triangles or squares can be used to form the same rectangle, but at this point the method of 
production can only prove that shapes and figures are incomplete beings or concepts. 
 
Leibniz’s Soul Pointilism: From the Resurrection of Body to the Indestructibility of Bugs in 
Bugs 
          Early modern natural philosophy challenged hylomorphism and the basic building-blocks 
of Scholastic Aristotelian ontology, substantial forms, were either entirely rejected or deemed 
                                                 
230
 A VI.3, 400; Parkinson, 115. 
100 
 
highly contentious notions.
231
 In their attempt to reform this framework, early modern natural 
philosophers proposed several specific alternatives, from elemental mixture doctrines (as was the 
case for Paracelsianism), to the rediscovery of ancient, physical atomism, or to the Scotist 
hypothesis of a forma corporeitatis and semina rerum or minima naturalia doctrines.
232
 My aim 
here is to discuss and re-contextualize what I consider to be Leibniz’s own specific alternative to 
hylomorphism: his early doctrine of the “flower of substance.”  
          In his 1671 text entitled On the Resurrection of Body, Leibniz developed the peculiar 
doctrine of the “flower of substance” as an attempt to solve the problem of bodily identity after 
the resurrection or the hypostatic union of human and divine natures in Christ.
233
 As he himself 
alludes to in a text from the Paris period entitled “On the Seat of the Soul” (1676), this “flower of 
substance” theory is a cognate of numerous similar Seventeenth-century doctrines, most of 
which advocated versions of the plastic power hypothesis and/or the semina rerum 
corpuscularian theory of matter, i.e. the essence of humans being contained in “seeds.”234  
A highly original version of the semina rerum theories, Leibniz’s flos substantiae is a formative 
principle coextensive with the entire body, corporeal yet subtler than the common or gross matter 
that makes up the remainder of it. This flower of substance is present in the animal spirits, but 
nevertheless non-identical with them. All of a piece, this substance is indivisible, yet able to 
contract itself back into the “fountain of life” as an extensionless, indivisible, and indestructible 
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point containing the mind or soul.
235
 In recent years, scholars have shown an increasing interest 
in Leibniz’s doctrine the flower of substance.236 Yet, discussions of this particular Leibnizian 
doctrine rarely amount to more than an incomplete story. All the accounts of Leibniz’s doctrine 
of the flower of substance share a common feature: historically, they assume the same continuist 
view regarding Leibniz’s philosophical development that I described in the introduction. In this 
case, the continuist position holds that developed throughout his early years and the Parisian 
period as a philosophical answer to a series of problems connected with the belief in the 
resurrection of the same body, the flower of substance doctrine would prefigure Leibniz’s late 
philosophy, the Monadology.
237
 
          Against this continuity claim, I argue that by 1686, in his lengthy, ecumenical Examination 
of the Christian Religion, Leibniz merely rehearses some of the details of his previous doctrine 
of the “flower of substance”, reiterating aspects he had fleshed out earlier in his writings. This 
time, the whole doctrine is expounded half-heartedly, with less effort being made to present it as 
a solid, plausible hypothesis. Consequently, the extent of Leibniz’s commitment to the flos 
substantiae doctrine in 1686 is not only unclear, but problematic. By this time, mature Leibniz’s 
metaphysics of substance takes a definite form. Finally, I will argue that the doctrine itself and 
some of the claims connected to it in 1669-1676 were abandoned by the time of the Examination 
(the Rabbinical Luz comparison, for example). And the single most significant claim in this 
context, the “punctual soul” hypothesis, is also left aside in Leibniz’s subsequent writings, once 
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he develops ideas central to his mature philosophical views, such as the unity of individual 
substances or the denial of any direct causality between mind or soul and body.  
          As follows, I re-contextualize Leibniz’s doctrine of the flower of substance in the larger 
framework of early modern Paracelsian and semina rerum theories and demonstrate the way in 
which this theory is directly related to Seventeenth-century “chymical”238 theories about 
palingenesis. By looking at the immediate context in which this theory was issued, I explain the 
reasons leading to Leibniz’s adoption of such an “obscure” doctrine, which in 1686 he claims to 
be based not on the principles of philosophers, but on the principles of contemporary 
“chemists.”239 
 
Sources and uses of the “flower of substance” theory 
          There are various possible sources for the “flower of substance doctrine”, but my focus 
here turns to those specific sources with which Leibniz himself relates his doctrine. Thus, in his 
1685/1686 Examen Religionis Christianae,
240
 Leibniz holds that the idea of an indestructible 
kernel or flower of substance can easily be extracted from the “principles of the chemists.” Who 
were those Seventeenth-century natural philosophers or “chymists” that held similar views? In 
addition to connecting the doctrine with the Rabbinical religious tradition, Leibniz appeals to 
several other contemporary doctrines or scientific treatises and experiments. One of the given 
sources is Pierre Borel’s collection of microscopic observations on plants and animals that 
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predates Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1665).241 However, Leibniz supports his flower of 
substance doctrine on the regeneration of plants from seeds, the idea that plants could be 
“chymically” resuscitated even after undergoing calcination. This regenerative capacity of plants 
proves that there is a seminal part able to resist fire and be preserved even in the ashes.
242
 
Promoted by Paracelsianism and some of the Paracelsians to which Leibniz directly refers to, 
namely Athanasius Kircher and Joseph du Chesne or Quercetanus, the interest in the 
experimental, human-handled “chymical resuscitation” or revival of plants and animals, a 
process otherwise known as “palingenesis”, thrived in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth-
centuries.
243
 The works of Jesuit natural philosopher Athanasius Kircher and French physician 
Joseph Du Chesne gathered several experimental recipes for palingenesis. Again, it would be 
conjectural to assume Leibniz’s direct knowledge of these experimenta. Nonetheless, 
descriptions of Kircher and Du Chesne’s experiments can be found in the more familiar works of 
another contemporary of Leibniz’s: Sir Kenelm Digby. Digby replicated and described 
Duchesne’s and Kircher’s palingenetic processes in his 1661 Discourse Concerning the 
Vegetation of Plants held in front of London’s Gresham College assembly. As in Leibniz’s case, 
this ultimately led Digby to consider a parallel with the resurrection of the dead.
244
 Moreover, 
Robert Boyle also refers to the “chemical experiments” of Du Chesne and Kircher, in his Some 
Physico-Theological Considerations About the Possibility of Resurrection (1675), a work 
annotated by Leibniz: “Nor yet will I here debate what may be said in favour of this conjecture 
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from those chemical experiments by which Kircherus, a Polonian physician in Quercetanus, and 
others, are affirmed to have by a gentle heat been able to reproduce, in well closed vials, the 
perfect ideas of plants destroyed by the fire.”245  
          Identifying the religious sources for Leibniz’s doctrine of resurrection is not a simple task 
either. What sources, if any, could one find for the doctrine Leibniz frequently calls “the Luz of 
the Rabbis”? In a footnote to his letter to Arnauld from 30 April 1687, the editors of the 
Akademie Ausgabe reference a Seventeenth-century collection of homilies taken from diverse 
kabbalistic, aggadic, and midrashic works. A possible source for Leibniz’s views on the “small 
bone” or “Luz of the Rabbis” is Israel ben Benjamin of Belzec’s Yalkut Hadash (1648).246 
Column 44 of Yalkut Hadash notes that, “on (the issue of) the small bone” (ha-etzem ha-qatan): 
“[…] from it shall begin the resurrection of the dead, as explained above at note 36. The bone 
will not rot and the Holy, Blessed be He, will soften it with dew and from it He shall raise up the 
body again at resurrection.”247 The belief that Luz (the “coccyx” bone in Aramaic) is 
indestructible and will form the kernel for the resurrection of the body was widespread in 
Talmudic literature and, moreover, accepted as an axiomatic truth by both Christian and Muslim 
theologians and anatomists.
248
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          Between 1668 and 1671 Leibniz works with different definitions of substantial form 
viewed as the principle of individuation of substances and of cohesion in bodies that he will then 
later consecutively abandon. He also rejects both the traditional Scholastic interpretation of 
substantial forms and the contemporary atomist one on the count of their unnecessary 
multiplication.
249
 As a consequence, by 1670-1671, the term “substantial form” almost 
completely vanishes from Leibniz’s vocabulary and is instead replaced by the concept of mind or 
soul reinterpreted through the concepts of indivisible and point. In his correspondence with 
Thomasius (1666-1671) treated in the former chapters, Leibniz identifies space or spatiality as 
the main attribute of matter, so that forms have to be educed from the passive power of this 
matter through spatial translation. As a result, forms are able to become some sort of points or 
indivisibles.  
          Why did Leibniz appeal to this “obscure” doctrine of the “flower of substance” in the 
attempt to solve the issues of individuation and cohesion, albeit in a different context? The first 
reference to the flower of substance doctrine in Leibniz’s work occurs in a text written during 
this period entitled “On the Incarnation of God, or, on the Hyposthatic Union” (1669-1670). 
Besides muddling their explanation of the Eucharist, the Scholastics, Leibniz contends, also 
struggled to explain hypostatic union. He thus exposes a partial version of the flower of 
substance doctrine, one meant to solve the problem of explaining the union between divine and 
human nature in Christ. For Leibniz, the union between mind and body is amongst the cases of 
hypostatical union exemplified by Christ’s natures:  
In the human body, it should not be thought that the soul is hypostatically united to all 
corpuscles in it, since they are constantly changing; the soul inheres in the very centre of 
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the brain, to a certain fixed and inseparable flower of substance which is most subtly 
mobile in the centre of the animal spirits.
250
  
Let me spell out the reasoning behind this a bit. Leibniz believes that he can offer a more 
adequate explanation of hypostatic union by replacing the hylomorphic model with his “flower 
of substance” doctrine, a version of semina rerum theory modeled on Paracelsian palingenetic 
processes. From this text, it is clear that, as early as 1669, the body and the mind supposed to 
individuate it are characterized by fundamentally different roles and functions. The mind or soul 
is immortal, while the body itself is corruptible and subject to annihilation or destruction. These 
two radically heterogeneous aspects Leibniz ascribes to soul and body also explain why in 1669 
their union is only assignable or describable in terms of a miracle. The gradual disappearance of 
“substantial form” was paralleled by a reconfiguration of the way in which Leibniz conceived the 
relationship between two different ontological levels: the spiritual realm of minds and the 
physical realm of bodies. 
          Soon thereafter, in May 1671, Leibniz writes to Duke Johann Friedrich of Hannover and 
again uses his specific, quasi-atomist alternative to hylomorphism. In “On the resurrection of 
body” (1671), Leibniz claims that the flower of substance doctrine gives a better explanation of 
bodily identity problems involved in resurrection. The Scholastic view of matter plus form as the 
essence of each thing fails to explain how the same body can return, because substantial form is 
extinguished through corruption and Scholastics have assumed “that there is no return from 
privation to possession.”251 As a consequence, Leibniz claims, they have been unable to 
understand how one and the same body can be resurrected. As I have already discussed, the 
Scholastic-Aristotelian reditus principle can be summarized as follows: whatever is deprived of 
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substantial form or its numerical identity through corruption or annihilation, cannot regain it. 
Here Leibniz argues that the flos substantiae is better equipped than substantial form to restore 
the numerical identity of one and the same body. After much thought, he affirms the idea that 
humans, “as well as animals, plants, and minerals” possess a certain Kern der Substanz. So 
subtle that it is conserved even in the burnt ashes, this nucleus or core of substance persists 
invariably despite the fact that its outer shell is in a perpetual flux of changes and its external 
organs might be destroyed.
252
 Further on, Leibniz explains that this nucleus of substance in some 
way encapsulates in itself the whole body. In this way, he rejects the hypothesis that, in the case 
of a severed limb, for example, due to the co-extensiveness of the flower of substance with the 
whole body, a part of it would remain in the limb detached from the rest of the body.
253
 The 
categories of quantity, augmentation and diminution, do not operate at the level of the flower of 
substance. Despite its corporeal status, this nucleus of substance does not increase or decrease in 
size. Furthermore, if corruption or destruction of the body occurs, as for example, in the case of 
phantom limb pain, the flower of substance is able to contract itself back into the fountain of life: 
“[…] when a member is cut off or rots away, this subtler part returns to the fountain of life, to 
which the soul itself is implanted.”254 Again, despite its corporeal nature, the flower of substance, 
the “subtler part” to which Leibniz refers, is nevertheless all of a piece and as such exists as a 
single unified thing, incapable of being divided.  
          As Antonio-Maria Nunziante has argued,
255
 this move suggests that by 1671 bodies 
acquire a new ontological status for Leibniz. If every human body encloses a seed, which 
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contains, as if in vitro, its substantial core, and if this substantial nature is destined to be 
conserved despite the perishing of its external components, bodies themselves acquire an 
incorruptible nature. The most subtle reason for this new status of corporeity resides in the 
necessity of a “conservation” of the body, based on the soul’s memory of previous corporeal 
perceptions. Traces and memories are necessary for the resurrection of the body, since without 
them there would be no valid criterion of judgment, punishment or reward after humans are 
resurrected.
256
 While the external organs that form the body are corrupted or destroyed, the 
body’s essence or idea corporis is “enclosed in the incorruptible punctual-ity of the mind or 
soul.”257 This flower of substance contains the forma corporeitatis common to all material 
substances and precedes specific forms.  
          Throughout these early texts Leibniz seems to argue that both Scholastics and his 
contemporaries encounter various difficulties explaining the possibility of resurrection (how 
souls detached from bodies could keep their individuality) while he, on the other hand, provides 
a simpler solution. This solution amounted to claiming that in the fons vitae, the soul continues to 
possess a spatial localizability even post-mortem. Moreover qua seminal, active principle – the 
“flower of substance” is able to act as a salient point. Contracted into its origin when the body is 
entirely disintegrated, it is in a position to (re)-diffuse itself into a quantity of matter once again, 
reclothing the soul with its previous “material dregs” at resurrection.258 In the same letter to 
Johann Friedrich from 21 May 1671, Leibniz describes the flower of substance as the most 
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proximate instrument and vehicle of the soul, situated in the centre of the brain and constituted in 
a mathematical point.
259
 Through the distinction between physical point and mathematical point, 
the same letter identifies mind or soul with point in order to exemplify the relationship of 
interconnectedness between mind and body. 
 
Conclusion: The Fate of “Pointilism” in Leibniz’s Mature Works 
          Once again, if there is a shift in vocabulary (disappearance of “substantial form”) and a 
change in concerns (resurrection, incarnation), then how is Leibniz’s flower of substance 
different from substantial forms? In other words, in terms of the continuist view of Leibniz’s 
philosophical development: what distinguishes early Leibniz’s flower of substance doctrine, on 
the one hand, from his re-adoption of substantial forms years later (1678), on the other?  
          Leibniz’s flos substantiae theory presents the hypothesis of a kernel or nucleus of 
substance that persists always and everywhere in the case of each particular substance. This 
kernel suffices to individuate one substance from another. Common to all substances, this kernel 
can in fact be interchangeably called matter or form, because, as Leibniz claims, its nature is 
corporeal (he identifies it with the Luz of the Rabbis) and its operation is modeled on “chymical” 
palingenesis. Thus, it can be indifferently called matter, insofar as it is the substrate of change, or 
form, insofar as it makes the substance one, indivisible thing.
260
 
          This “pointillism” about souls is not the only ontology of “point” Leibniz develops. In 
contexts quite different from proving the immortality of the soul or discussing the Christian 
doctrine of resurrection, his mature works also attach a central argumentative role to points seen 
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as some sort of indivisibles. Once again, these indivisibles are not atoms in a classical sense, nor 
Gassendian or Sennertian atoms.  
           Perhaps for ecumenical reasons, and again in the context of his theory of bodily 
resurrection, Leibniz continues to appeal to his earlier flower of substance doctrine in the 1680’s. 
In 1686, in the Examinatio Religionis Christianae he acknowledges that:  
[…] in each and every body there is a sort of flower of substance, the nature of which 
may be illustrated from the principles of the chemists, and which is preserved in the 
course of numerous changes and always subsists exactly as it was for each and every 
person at his birth.
261
  
While reiterating his earlier claim that one individual’s flower of substance should not be 
confused with another’s, the Examination of Christian Religion offers no explanation for why 
Leibniz would support the doctrine and lacks any mention about the location of the flower of 
substance or its mode of operation. The Rabbinical bone or luz used to illustrate the doctrine is 
also rejected as an unnecessary hypothesis.  
          What were the reasons for the dismissal of a doctrine early Leibniz held to explain difficult 
items of Christian doctrine such as the incarnation or resurrection? By 1686, Leibnizian 
metaphysics denied any direct causality between the soul and the body, rendering an 
intermediary seminal principle or entity like the flos substantiae superfluous. It seems likely that 
whatever the original “chymical” or theological understanding of the theory, by his middle years 
Leibniz rejects the notion of a flos substantiae and disentangles it from the related hypothesis of 
the punctual nature of the soul.   
          The problem of the nature of the soul and its subsistence resurfaces soon in Leibniz’s 
works. In a letter sent to Antoine Arnauld from 30 April 1687, Leibniz explains the persistence 
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of movement in the sectioned part of an insect’s body through the subsistence of its soul in one 
of the two bodily parts. Moreover, he argues that although it is possible that the soul possesses a 
body composed of parts animated by separate souls, the soul or form of the whole thing is not for 
that reason made up of the souls or forms of the composing parts. In the case of insects being cut 
up, Leibniz adds, it is not necessary for the two halves to still be animated in order for them to 
possess some motion. Division or destruction aside, the soul of the complete insect remains in 
one of its parts. The soul will subsist at its destruction, alive, in this certain part, the same way it 
was present and alive in the beginning, for the formation and growth of this insect: 
Nevertheless, although a soul can have a body made up of parts animated by other souls, 
the soul or form of the whole is not, as a consequence, composed of the souls or forms of 
its parts. It is not necessary for the two parts of an insect cut in half to remain animated, 
although there may be some movement in them. At very least, the soul of the whole 
insect will remain only on one side. And since, in the formation and growth of the insect, 
the soul was, from the beginning, in a certain part that was already living, after the 
destruction of the insect it will still remain in a certain part that is still alive, a part as 
small as is necessary for it to be protected from the action of someone tearing or 
destroying the body of that insect. Hence, we do not need to imagine, with the Jews, that 
there is a little bone of insurmountable hardness in which the soul takes refuge.
262
  
The Rabbinical luz and, implicitly, the flower of substance doctrine are once again set aside and 
rejected as superfluous explanations.
263
 The context has now changed. By 1687, Leibniz 
develops an entirely different solution to what Daniel Garber has aptly called the “division-to-
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dust problem:”264 what are the limits to the divisibility of a substance or body, if any? Whereas at 
the time of the flos substantiae theory Leibniz seemed to lean towards a solution to the problem 
in terms of a semina rerum doctrine, his answer now develops as a result of a discussion with 
Arnauld on the unity of individual substances. What the larger context of this debate with the 
French theologian entails is the object of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
TOWARDS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY: THE FATE OF 
INDIVIDUATION 
 
Introduction           
          The reception of Leibniz’s work in the Eighteenth-century regarded the German thinker as 
the author of a “system” or a combination of “systems”: that of the “pre-established harmony” 
following the discussions around the New System (1695), the “system of optimism” in wake of 
his Theodicy (1710), or the “system of monads”, after the publication of the German and Latin 
translations of his Monadology (1720; 1721). Despite the fact that our present knowledge of the 
Leibnizian corpus has increased considerably since the publication of Gerhardt’s Nineteenth-
century Leibniz Philosophische and Matematische Schriften, such reductionist and syncretic 
pictures of a philosopher’s thought continue hold sway in Leibniz studies. In his influential 1986 
monograph, The Philosophy of Leibniz, Benson Mates echoed a similar view on Leibniz by 
asserting that, over his entire career, Leibniz is astonishingly consistent in terms of his main 
philosophical points. Specifically, Mates claims that for more than five decades, Leibniz 
persistently maintains the thesis that the whole entity of matter and form is what individuates 
substances, every property matter and form instantiate being essential to the identity of an 
individual. He never wavered from a Nominalist, Suárezian particularist ontology and some sort 
of super-essentialism for which all properties of individuals, even contingent ones, become 
essential to them. In this chapter I further criticize this continuist view of Leibniz’s philosophy 
114 
 
and return to the point from which my investigation first began. Against the continuist account, I 
show that far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in individuation seems to fade 
towards the end of his life. First, I will begin by making some textual observations on the topic 
of individuation in the Leibnizian corpus, which will then guide my questioning and argument.  
          The thematic index of the monumental Akademie Ausgabe detects two strands of strong 
frequency when it comes to the vocabulary of “individuation” in Leibniz’s works. The first is 
found in Leibniz’s early works, his 1663 (deeply Scholastic) bachelor’s thesis, Disputatio 
Metaphysica de Principio Individui and in a number of his other essays, including the De 
Transsubstantiatione (1668), Confessio philosophi (1672), and Meditatio de Principio Individui 
(1676), as well as the Discourse and the correspondence with Arnauld. The second is present in 
the late New Essays on Human Understanding.
265
 Over this period of time, Leibniz’s views 
about individuation twist and turn, over a host of disparate theses that go beyond his 1663 view 
of the “whole entity” (matter plus form) as the individuating principle, at times making 180 
degree shifts.    
          In addition to exploring whether the principle of individuation is internal or external to a 
substance, he also questions whether it amounts to some kind of haecceity or substantial form. 
Yet, surprisingly enough, such deep concerns about “individual” or “individuation” are entirely 
absent from the final draft of Leibniz’s 1714 “Monadology.” It turns out Leibniz had deleted 
“choses” and “individus” from a previous draft of article 9,266 which restated the identity of 
indiscernibles: 
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It is also necessary that each monad be different from each other. For there are never two 
beings [things; individuals – both deleted] in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in 
which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an 
intrinsic denomination.   
Even earlier, in the New Essays, Leibniz’s appeal to the problem of individuation seems more of 
a concession made to Locke’s discussion of identity in the Essay (1689), to the point that he 
almost claims that admitting the existence of two perfectly similar and indistinguishable 
individuals would altogether preclude a principle of individuation.
267
 Given Leibniz’s 
extensively documented concern for the topic of individuation, from his youth to the aftermath of 
the Discourse, what are the reasons for its near dismissal or disappearance from his late major 
works such as the New Essays, the Monadology, the Principles of Nature and Grace or even the 
correspondence with Clarke? With this question in mind, my goal here is two-fold. In order to 
fully grasp the significance of this change with respect to Leibniz’s views about substance and 
individuation, we need to 1) turn to the intellectual context of the Seventeenth-century and the 
living philosophical debate between Leibniz and his contemporaries (Descartes and Gérauld de 
Cordemoy) and 2) trace the fate of some of the early and middle period Leibnizian views on 
substance and the individual in his late works. 
          Thus, in the first section, I claim that the New System, published towards the end of 
Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, one 
that has to do with a deep terminological and ontological shift in Leibniz’s metaphysics of 
substance. There Leibniz elaborates on the concept of “simple substance”, the future synonym of 
“monad”268: no longer are substances characterized in terms related to individuation 
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(completeness, predicative complexity, etc.), but in terms of simplicity. The language of 
“individuation” is abandoned in favor of a language of “simplicity” and “unity” and it looks like 
the focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” (and 
truly “one”). I show that this shift was influenced by a confrontation on two levels: 1) a first, 
direct confrontation with Cartesian physics through the critique of Descartes’ notion of extension 
and his principle of individuation through shared motion 2) a second confrontation, with 
Cartesianism per se, apparent in Leibniz’s critique of Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-
metaphysical atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. Last, but 
not least, I argue that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to the formulation of a 
more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). 
          Finally, in the last section, I analyze the different treatment Leibniz applies to some of his 
early and mature views about individuation in his later works: most notably, the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles and the more general issue of the internality or externality of the 
individuating principle. Can individual accidents function as a principle of individuation for 
Leibniz? My initial chapter shows that Leibniz expressed one such view very early, in the 
Confessio philosophi of 1672-1673, in which he radically departed from the common Scholastic, 
internal individuating principle and identified haecceity as the principle of individuation 
consisting in the external spatio-temporal circumstances. I claim that despite its “apparent 
singularity”,269 early Leibniz’s adoption of an idiosyncratic, external (and thus non-Scholastic) 
principle of individuation, defined in terms of time and space, can neither be passed over, nor 
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merely relegated to an isolated episode. What happens to these relational, spatio-temporal criteria 
of individuation? I illustrate how this relational aspect of individuation is re-worked from the 
Discourse to the late works, being initially internalized in Leibniz’s theory of complete concepts 
and then entirely rejected once the problem of individuation itself becomes secondary. In the 
same way, the complete concept theory of the Discourse itself seems to become secondary for 
Leibniz. Examining his thought on individuation after the Discourse on Metaphysics will not 
only help establish why Leibniz’ interest in the topic seems to fade away, but it will also shed 
light on some of the reasons for which the argument for individuation based on the predicate-in-
notion principle and complete concepts becomes overshadowed in his later works. 
 
Seventeenth-century Views on Individuation: Leibniz’s Critique of Descartes and 
Cordemoy 
          Several historical aspects have to be fleshed out when discussing some of the most 
prominent Seventeenth-century philosophical views on individuation.  
          First, despite the prominence of controversies over individuation during the Middle Ages, 
the medieval influence on similar early modern debates cannot be overestimated. One cannot 
ignore that early modern philosophers like Descartes or Leibniz had a partial and almost always, 
second-hand knowledge of the philosophers and theologians of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth-
centuries such as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, or William of Ockham.
270
 While being a matter 
of intense controversy from Boethius to the end of the Middle Ages, the medieval problem of 
individuation – what explains the individuality of an individual – seems to have lost much of its 
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vigor in the early modern period. Yet, despite this lack of prominence given to discussions of 
individuation in Seventeenth-century philosophy, interest in the topic was revived by a powerful 
and multifaceted renewal of either Aristotelianism, or Thomism and Scotism. Only by turning to 
these Late Scholastic strands of thought, we can fully grasp the significance of the question for 
Descartes and Leibniz – to those authors that were commonly called the neo-scolastici, the 
liberal Jesuit (and mostly Spanish) Scholastics of the Counter-Reformation. Each discussion of 
individuation and its related issues has to go through an examination of the status quaestionis for 
this Second Scholastics. Thus, one should note that, in the philosophical context of the early 
Seventeenth-century, Late Scholastics were divided between Thomistic and Scotistic views on 
the principle of individuation, that is, between materia signata, a designated portion of matter, 
and an individuating form or soul as the principle of individuation.
271
 Still, the majority of early 
modern textbook authors argued against the Thomist position of quantified matter as the 
principle of individuation and instead opted for the Scotist line claiming an ultimate specific 
difference (hecceity) or individual form for each substance. It is this shift from matter to form 
that became highly influential in Seventeenth-century philosophy, a position mature Leibniz 
adopted at the time of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) after arduous attempts of re-
conceptualizing Scotus’ haecceitas, and, certainly, a view Descartes could come up with when 
needed, if the delicate political issue in question asked for it.
272
  
          Secondly, even though Late Scholasticism helped shape the early modern approach to 
individuation, with Descartes and Leibniz the story became much more complex than the well-
documented Late Scholastic influences let transpire. With the establishment of the new 
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mechanical philosophy, the relevance of metaphysical theses on the individuation of substances 
or physical bodies is judged upon and depends on the construction of a physical science or 
natural philosophy. While there is still much contention amongst scholars as to what would be a 
standard view of mechanical philosophy,
273
 Descartes and mature Leibniz were both staunch 
advocates of this new paradigm, embodied in the idea that every property of substance must be 
explained through its primary qualities: size, figure, and motion. Furthermore, despite unabated 
claims to the contrary from the Seventeenth century onwards (in Descartes’ case), or in present 
scholarship for Leibniz, both Cartesian and Leibnizian physics are consistently anti-atomist. It is 
doubtful whether from the perspective of classical, “physical atomism” or even the “chymical”, 
qualitative one contemporary to Descartes and Leibniz, the problem of individuation arises at all. 
If it does, it is unclear whether it solves any problems or just muddles the issue.
274
 One could 
assume, with a corpuscularian like Locke, that the mere existence of an infinity of atoms is the 
“principle of individuation.” But absolutely hard atoms distinguished from one another by 
interstitial voids cannot be properly called “individuals” precisely on account of their being 
conceived as multiplicities of perfectly similar or indiscernible simple entities.
275
 On the other 
hand, a look at the chymical atomism typical of the works of Daniel Sennert raises a somewhat 
similar issue concerning individuation. Endowing atoms with qualities and making them 
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substantial form-encasing minima, like Sennert does, would lead to an unnecessary 
multiplication of substantial forms rivaled only by Scholastic hylomorphism at its peak.
276
 
          Scholastic substantial forms were one of the philosophical idées reçues that were met with 
fierce opposition in the Seventeenth-century.
277
 Surely, there were a few “co-religionaries” of 
form
278
 (such as Sennert or Leibniz himself), but for major early modern philosophers, Descartes 
being the most categorical, substantial forms had to be rejected on account of their incoherence 
or superfluity. The most noteworthy consequence of almost entirely eliminating Scholastic 
substantial forms like Descartes did, or almost endlessly reinterpreting them like Leibniz, was 
that substantial unity and individuation became impending problems for both metaphysics and 
natural philosophy. 
          In defining the nature of corporeal substances, the basic furniture of the world, Descartes 
had to find a middle ground between two alternatives: one the one hand, the inheritance of 
Aristotelianism in Late Scholasticism, on the other hand, the theories of those contemporary 
novatores such as Sennert and Basso. Thus, by eliminating all substantial forms besides the 
human rational soul, Descartes had changed the role substantial form had in defining the essence 
of substances. The two different roles matter and form played in defining substances for 
hylomorphism fused together in the notion of extension: extension defines the essence of a 
substance while also constituting its matter.  Since extension takes up an essential role in 
defining both the formal and the material aspect of substances, what makes those substances 
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individual, given that traditionally, their individuation was ascribed to either matter, form, or the 
compound of the two?  
          Descartes seems to have held a couple of positions on individuation throughout his career. 
In the case of informed matter, he held a view very similar to the Seventeenth-century 
Scholastics with which he was familiar. Thus, with respect to the human body he accepted a 
Scotist view. For the human body, the principle of individuation is the only substantial form of 
the Scholastics he did not abolish, the human rational soul. In the case of non-informed matter or 
extended things, his view was that motion individuates bodies.  
          Descartes developed the first position on the principle of individuation in an attempt to 
philosophically explain the Catholic theory of transubstantiation. Seventeenth-century 
controversies on the Eucharist frequently hit upon the problem of explaining what exactly 
individuates either substances (Jesus Christ’s body, the Eucharistic species of wine and bread) or 
their accidents.
279
 In a letter to Mesland from 9 February 1645, Descartes gives a different 
account of individuation, one holding for both animate and inanimate bodies, as well as for the 
human body. With respect to the latter, its identity through changes is preserved due to its union 
with a soul. Bodies, Descartes claims, “[…] are numerically the same (eadem numero), only 
because they are informed by the same soul.”280 He illustrates this through the example of 
humans naturally converting (or “transubstantiating”) other matter by incorporating it or making 
it a part of their bodies, bodies that are themselves informed by a soul. Descartes similarly 
explains transubstantiation as the soul of Christ supernaturally informing the matter of the host 
upon consecration.
281
 But as Roger Ariew has carefully argued through an analysis of the early 
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Cartesian reception, the first option, Descartes’ “two-tiered” principle of individuation, was only 
available to a private circle until the publication of Descartes’ correspondence with Mesland in 
1811.
282
  
          Superficially, this lack of any traditional discussion of the topic of individuation in the 
works Descartes published during his lifetime might look like a dismissal of the problem 
altogether. Yet when Descartes does officially address the issue of individuation in articles 23 
and 25 of the Principles of Philosophy Part II, he gives a “physical” principle of individuation. 
Article 23 holds that: “[…] all the variety in matter, or all the diversity of its forms, depends on 
motion.”283 It is then article 25, “What motion is, properly speaking,” that claims bodies are 
individuated through their shared motion: 
Not looking to popular usage, but to the truth of the matter, let us consider what should 
be understood by motion according to the truth of the thing; we may say, in order to 
attribute a determinate nature to it, that it is the transference of one part of matter or one 
body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, and which 
are regarded as at rest, into the vicinity of others. By one body or by one part of matter I 
understand everything transported together, although it may be composed of many parts 
which in themselves have other motions.
284
 
Of course, in the second part of the Principia Philosophiae, matter is identified with quantity, 
quantity with substance, and substance with extension. Moreover, taken generally, as the essence 
of substance, extension constitutes the nature of all bodies; yet if we consider extension as a 
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mode, then it regards the determinate extension of one particular body, this book you are holding 
right now. Following the real distinction between the soul as a thinking substance and the body 
as an extended substance, Descartes held that the notion of extension is the main attribute 
through which we can know the body:  
But although any one attribute is sufficient to give us a knowledge of substance, there is 
always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and 
to which all other properties are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth, and depth 
constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of 
thinking substance. For all else that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, and 
is but a mode of an extended thing; as everything that we find in mind is but so many 
diverse forms of thinking.
285
 
As an ontological consequence, extension constitutes the substance of bodies. Moreover, 
epistemologically speaking, everything can be explained in terms of size, shape, and motion. 
Several difficulties persist. First of all, what accounts for the distinction between different parts 
of extension and is there genuine unity in bodies, since they are all made up of the same 
fundamental stuff?  Furthermore if motion introduces diversity in an otherwise uninformed, 
indeterminate extension, why do some individual bodies change shape in interaction with each 
other? As recent commentators have argued,
286
 the principle of individuation for extended things 
Descartes used in his physics encounters several difficulties, both “static” and “dynamic”. Due to 
the circularity or juxtaposition between the definition of “body” or “part” and “motion,” 
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Descartes’ principle seems incapable of explaining the distinction between bodies in close 
proximity, whether these bodies are moving or are at rest.  
          This difficulty at the core of Descartes’ physics is duly noted by some of the first 
Cartesians. Cartesian Atomist Gérauld de Cordemoy (1626-1684) notes the implications of 
Descartes’ definition of the essence of substance as extension for the physical individuation of 
bodies: if infinite, continuous extension constitutes the essence of substances,
287
 then there would 
be no room for the differentiation of things from one another or for their separation. He believes 
the errors of physics have arisen from an initial confusion of inadequately defining and 
distinguishing between the notions of body and matter. Thus, Cordemoy’s theory of matter is 
quite the opposite from that of Descartes. Bodies are extended substances and matter is an 
“assemblage of bodies:”  
It is known that there are bodies and that the number of bodies is almost infinite. It is also 
known that there is matter, but it seems that we do not have adequate definitions of the 
two, and from that have arisen almost all the errors in physics. […] Bodies are extended 
substances. […] each body is one and the same substance, it cannot be divided and its 
shape cannot change: this is called impenetrability. […] Matter is an assemblage of 
bodies. Each body, being a component of this assemblage is what we strictly call a part 
of matter. Several of these bodies together, separate from the other, is what we strictly 
call a portion of matter. […] one body cannot be divided, because it does not have parts; 
but since matter is an assemblage of bodies, it can be divided in as many parts as there 
are bodies.
288
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          Extended substance endowed with shape, body cannot lose its figure – otherwise it would 
stop being one substance. Cordemoy uses the distinction between matter as an assemblage of 
bodies and body as part of matter to ground the indivisibility of bodies. He also rejects 
Descartes’ indefinite divisibility of matter because it does not seem different from the infinite 
divisibility of matter.
289
 Using these new definitions and distinctions to construct a parallel 
critique of Descartes’ notion of infinite divisibility and of his concept of substance, Cordemoy 
identifies a stumbling-block at the core of Descartes’ principle of individuation through motion: 
I notice another disadvantage about the position of those who claim that matter itself is an 
extended substance: they cannot conceive of one body separately, without assuming 
motion, in such a way that according to their doctrine, one cannot conceive of a body at 
rest between other bodies. For supposing that this body touches the other bodies, this 
doctrine teaches that it should be the same body with them. However, it seems to me that 
we possess a clear and natural idea of a body that is perfectly at rest between other bodies 
that are not moving and that what I say about each body is absolutely compatible with 
this idea.
290
    
In Descartes’ plenist physics, motion is the only thing diversifying matter. Since the number of 
bodies is almost infinite, either everything is moving, or it is impossible to explain that there are 
bodies at rest. For Cordemoy this last option seems utterly inconceivable, since he claims we 
have a perfectly clear and distinct idea of a non-moving body among other bodies. Therefore a 
different principle of individuation is needed, one that would not transform motion in a uniquely 
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individualizing process. His solution is to redefine body as “one and the same substance,” 
indivisible, incapable of losing its shape, impenetrable, i.e., an atom.
291
 Through Cordemoy’s 
atomist drift, Descartes’ physics found a renovator capable of reforming its definitions of body 
and matter by stressing the need for “atomic” unity in order to account for individuation. In this 
way, body becomes a synonym of unity.  
          We have to keep in mind that Descartes was not the only Seventeenth-century philosopher 
to have argued for a “physical” principle of individuation based on shared motion. Article 25 of 
the Principia Secunda Pars found an immediate reception in Spinoza’s works. In a discussion of 
physical topics that occurs between Ethics IIP13 and IIP14 Spinoza explained the existence, 
persistence, and difference of an individual as a function of what he calls a “ratio of motion and 
rest” (ratio motus et quietis). Bodies, we find out at Lemma 1 of 13 “[…] are distinguished from 
one another in respect of motion-and-rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of 
substance” and the proof to lemma 3 of the same proposition merely repeats: “Bodies are 
individual things which are distinguished from one another in respect of motion-and-rest.” 
Nevertheless, leaving aside Spinoza’s direct endorsement of Descartes’ position with respect to 
“physical” individuation, Descartes’ position in the Principles of Philosophy still encountered 
strongly dissenting voices throughout the Seventeenth-century.  
          I now turn my attention to what I believe to be the strongest of these critical voices, since 
it represented a direct, negative reception that already underlined the difficulties related to both 
the static aspect of Cartesian individuation and the dynamic one. How did Leibniz see himself as 
developing, defending, extending, or correcting Descartes’ philosophy with respect to 
individuation? In what remains of this section I will show how Leibniz uses Cordemoy’s own 
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strategy addressing the issue of what individuates bodies at rest against Cordemoy’s own 
Cartesian atomism.
292
 Finally, I contend that Leibniz did not just push the critique of Cartesian 
physics even further by objecting to both Cartesian individuation and Cordemoy’s attempted 
reform, but more importantly, he also took a decisive step towards the “metaphysical atomism” 
of his late years.  
          In Chapter I, I analyzed Leibniz’s account of individuation in De transsubstantiatione 
(1668). In this theological context, young Leibniz defended a similar Scotist position on 
individuation to the one Descartes had revealed to Mesland: substances are individualized 
through the substantial form viewed as an active principle directly enacting a divine idea. More 
specifically, he asserts that bodies are not substances apart from a concurring mind because a 
substance is a being that “has a principle of action within itself” and “actiones sunt 
suppositorum.” Substance is union with a mind and bodies that lack reason are substances 
through a union with the universal mind or God. Transubstantiation thus involves the mind of 
Christ taking on the accidents (bread and wine) in the sacraments, substituting its special 
concourse for the general concourse of the divine mind. Thus the transubstantiated accidents 
would have numerically the same substantial form as Christ’s body. Since they would not be 
changed in any respect apart from the substantial form of the concurrent mind, they would retain 
and realize their accidents.
293
  
          Now, it looks as if though in 1668 Leibniz is simply extending Descartes’ view with 
respect to the individuation of the human body to all animate and inanimate bodies. Despite the 
striking similarities between the two positions, there is no textual proof that would allow us to 
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argue for a direct influence of Descartes’ letter on Leibniz’s views (once again, Descartes’ letters 
to Mesland were only published in the Nineteenth-century). This leads to a necessary inquest as 
to what was young Leibniz’s knowledge of the published Cartesian corpus before the Paris 
period (1672-1676). In a letter sent to Simon Foucher in 1675, Leibniz admitted how little he had 
read of Descartes in comparison to other seventeenth century novatores:  
I admit that I have not yet been able to read all his writings with all the care I had 
intended to bring to them, and my friends know, as it happened, I read almost all the new 
philosophers before reading him.
294
 
This shows that passages like the one in Theoria motus abstracti (1670-1671), in which Leibniz 
rejects the indefinite division of the continuum, saying that “[…] the indefinite of Descartes is 
not in the thing but in the thinker”,295 should not be taken as indicating an in-depth knowledge of 
Descartes’ Principia Philosophiae or the Cartesian corpus. One can also argue that the little 
knowledge Leibniz might have had of the Cartesian texts before going to Paris mainly concerned 
problems of general physics in Descartes’ Meteors (1637). The earliest evidence of Leibniz’s 
acquaintance with Cartesian “meteorology” is found in the correspondence with his mentor, 
Jakob Thomasius. In a letter written on 16/26 February 1666, Leibniz discussed the question 
raised by Thomasius as to why Anaxagoras spoke of the possibility of black snow. He discusses 
this paradox by using a corpuscular hypothesis based on Descartes “three elements” theory from 
the first Discours of the Meteors.
296
 Further proof can be found in a text dated August-September 
1669 entitled De rationibus motus, a preliminary note to the same Theoria motus abstracti. Here 
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Leibniz assimilates Descartes’ explanation of the solidity and cohesion of bodies in the first 
discourse of Les Météores
297
 with a Gassendian, atomist position:  
Est etiam contra ipsum Cartesium qui cohaesionum corporum ex ramositate 
subtilissimarum partium explicat, cum tamen corporum in statu primo et naturali 
consideratorum nulla sit ramositas, nulla cohaesio, nulla talis continuitatis.
298
  
Thus, Descartes’ conception of the firmness of mixed bodies would be identical with the 
“hooked” and “crooked” atoms of the ancients,299 a cohesion relying on the “ramified” structure 
of the most subtle parts of bodies. This conflation is surprising. If around 1669-1671, Leibniz 
had possessed a direct and detailed knowledge of Descartes’ Principles, he would have known 
about the latter’s classical proof against atomism from part two, article 20.300    
          In his early period Leibniz already held a notion of individuality comparable to Descartes’ 
yet much broader and remarkably original; what remains in question are Leibniz’s mature views 
and their relation with the one principle of individuation Descartes did make “public.” There is 
textual support for Leibniz’s acquaintance with Descartes’ Principles in some marginalia 
Leibniz wrote the Fall of 1675.
301
 Although some of the scattered notes do resound, in nuce, with 
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the criticism of Cartesian physics in the Discourse on Metaphysics,
302
 they neither specifically 
mention the incriminating article (25), nor refer to articles 54 to 63 in which Descartes explains 
his theory of matter and the cohesion of bodies.
303
  
          In a text from a few months later entitled Meditatio de Principio Individui (1 April 1676), 
Leibniz illustrates his more mature view on individuation beyond Descartes’ thesis of 
individuation through motion. There Leibniz gives the example of either two rectangles or two 
triangles coming together to produce two indistinguishable squares. He considers this a situation 
in which two different causes produce an effect that is so perfectly similar that not even an 
omniscient observer could distinguish one square from the other. Leibniz introduces the principle 
according to which the entire effect is equivalent to its full cause, “in such a way that whoever 
understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge of its cause.” This principle 
of equivalence between cause and effect leads Leibniz to claim that:  
[…] if we admit that two different things always differ in themselves in some respect as 
well, it follows that there is present in any matter something which retains the effect of 
what precedes it, namely a mind.
304
 
According to this important principle, matter is individuated or differentiated not through 
motion, but by its relation to a mind capable of preserving the memory or traces of its 
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production. Therefore, the principle of individuation has to be internal to a thing. I return to 
Leibniz’s important discovery from the Paris period because the example of two perfectly similar 
geometrical figures produced by different causes is repeated as late as 1685 in Leibniz’s Notes 
on Cordemoy’s Treatise On the Distinction between Body and Mind.305 This time the example is 
used in a critical argument against Cordemoy’s atomist solution to Descartes’ principle of 
individuation. Although he appreciates Cordemoy’s criticism of the static aspect of Cartesian 
individuation, Leibniz uses the same strategy the latter employed in criticizing Descartes against 
Cordemoy himself:  
These are difficulties for Cordemoy himself: let us suppose two triangular atoms come 
into contact and compose a perfect square, and that they rest next to each other in this 
way, and let there be another corporeal substance or atom, a square one equal to the other 
two. I ask, in what respect do these two extended things differ? Certainly no difference 
can be conceived in them as they are now, unless we suppose something in bodies 
besides extension; rather they are distinguished solely by memory of their former 
condition and there is nothing of this kind in bodies.
306
 
In Leibniz’s opinion, even though he rejected the indefinite division of body and the Cartesian 
identification between space and extension, Cordemoy’s Cartesian atomism is still unable to 
solve the inadequacies of Descartes’ theory of matter. He believes that although the French 
atomist had addressed a pertinent objection to the Cartesian individuation of bodies, he had not 
gone far enough in his solution. The step Cordemoy takes in resolving the inherent difficulties of 
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Descartes’ physics, his atomist drift, is only a half-step towards metaphysical atomism, towards 
solving the problem of the unity and individuality of bodies. 
          The notion of individuation Leibniz marshals in the Discourse on Metaphysics, written 
immediately following his notes on Cordemoy, is intended as a direct criticism not only of 
Descartes’ and Spinoza’s views on individuation through motion. Leibniz also explicitly attacks 
Cartesian physics (articles XVII and XVIII)
307
 by introducing the problem of the substantiality of 
bodies that are not the human body. At first, this problem remains ambiguous since it is not 
particularly clear how Leibniz’s discussion of substantial forms fits in with his theory of 
complete individual concepts. But Leibniz does add in an earlier draft “that if bodies are 
substances, it is not possible that their nature consists only in size, shape, and motion, but that 
something else is needed”, which seems to imply that the substantiality of bodies relies on their 
possessing an internal principle of unity or identity, in other words, a substantial form conceived 
on the model of the rational soul. The critique of Descartes’ theory of matter and its consequent 
principle of individuation takes place in two steps. First, articles XII and XVIII deny that the 
nature of body would consist or can be conceived uniquely in terms of extension: an analysis of 
the modes of extension must show their imaginary character relative to our perceptions. The 
relative aspect of motion and its incapacity of accurately individuating bodies are expressed 
through a consideration of what “motion contains precisely and formally.” Given that it is 
impossible to univocally attribute a subject of movement in changes of situation or place, motion 
is not entirely real. These are all claims Leibniz made prior to the Discourse about the relative 
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character of motion and extension or the fact that “[…] there are no precise shapes in the nature 
of things, and consequently no precise motions.”308  
 
“Astounding things which have not come into the mind of any Scholastic” or Cartesian: 
The Individual in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy (1686-1714) 
          In order to better evaluate the shift from a metaphysics of individual substances to one of 
formal atoms or simple substances, let me return to the “forgotten” Discourse illustrating 
Leibniz’s mature view about individuation. In his recent Leibniz monograph, Daniel Garber 
notes how:  
[…] while the claim that individual substances have complete individual concepts is one 
of the enduring theses of Leibniz’s philosophy […], the argument for it from the 
complete individual concept seems to drop out of his repertoire rather quickly, by the 
early or mid-1690s. When Leibniz first publishes his philosophical thoughts on body and 
substance in 1695 in the ‘‘Système nouveau’’ and in the ‘‘Specimen dynamicum,’’ the 
argument of ‘Discours’ § 8 from the Predicate-in-Notion principle and the Complete 
Individual Concept seem to play no role in any of the arguments.
309
  
In paragraph 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz appeals to an explanation of individual 
substance in order to distinguish the actions of God from those of creatures. From the beginning, 
the logical and ontological requirements a subject has to meet in order to be recognized as an 
individual substance are disseminated through a search for a general principle of individuation, 
one that would hold for all created substances. In 1686, his conception of individuation marks 
the revival of the Aristotelian concept of primary substance through the reinterpretation of the 
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Thomistic angelic principle of individuation as species infima. The individual for Leibniz 
corresponds to the Scholastic last species he had declined to discuss in his 1663 Disputatio. No 
longer individuated by the totality of matter plus form belonging to the complete entity of a 
given being, substances are instead individuated by the multitude of accidents befalling an 
individual. The principle of individuation also entails the identity of indiscernibles. Each 
individual is, in itself, its own last species – not an exemplar of a specific essence, but a unique 
one with all its accidents. Leibniz’ main original claim is that a complete concept corresponds to 
this individual essence or last species.  
          In the Discourse, God chooses the perfect world, one made up of individuals with actions 
and passions (DM § 8). Since God created subjects, individuals like Alexander, Darius, or Porus, 
he also sees their individual notion or haecceity. In their individual notion or haecceity God sees 
“[…] the basis and reason for all the predicates that can be said truly of him, for example, that he 
vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (and not by experience) whether he died a 
natural death or whether he was poisoned, something we can know only through history” (DM § 
8). From this concept of an individual notion, Leibniz derives a couple of “notable paradoxes.” 
First, that “[…] every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the whole 
universe” (DM § 9) and, secondly, that there can be no such thing as two perfectly similar 
individuals, given that two substances cannot differ only in number. He also claims that his view 
is: “[…] what Saint Thomas asserts on this point about angels or intelligences (that here every 
individual is a lowest species [quod ibi omne individuum sit species infima]) is true of all 
substances” (DM § 9).310 Against claims of continuity with regard to Leibniz’s views on 
substance and the individual, I proved how the position on individuation in the Discourse was 
actually a combination of two traditional and one original concept: Thomas’ species infima, a 
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Scotist haecceity, and the complete concept view of substance. I also showed that the views 
represented by Leibniz’s three concepts were all rejected in 1663, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Moreover, less than ten years later after the Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui, in the 
Confessio philosophi (1672-1673) Leibniz radically breaks with Scholasticism by adopting an 
external principle of individuation. To illustrate these “[…] astounding things, which, I believe, 
have not come into the mind of any Scholastic even in a dream,” Leibniz uses the case of two 
perfectly similar and indistinguishable eggs. How would one mark the difference between them? 
Leibniz responds: 
At least they differ in this: that one is this one, the other, that one, that is, they differ in 
haecceity, or because they are one thing and another thing, i.e., because they differ 
numerically. But what do we mean when we count, that is, when we say this (for to 
count is to repeat this). What is this? What is it to determine something? What is it 
except the perception of time and place, i.e., of motion either, on the one hand, of a 
given thing in relation to us or to a thing already determined, or, on the other hand, of 
our own movement (e.g., the motion of our hand or the finger by which we point), or 
the motion of some already determined thing, like a stick, in order to point to a given 
thing? There you have it, what may amaze you, the principle of individuation, outside 
the thing itself. For between these eggs no difference can be assigned either by an angel 
or, I have the audacity to say, by God (given the hypothesis of the greatest similarity 
possible) other than that at the present time this one is at place A, and that one is at 
place B.
311
 
I wish to underscore that these seemingly disparate notions can be found together elsewhere in 
Leibniz’s writings in the 1680s. First offering a detailed account of the complete concept theory, 
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and then connecting it with both the principle of individuation and the notion of a species infima, 
Leibniz argues in the Notationes Generales (Summer 1683-1685?) that singular things are 
ultimate species. There can never be two singular things similar in every respect and the 
principle of individuation is always a specific difference. He adds that this is what Saint Thomas 
said of intelligences, but applied to all individuals. He again considers the example of two eggs 
and asserts that one should be able to say of one egg something that cannot be said of the other; 
otherwise, they could be substituted for each other and there would be no reason not to say that 
we are dealing with one and the same thing: 
Hinc porro sequitur Singularia esse revera species infimas, neque umquam dari posse duo 
singularia per omnia similia et proinde principium individuationis semper esse 
differentiam aliquam Specificam, quod S. Thomas ajebat de intelligentiis, sed idem est 
verum de individuis quibuscunque [. . .] exempli causa duo ova, necesse est enim aliqua 
de uno dici posse quæ de altero dici non possint, alioqui substitui sibi mutuo possint, nec 
ratio erit cur ita non potius dicantur esse unum et idem.
312
 
 There is a clear difference between this text and the Confessio. By this time Leibniz had 
established a relational theory of space and the example of two perfectly similar eggs is now 
relegated to the status of a logical impossibility. Without any qualitative difference between them 
the eggs would be not two, but one and the same egg. Now the question is what happened with 
the “perceptions of time and space” from the Confessio in Leibniz’s mature works? Did spatio-
temporal criteria become insufficient for individuation in the 1680’s? Yes and no.  
          The account of complete individual concepts in the Discourse proposes that the complete 
concept of Peter or John “[…] contains the entire sequence of ordinary and extraordinary graces 
and all the rest of these events with their circumstances” (art. 31) and that the concept of an 
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individual substance also “[…] contains all its events with all their circumstances.”313 Despite its 
vagueness, I find this notion of “circumstances” to be very similar to what Leibniz had in mind 
in the Confessio philosophi, text in which he notes that souls “[…] are also subjected from the 
beginning to these circumstances of time and place (from which the entire series of life, death, 
and salvation, or damnation arises).”314 Similar claims found in texts contemporary to the 
Discourse can help clarify the relation between the aforesaid “circumstances” and complete 
concepts. In July 1686, Leibniz writes to Arnauld that “[…] the concepts of individual 
substances, which are complete and suffice to distinguish them completely […] enclose 
contingent truths or truths of fact, and individual circumstances of time and place, etc. 
[…]”315and a few years later he claims there are both “intelligible” and “perceptual” differences 
between substances, defining individuals as haecceities: “[…] where there is space and time.”316 
Notice the significant change around the time of the Discourse with regard to the Confessio: 
things are no longer individuated extrinsically, by means of time and space alone. In the 
Discourse, Leibniz adopts an internal principle of individuation in accordance to which complete 
concepts individuate the substances corresponding to them, because circumstances of place and 
time as external individuating criteria are now internalized and contained in their concepts. Take 
the case of Adam, for example. All posterity is implicit in the first man’s concept: all its events 
and all its circumstances. Since “[…] the concept of an individual substance includes all its 
events and all its denominations, even those which are commonly call extrinsic,”317 those which 
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pertain to it in virtue of the principle of individuation being also the principle of conjuratio 
rerum generalem.
318
 One can therefore point to various instances in which Leibniz, at the time of 
the Discourse on Metaphysics, internalizes the spatio-temporal individuating criteria of the 
Confession of a philosopher.    
          If the Confessio and the Discourse showed Leibniz championing revised Scholastic 
notions about individuation (haecceitas, species infima) and including the idiosyncratic external 
principle of individuation in his mature complete concept theory, his late works will not be as 
positive about these Scholastic remnants or the status given to spatio-temporal circumstances and 
complete concepts. Putting a negative twist on the “notable paradox” that two things cannot be 
perfectly similar, the late Leibniz will say:  
The vulgar philosophers were mistaken when they believed that there are two things 
different in number alone, or only because they are two, and from this error have arisen 
their perplexities about what they called the principle of individuation.
319
  
One can see this almost dismissive attitude at work in Leibniz’s answer to the issue of 
individuation in the confrontation with Locke and the revival of the problematic of individuality 
and singularity in the New Essays. Leibniz echoes a passage in which the principle of 
individuation is said to be something of concern merely in the schools, “[…] where they torment 
themselves so much in seeking to understand what it is.” In his response he asserts:  
The principle of individuation for individuals reduces to the principle of distinction. [...] 
If two individuals were perfectly similar and equal and (in a word) indistinguishable in 
themselves, there would be no principle of individuation.
320
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What caused this shift in Leibniz’s thought and why does the problem of individuation seem to 
have lost its central role in his late works? My answer is that the middle-years doctrine of 
individual substance is only preserved to a certain extent in his late works, since the concept of 
simple substance (or monad) Leibniz began to develop in the New System partially modified the 
foundations of his metaphysics of substance.  
          The first step in this direction is taken immediately after the Discourse in his 
correspondence with Arnauld. In continuity with the discussion of substantial forms based on 
articles X-XIII of the Discourse, the second part of Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld shifts 
focus from a concern with the doctrine of individual substance and its complete notion, to 
problems relating to the “physical” individuation of corporeal substances and their unity.321 Now, 
it might well have been Leibniz’s increasing awareness of the Spinozist and necessitarian 
implications of his complete concept theory
322
 that drove him to drop the argument from 
Discourse 8, but the fact is, when Leibniz makes public his New System of Nature and the 
Communication of Substances (1695) he first references the epistolary exchange with Arnauld, 
while the Discourse seems completely forgotten. This omission of the Discourse on Metaphysics 
and the reference to the correspondence with the French theologian is not a mere coincidence.  
          Writing to Arnauld in 30 April 1687, Leibniz claims that multitude cannot have its reality 
from points, as if points composed the physical or mathematical continuum. Ontological reality 
is given only by authentic, true unities, unities he characterizes as formal atoms, thus 
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rehabilitating the substantial forms he had rejected in the 1670’s.323 In 1695, in the New System 
of Nature and Communication of Substances, Leibniz returns to this idea of true unities adding 
important corrections. The announcement of the rehabilitation of substantial forms made to 
Arnauld is revised by putting forward an account of unities, points, and atoms. This time, the 
reality of multitudes (bodies, composites, corporeal substances) is given by the true unities, 
which Leibniz is careful in distinguishing not just from points in general, but from mathematical 
points in particular.
324
 When considering real unities one must necessarily appeal to animated, 
real points or atoms of substance, for substantial atoms contain something formal or active in 
order to be able to account for a complete being. Michel Fichant has persuasively argued that by 
1695 Leibniz’s search for the unity necessary in accounting for multiplicity follows the model of 
the Euclidean constitution of integer numbers.
325
 Leibniz looks for the arithmetical unity of true 
substantial unities or real unities. True substantial unities because, as opposed to numerical unity, 
they are completely devoid of parts, while the number one for example, is always divisible into 
fractions. These Leibnizian indivisibles are thought of “etymologically” as atoms: neither the 
atoms of Democritean or Epicurean atomism, which have a contradictory concept since matter is 
infinitely divisible, nor the atoms of Gassendi, which are not mathematical points and possess 
parts, but the atoms of substance or, as Leibniz calls them, formal atoms. The absence of parts is 
also the main characteristic of Euclidean geometrical points, different from physical, atomic 
points.
326
 Therefore, substances are not characterized as anything proximate to exact, physical, or 
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mathematical points, as was the case for the point-like nature of the flower of substance. 
Substances are real, geometrical points, i.e. metaphysical points.  
          Moreover, this meditation on true unity and the atoms of substance in the New System 
(1695) becomes the context for Leibniz’s development of a discussion of unity in the late 
correspondence with Jesuit Bartholomew des Bosses. Continuing the direction of the New 
System, Leibniz’s 11 March 1706 letter to Des Bosses starts by discussing the distinction 
between formal unity and material unity: 
Numbers, unities, and fractions have the nature of relations. And to that extent they can in 
some way be called “beings.” A fraction of a unity is no less one being than the unity 
itself. And it should not be thought that a formal unity is an aggregate of fractions, for its 
notion is simple, applicable to both divisibles and indivisibles, and there is no such thing 
as a fraction of indivisibles. Yet a material unity, that is, one actually effected (but 
considered in general), is, according to mathematicians, composed of two halves when 
their subject is able to contain them, just as ½+½=1, or, for example, the value of a 
groschen is an aggregate of the values of two halfgroschen. However, I was speaking of 
substances. A fraction of an animal, or a half-animal, therefore, is not one being per se, 
since this can be understood only of the body of the animal, which is not one being per se 
but an aggregate, and has an arithmetical unity and not a metaphysical unity.
327
 
The first type of unity characterizes substances. The fraction of an animal or the half of an 
animal Leibniz had in mind while, for instance, giving the example of a sectioned insect earlier 
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on in the correspondence with Arnauld, is not a real unity or being through itself. The sectioned 
part of an insect can only be understood through the body of an animal, that is, as an aggregate 
possessing arithmetical unity – not the metaphysical unity of an atom of substance. The case and 
point made in Leibniz’s letter regards the incorruptibility and indestructibility of the soul and the 
animal. At the time of the correspondence with Des Bosses, Leibniz had already set up the 
hierarchical system composed of soul, animal, and organic body predating the simple substances 
of the Monadology. In this context, the hypothesis of a point-like soul central to his earlier 
“flower of substance” theory bears a limited relevance. It functions as a tool for explaining the 
indestructibility of those simpler, lower machines of nature that end up composing, as “bugs in 
bugs,”328 – superior monadic aggregates. Thus, Leibniz argues, animated machines and machines 
of nature in general are indestructible. Each sensitive soul or animal soul is localizable in its 
body, like a “point” in a drop of water – a point that subsists in a part of this drop when it 
reduces or divides its volume. This way, at death, the soul stays where it was, in a part of the 
body as reduced as it may be. There is an infinity of organs enfolded into each other in the body 
of an animal and the lower souls and animals cannot be destroyed, although they can be 
diminished or concealed so that their life does not appear to us. 
          Since there is no mention of complete concepts in the New System, the text marks an 
important landmark in Leibniz’s philosophical evolution, one that has to do with a terminological 
as well an ontological shift regarding his views about substance and individuation. For the first 
time, Lebniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance”, the future synonym of “monad.”329 
No longer are substances characterized in terms related to individuation, such as completeness or 
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predicative complexity, but in terms connected to unity and simplicity. The language of 
“individuation” is abandoned in favor of a language of “simplicity” and “unity” and the focus 
changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” (and truly 
“one”). This might explain why there are few traces of the conceptual predication theory that 
previously grounded the individuality of substances in both the Monadology and the Principles 
of nature and Grace. What about the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and spatio-
temporal circumstances as extrinsic denominations?  
          Both these issues reappear in a text written right after the New System, marking Leibniz’s 
first use of the term “monad” in his published writings. Albeit indirectly, in On Nature Itself 
(1698), Leibniz once again addresses the question of individuation, in the context of delivering 
his sharpest critique of Descartes’ only official principle of individuation, from article 25, the 
second part of the Principles of Philosophy. Focusing on the dynamic aspect of Descartes’ 
conception of individuation, this critique claims that Cartesian bodies in motion would be just as 
indistinguishable or hard to individuate as contiguous bodies at rest. Leibniz pushes Cordemoy’s 
critique even further and notes how, given the perfect uniformity of matter in a Cartesian 
plenum, extension and motion alone are not sufficient to individuate bodies:  
For if no portion of matter whatsoever were to differ from equal and congruent portions 
of matter […], if one momentary state were to differ from another in virtue of the 
transposition of equal and interchangeable portions of matter that agree in every way, 
then […] it obviously follows that in the corporeal world there can be no way of 
distinguishing different momentary states from one another.
330
 
Consequently, there must be intrinsic differences among bodies besides those resulting from 
motion, since motion with all it involves (shape, spatial situation or temporal duration) only 
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bestows an extrinsic denomination on those bodies. Leibniz critiques the dynamic aspect of 
Descartes’ conception of individuation because, he claims, Cartesian bodies in motion would be 
as indistinguishable or hard to individuate as contiguous bodies at rest. He notes that, under the 
Cartesian assumption of a perfectly homogenous extended matter, “[…] one cannot in any way 
distinguish one place from another, or one bit of matter from another bit of matter in the same 
place.” Furthemore, appealing to shape or impenetrability like Cordemoy does, is also 
insufficient:   
For in a mass that is perfectly homogeneous, undivided, and full, no shape, that is, no 
boundary or distinction between its different parts arises, unless through motion itself. 
But if motion contains no mark for distinguishing things from one another, then it 
likewise bestows no mark with respect to shape. And since everything substituted for 
something prior would be perfectly equivalent, no observer, not even an omniscient one, 
would detect even the slightest indication of change. And thus, everything would be just 
as if there were no change or discrimination in bodies, nor could we ever explain the 
different appearances we sense.
331
  
It looks as if, around the 1700s, “the perception of time and place, of motion” from the Confessio 
is no longer sufficient as a principle of distinction or individuation for bodies. But in general, 
around this time, spatial and temporal differences are devaluated as adequate criteria of 
individuation and discernability. Even the ever present example of the two perfectly similar eggs 
will be depreciated or reworked, regressing to the limited and confused character of our 
perceptions. As Leibniz remarks in the same argument of De Ipsa Natura, since motion 
“contains no mark for distinguishing things from one another,” if we were to imagine two 
perfectly similar and concentric spheres, one enclosed in the other without any gaps and 
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revolving around its axis or being at rest, “not even an angel could find any difference between 
its states at different times,” between motion and rest. Indiscernability is a constant aspect of 
human condition since “we lack both a gap and a criterion of distinction” and Leibniz goes on to 
formulate his “new and most important axiom” that “nowhere are there two things perfectly 
alike.” He further adds that “[…] there are neither corpuscles of maximal hardness, nor a fluid of 
maximal thinness, nor a subtle matter universally diffused, nor ultimate elements which certain 
people call by the names 'primary' and 'secondary,'” such theoretical concepts being alien to the 
true order and nature of things.  
          Both Garber
332
 and Des Chene
333
 have analyzed the argument from De Ipsa Natura 
extensively. Here I call attention to different aspects of Leibniz’s critique of the Cartesian 
position on both body and what individuates bodies in the world. At the end of his analysis, 
Garber concludes that:  
[…] it would seem, motion can be used to individuate bodies only if there is some way of 
re-identifying bits of material substance across time, and this can only happen, Leibniz 
argues, if there is something in body over and above extension. 
Even though I agree that continuity through time is much more central to Leibniz’s metaphysical 
concerns than to Descartes’,334 I wish to underscore the temporal aspect of his critique of 
Cartesian individuation one more time. This temporal aspect once again leads back to the 
“important principle” stated in the Meditatio of 1676. Leibniz’s critique of extension is deeply 
concerned with temporality because extension is regarded not as a constituent element of things, 
but the diffusion, extending of one thing. He is convinced there is a central difficulty in 
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Descartes, in conceiving of the relationship between substance (to which extension is an 
attribute) and duration (which is but a mode). Extension cannot account for the true nature of 
substance since it is temporally bound to the present and merely sequential. Instead, it only 
reflects a precise moment in the successive state of things, a sequence in the development of 
phenomena. Therefore, it cannot account for all present and future states or developments of a 
substance, like a mind, soul, or simple substance would. This is where the need for the 
internalization of spatio-temporal individuating accidents (Confessio philosophi) and something 
of a mind-like nature, endowed with memory and a history, emerges. This temporal aspect of 
substances will be fulfilled by the concept of force: derivative force both is and expresses the 
present state of a substance. 
          Secondly, it is unquestionable that Leibniz’s critical arguments against motion and shape 
in Cartesian physics are meant to cut through the core of both Descartes and his followers’ 
conceptions of body and substance. I ended last section with a text from 1683 entitled Wonders 
Concerning the Nature of Corporeal Substances, in which Leibniz holds that “there are no 
precise shapes in bodies, and as a consequence no precise motions.”335 Similar claims can be 
found throughout Leibniz’s works from the early 1680’s onwards.336 In a 1687 letter to Arnauld, 
Leibniz states that: 
[…] shape itself, which is of the essence of finite extended mass, is never exact and 
specific in nature, because of the actual division ad infinitum of the parts of matter. There 
is never a shape without inequalities, not a straight line without curves intermingled, nor 
a curve of a certain finite nature unmixed with some other, […], with the result that 
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 G II, 77; A&G, 80: “And indeed it can be said that because of the actual subdivision of the parts, there 
is no definite and precise shape in bodies. As a result, bodies would doubtless only be imaginary and 
apparent, if there were only matter and its modifications.” 
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shape, far from being constitutive of bodies, is not even a wholly real and specific quality 
outside of thought, and one will never be able to fix upon a certain precise surface in a 
body as one might be able to do if there were atoms.
337
 
Here Leibniz seems to reject another Cartesian mode of extension as being unreal. Yet, whereas 
the passage to which I referred earlier directly attacked Descartes’ view of matter, in this case 
Leibniz is clearly addressing Cordemoy’s atoms. The entire foundation of the Cartesian’s 
argument for atomism was built on the premise that there are actually precise shapes in bodies or 
atoms: this is what endows them with impenetrability, and consequently unity. Furthermore, as 
we recall, in article 53 of Principia I, Descartes asserted that everything in bodies can be 
explained through their main attributes: size, shape, and motion. The modes of bodies are also 
interdependent: shape derives from motion, in the same way that movement depends on 
determinate bodies existing. By arguing there are no precise shapes in nature, Leibniz delivers a 
devastating blow to Cartesian metaphysics and its aftermath, leaving open the possibility that 
other modes of extension are also unreal.  
          I began this section with a different question in mind, what was the aftermath of Leibniz’s 
own, idiosyncratic principle of individuation from 1672-1673 and how did this influence his 
mature conception of individuation? Other corollaries of the complete concept theory are also 
rejected in Leibniz’s late works, including the principle according to which every extrinsic 
denomination or relational property (i.e. space, time) has its foundation in an intrinsic 
determination.
338
 Once again, the consequence is that spatial and temporal differences are 
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equating “last species” with the singular beings corresponding to each complete concept. Since the human 
mind cannot explain the notion of individual, there are no infimae species amongst complete entities: only 
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relegated to the status of improper criteria of individuation and discernability. One can see the 
last of these assumptions at work in Leibniz’s answer to the issue of individuation in his 
confrontation with Locke and the revival of the problematic of individuality and singularity in 
the New Essays. Leibniz echoes a passage in which the principle of individuation is said to be 
something of concern merely in the schools, “where they torment themselves so much in seeking 
to understand what it is.” The much inquired after principle of individuation, Locke claims in the 
2
nd
 Book of the Essay, consists in existence itself, determining “beings of any sort to a particular 
time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.”339 It is impossible for two 
things of the same species to exist in the same time at the same place. Therefore, the identity of a 
thing – it being the same – simply refers to the thing being at this place and at this time. Now, 
this Lockean position resembles Leibniz’s own “astounding” principle of individuation in the 
Confession of a Philosopher so closely that, in his response, Leibniz adopts the completely 
opposite view from the Discourse and rejects the external, spatio-temporal individuating criteria 
he had formerly internalized in complete concepts: 
In addition to the difference of time or of place there must always be an internal 
principle of distinction, and even though there can be many things of the same kind, it is 
still the case that none of them are ever perfectly similar. Thus, although time and place 
(i. e. the relations to what lies outside) do distinguish for us things which we could not 
easily tell apart by reference to themselves alone, things are nevertheless distinguishable 
in themselves. So time and place do not constitute the core of identity and diversity, 
despite the fact that diversity in time or place brings with it differences in the states that 
                                                                                                                                                             
media) – a claim that in itself relapses to the Scholastic individuum est ineffabile informed by the 
Aristotelian tradition of the Analytics. 
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are impressed upon a thing, and thus goes hand in hand with diversity of things. To 
which it can be added that it is by means of things that we must distinguish one time or 
place from another, rather than vice versa; for times and places are in themselves 
perfectly alike, and in any case they are not substances or complete realities.
340
 
Extrinsic denominations such as time and space are merely relational – abstract and uniform 
things similar to mathematical entities. Different times and different places can only be 
distinguished by and through things or substances. In comparison to earlier texts such as the 
Notationes Generales, the New Essays claim that the difference between human souls is not a 
specific difference. If an individual substance, soul or body, were to differ from another, the 
ground for this distinction must rely on the intrinsic properties of substances. In a word:  
The principle of individuation for individuals reduces to the principle of distinction I just 
mentioned. [...] If two individuals were perfectly similar and equal and (in a word) 
indistinguishable in themselves, there would be no principle of individuation.
341
  
This time, if one were to admit indiscernability as a real possibility, there would be no need for a 
principle of individuation. But no existing thing is perfectly similar to another, for there is 
always an internal quality distinguishing them. Individuals can neither be discriminated through 
abstract concepts such as existence, nor would extensional criteria (space and time) suffice for 
what distinguishes each individual in itself. Here there is no complete notion that would entail 
the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, but Leibniz still maintains that the principle of 
individuation has to be internal to a thing. As a result of Leibniz’s critique of Cartesian 
metaphysics and atomism, the spatio-temporal criteria are relegated to a status of insufficiency as 
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individuating properties and one can see the full significance of the absent reference to 
individuation that started off this chapter in a text contemporary to Leibniz’s Monadology.  
          In his Fifth Paper to Clarke, Leibniz once again shifts from his earlier position on 
indiscernability in the Notationes. While denying the existence of such indiscernabilia as two 
perfectly similar drops of water, or two eggs, or leaves, he does not deny that they are at least 
theoretically possible. If two perfectly indiscernible things did exist, they would be two and not 
one and the same thing – although this is contrary to divine wisdom and violates the principle of 
sufficient reason. Furthermore, Leibniz puts a negative twist on the “notable paradox” that two 
things cannot be perfectly similar to each other and concludes that:  
The vulgar philosophers were mistaken when they believed that there are two things 
different in number alone, or only because they are two, and from this error have arisen 
their perplexities about what they called the principle of individuation.
342
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CONCLUSION 
 
          I have briefly traced Leibniz’s complex and evolving views on individuation and atomism 
from pre-1686 to his late works. I do not believe Leibniz has a “system,” a well-established set 
of metaphysical doctrines until his middle-years. He frames hypotheses, flirts with atomism, and 
at times embraces positions on individuation as distinct and idiosyncratic as possible. Regarding 
individuation, I can say without equivocation that the only constancy during these years is 
Leibniz’s willingness to change his mind completely about a host of issues, as he works through 
various problems of disparate provenance and adjusts his thinking accordingly, using one result 
in one domain against another in another domain and then reversing himself, repeating the 
process. Although Late scholasticism had provided a number of resources for dispelling concerns 
about the principle of individuation, much of the metaphysics of the scholastics was rejected 
during the Seventeenth-century. Descartes’ elimination of scholastic substantial forms or their 
almost constant reinterpretation in Leibniz’s philosophy had the noteworthy consequence of 
making substantial unity and individuation become impending problems for both metaphysics as 
well as physics. Thus, leaving aside previous influences, early modern philosophers had to either 
amend scholastic hylomorphism in order to match their new systems or propose a range of 
innovative alternatives that would bypass the inherent stumbling blocks of an Aristotelian 
ontology, likely via atomism or materialism. Leibniz, I claim, offers a complex response to this 
set of problems and his solution changes a number of times throughout his career, involving a 
unique combination or reinterpretation of components from the history of philosophical thinking 
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about individuation, unity, or simplicity. In each chapter I try to reconstruct these concerns as 
minutely as possible, by examining the discontinuities and modifications he makes to his views, 
as he tackles issues about body, motion, and substantial form within diverse philosophical, 
physical, metaphysical, and theological contexts.  
          In the first chapter, my genetic story starts with an examination of Leibniz’s first thought 
on individuation. I prove that by the end of his middle period, Leibniz weaves together three 
traditionally distinct and conflicting strategies about individuation. For the first strategy, he 
reinterprets the Thomist principle of individuation of specifically different angelic beings to hold 
for all substances. The second strategy is that of the Scotists. Leibniz transforms haecceities into 
qualitative internal properties, even though before he had made them into external space-time 
circumstances (Confessio philosophi 1672-1673). The final strategy, Leibniz’s own twist, is the 
individuation of substances through their complete notions or concepts: the multitude of 
accidents befalling individuals. The extrinsic, spatio-temporal aspect of individuation is now 
internalized in Leibniz’s doctrine of complete concepts. I complete the full circle in the last 
chapter by showing how a couple of relational aspects of individuation such as indiscernibility 
and time-space circumstances were constantly re-worked at the time of the Discourse and 
beyond, first internalized in Leibniz’s theory of complete concepts and then dismissed in his late 
texts, once the problem of individuation itself became secondary. Albeit in different forms, those 
“astounding things which have not come into the mind of any Scholastic or Cartesian” were still 
on Leibniz’ mind as he developed a metaphysics denying indiscernibles that would eventually 
modify his theory of substance. Things which have not come into the mind of any Cartesian, 
because in the same chapter, I show how Cordemoy’s criticism of the static aspect of Descartes’ 
official principle of individuation is developed by Leibniz in a criticism of both Cordemoy and 
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Cartesianism itself. Furthermore, this reception and Leibniz’s own attempts at a principle of 
individuation all develop in a context in which Descartes’ “two-tiered” principle of individuation 
was unknown. The inherent difficulties of the only-known Cartesian individuation principle have 
managed to originate two of the most interesting and original Seventeenth-century philosophical 
doctrines: a quasi-metaphysical atomism in the work of Cordemoy and a metaphysical atomism 
in Leibniz. And through Cordemoy’s original version of a corpuscular theory of matter, I 
reconnect with the atomism Leibniz himself is supposed to have toyed with during his early 
years. It is here, I believe, that atomism and individuation interlace for Leibniz. He is able to 
recognize that the explanation of cohesion for both microscopical and macroscopical bodies is 
one of the great stumbling blocks for atomism and at the same time dismiss the Cartesian 
individuation in terms of the composite motion of the parts of bodies. If physical bodies are 
individuated as a specific aggregate of material particles, the problem faced is cohesion 
(atomism). If, on the other hand, bodies are individuated by a sized, shaped portion of extended 
matter in motion (Cartesianism), distinction and (in)discernibility must be taken into account.  
           In Chapter II, I disentangle the strands of atomism and individuation through an analysis 
of Leibniz formative stance against atomism in the Confessio Naturae contra Atheistas (1669) 
and his changing views about substantial forms in the correspondence with Jakob Thomasius. I 
prove that he adopted an Aristotelian position against the atomist explanation of bodily cohesion, 
rejected contemporary minima naturalia doctrines on account of their views of substantial forms, 
and conclude by reconfiguring his idiosyncratic accounts of form from 1668-1671. In continuity 
with these conclusions, in the next chapter, I tackle secondary literature’s claims of a Leibnizian 
commitment to atomism between 1666 and 1676 from several angles: 1) Leibniz did not deem 
any of the “atomist” workshop drafts in De Summa Rerum worth publishing; 2) based on several 
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accounts of his intellectual formation, it is difficult to identify texts in which he supported both 
atomism and the void; 3) there is a continuity between early Leibniz’s anti-atomist objections 
and mature arguments against atomism (including his claim that atomism results from a 
misguided over-reliance on imagination), 4) through an analysis of his early reception of 
Gassendi, it appears the French atomist is nothing more than a handy influence. Finally, in the 
last section of this chapter, I discuss early Leibniz’s doctrine of the “flower of substance” as a 
specific alternative to Scholastic hylomorphism and properly re-contextualize it in relationship to 
Seventeenth-century “chymistry” and semina rerum theories (Athanasius Kircher, Joseph Du 
Chesne, and Kenelm Digby’s views about palingenesis). Against continuity claims (Leibniz’s 
flos substantiae as proto-monad), I uncover how this doctrine together with its related hypotheses 
(“punctual soul,” “Luz of the Rabbis”) was actually abandoned once Leibniz developed a clearly 
defined ontology, based on the unity of (simple) substances.         
          Finally, after all these trials and testing (internal/external principle of individuation, 
complete concepts, “bubbles,” “flowers of substance,” etc.), Leibniz elaborates the concept of 
“simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” and the problem of individuation as well as 
the problem of cohesion of his early and middle years (1663-1686) become secondary. Leibniz 
has to come up with some notion of unity and/or simplicity over the unity and simplicity of 
Cordemoy’s semi-metaphysical atomism. By ultimately switching from a metaphysics of 
individual substances to simple substances, formal atoms, or monads, Leibniz aims at giving a 
foundational account of being and constructing a more fundamental ontology that would 
encompass what he perceived as constitutive flaws inherent in the philosophical doctrines of his 
atomist or Cartesian contemporaries. 
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          Thus, I hope to at least have partially achieved my initial goal of illuminating 
underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works, therefore offering 
a clearer understanding of his philosophy as a whole. I firmly believe that more can be done and 
my aim for the future is to expand this study into a book project that would thematically redefine 
and chronologically extend the scope of my doctoral research. 
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